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OORODUCTION 
Private antitrust enforcement is riven by a tension between pub-
lic enforcement goals and the self-interested agendas of private en-
forcers. The antitrust st.atutes give private antitrust enforcers 
powerful weapons, attesting to the public importance of competi-
tion goals, the pursuit of which Congress was unwilling to leave ex-
clusively in the hands of government officials. At the same time, 
private enforcers are driven by the strong winds of their own eco-
nomic interests, which may sharply deviate from antitrust goals. It 
falls on the courts to reconcile these often conflicting purposes -
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as demanding and challenging a task as any that confronts the 
judiciary. 
This article examines a vital problem of private antitrust en-
forcement - the standing of private merger litigants - where the 
unresolved tension between public antitrust goals and the private 
interests of litigants threatens enforcement breakdown. Private 
merger enforcement is at risk not because courts have determined 
that such enforcement is undesirable, but because courts have failed 
to see the problem as an issue of systems design requiring effective 
integration of public and private enforcement. Instead they have 
focused on particular elements of antitrust standing - feared 
abuses by wrongly motivated plaintiffs - neglecting systemwide ef-
fects and jeopardizing the health of private enforcement as a whole. 
In this paper, I attempt to develop a coherent method for recon-
ciling public interest goals and private enforcement incentives that 
will be useful not only for merger enforcement, but for other areas 
of antitrust law, and perhaps for public interest litigation generally. 
Part I describes the present plight of private merger enforce-
ment, where narrow standing rules threaten enforcement break-
down. Part II sets forth the substantive goals, procedural 
mechanisms, and incentive structure that underlie coherent policy. 
Part III proposes criteria for assessing standing rules and private 
enforcement procedures and for managing the distorted incentives 
of private enforcers. Parts IV and V apply the proposed enforce-
ment criteria and procedural controls to competitors and takeover 
targets - the private enforcers upon whom effective enforcement 
of the merger law inevitably rests. 
This paper focuses on merger enforcement alone because such 
enforcement is critical in order to maintain effective competition 
and because by treating a single enforcement policy in depth I am 
able to develop a fully specified methodology that appears suitable 
for other types of antitrust and nonantitrust enforcement as well. 
In a time of increasing skepticism toward public interest litigation, 
such an approach, concentrate4 on achieving systemwide goals and 
effectively managing the incentives of private enforcers, provides a 
constructive alternative to more draconian proposals that would 
close the door to many types of private suits because of feared liti-
gation abuse. 
I. THE CRISIS IN PRIVATE MERGER ENFORCEMENT 
Restrictive judicial decisions threaten the ability of private liti-
gants to challenge unlawful mergers. Where once private merger 
4 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:1 
cases centered on the anticompetitive effects of the merger, now the 
spotlight of attention focuses on the plaintiff's litigation credentials. 
Thus, the merger court must engage in a microscopic examination 
of the injury sustained by a plaintiff, in order to determine whether 
the injury is of the character that gives the plaintiff standing to sue. 
In technical terms, courts ask whether the plaintiff has sustained 
"antitrust injury" - the standing doctrine at issue in merger cases. 
While courts at first thought the rule would not apply to merger 
injunction actions, that view changed in 1986, resulting in drastic 
curtailment of private merger enforcement.1 
At the same time, public merger enforcement atrophied during 
the 1980s.2 The disturbing result was that mergers that appeared 
clearly unlawful under core judicial holdings occurred with virtually 
no restraint. This led to a frantic rush to inerge, intensified by the 
desire to take advantage of a permissive regime that many believed 
could not last. The growing merger wave of the mid-1990s gives 
renewed urgency to merger enforcement policy.3 
A. The Cargill Decision 
The crisis in private merger enforcement was brought to a head 
by the Supreme Court decision in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo-
rado, Inc. 4 In a divided ruling, the Supreme Court held that a com-
petitor, which in the judgment of two lower courts had proved a 
clear violation of the Clayton Act,5 lacked standing to bring an in-
junction action to block the merger. The problem was not that 
there was doubt that the merger·between the second and third larg-
est meat-packers in the United States violated the antitrust laws, for 
the Court did not review the merits, or that the plaintiff was not 
1. See U.S. GEN. AccoUNTING OFFICE, JusnCE DEPT.: CHANGES IN ANTITRUST EN. 
FORCEMENT POLICIES AND AC11V1TIES 48 (Oct. 1990) (50% decline in ratio of private merger 
cases to Hart-Scott-Rodino filings in 1987; 90% decline as compared with 1982-86); ABA 
ANTITRUST SEcnON, MONOGRAPH No. 16, PRIVATE LITIGATION UNDER SEcnON 7 OF THE 
CLAYTON Acr: LAW AND POLICY 5 (1989) (stating that antitrust injury doctrine may cause 
private merger enforcement to "wither on the vine"). 
2. See U.S. GEN. AccoUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 47-52; Thomas G. Krattenmaker 
& Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger Policy and the Reagan Administration, 33 ANTITRUST 
Buu .. 211, 213, 225-28 {1988). 
3. See Shifting Deal Flow Back to the Fast Lane, MERGERS & AcauismoNs, Jan.-Feb. 
1994, at 60 (arguing that merger activity is "starting to resemble the 1980s"); Randall Smith, 
Rising Tule: Higher Stock Prices Are Feeding a Revival of Merger Activity, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
14, 1993, at Al; Greg Steinmetz, Mergers and Acquisitions Set Records, but Activity Lacked 
that '80s Pizazz, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1995, at RS. 
4. 479 U.S. 104 {1986). 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 18 {1994) {barring mergers that "may • . . substantially lessen 
competition"). 
October 1995] Antitrust Standing 5 
threatened with injury as a result of the merger. The defect in the 
case was that the plaintiff had not suffered "antitrust injury," a judi-
. cial limitation on antitrust suits that requires a plaintiff to prove not 
only that it has been injured by an antitrust violation but also that 
its injury is an anticompetitive effect of the violation.6 
The plaintiff in Cargill had claimed antitrust injury because the 
merger created multiplant efficiencies that would enable the de-
fendant to compete more vigorously with rivals, lowering the plain-
tiff's profit, and because following the merger, the defendant would 
attempt to drive the plaintiff out of business by "sustained preda-
tory pricing."7 Although these claims of threatened injury had sat-
isfied the lower courts, the Supreme Court found them insufficient 
because the first claim, based on lower prices due to increased effi-
ciency, was merely a claim of injury from intensified competition, 
and the second claim, future predation, was neither effectively al-
leged nor proved.8 Moreover, the Court found that the market did 
not have the anticompetitive structure necessary to support preda-
tory pricing. 9 
The Cargill decision is notable, not because of these findings, 
but because the Court applied the antitrust injury doctrine to a 
merger injunction action. As the Court had explained in an earlier 
decision, to allow parties to collect damages for losses that stem 
from competition even though the transaction itself violates the an-
titrust laws would undermine the very purpose of those laws.10 The 
Supreme Court, however, had previously applied this limitation on 
standing only to damage cases. In Cargill, the Court held for the 
first time that the antitrust injury doctrine prevented a plaintiff 
from maintaining suit under the antitrust injunction statute.11 The 
Court reasoned that it would be "anomalous" to allow a plaintiff to 
obtain an injunction to prevent a threatened injury for which the 
plaintiff could not obtain damages if the merger occurred and that 
the injunction and damage statutes are "best understood" as pro-
viding "complementary remedies for a single set of injuries."12 
6. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 109-13; Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 
477, 484-89 (1977) (providing the first recognition of antitrust injury doctrine). 
7. 479 U.S. at 117. 
8. 479 U.S. at 114-19. 
9. The postmerger firm would have neither high market share nor excess capacity suffi-
cient to absorb the market share of rivals, and there was no showing of high entry barriers 
sufficient to permit predatory pricing. 479 U.S. at 119 n.15. 
10. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 487-88. 
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1994). 
12. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 112-13. The Court relied on the sketchy legislative history of the 
injunction statute, which it found to be at least consistent with the view that injunctive relief 
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A strongly worded dissent written by Justice Stevens and joined 
by Justice White expressed concern that the majority decision 
would effectively bar private enforcement of the merger law.13 The 
dissenters· feared that the majority had rejected the prophylactic 
and preventive purpose of merger enforcement by requiring what 
amounted to proof of a Sherman Act14 violation. The remedy 
sought was an injunction, which required proof only of threatened 
future loss or injury, but the majority would demand evidence of 
actual injury, as in a damage action. The Court's decision would 
lead to a statute "enforceable by no private party."15 
Thus, the standing of private merger plaintiffs remains unclear 
after Cargill. What proof must a merger plaintiff present to show 
antitrust injury? If the plaintiff is a competitor of the merging 
firms, must the plaintiff prove threatened price predation by the 
same evidence that would be required in a damage case? Apart 
from predatory pricing, what evidence must the competitor plaintiff 
present to demonstrate threatened injury from other anticompeti-
tive effects, such as nonprice predation, market exclusion, or cartel 
punishment? How do the Cargill decision and its progeny affect the 
standing of other private merger litigants, particularly takeover 
targets? What constitutes antitrust injury as to them, and how is it 
to be proved? If both competitors and takeover targets face diffi-
cult or impossible standing requirements, what private party with 
the incentive and legal resources remains to challenge unlawful 
mergers within the fast-breaking pace of a merger injunction 
action? 
B. Subsequent Lower Court Decisions 
Since Cargill, the lower courts have been deeply divided in their 
approach to standing in merger cases, and the circuits are in direct 
conflict. In competitor cases some lower courts have required rig-
was available only to prevent injuries for which damages could be recovered. See 479 U.S. at 
112-13. 
13. 479 U.S. at 122-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
14. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1994). 
15. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 129 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The issue of standing in merger cases 
was not clarified by the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. 
USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990), a nonmerger case, discussed infra in text accompa-
nying notes 70-75. In denying standing to the plaintiff, however, the Court - perhaps heed-
ing the Cargill dissenters' concern about antitrust statutes enforceable by no private party -
emphasized that other viable private enforcers existed " 'whose self-interest would •.• moti-
vate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement' " 495 U.S. at 345 (quoting 
Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542 
(1983)). 
October 1995] Antitrust Standing 7 
orous proof of predation, which plaintiffs have been unable to pres-
ent in advance of the merger, and as a result mergers that appeared 
patently unlawful were upheld. Other lower courts have been will-
ing to base findings of threatened antitrust injury on proof of mar-
ket structure and economic conditions that create the capability and 
incentive to engage in predation or other anticompetitive conduct. 
The Fifth Circuit followed the rigorous proof approach in 
Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co.16 and refused to enjoin a 
merger between Kodak and another film processor that would give 
the merging firms between sixty-six and eighty-five percent of the 
wholesale photo-finishing market, augmented by the dominant po-
sition of one of the merging firms in the upstream photo materials 
market. The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's attempted show-
ing of threatened predatory pricing and other monopolizing acts be-
cause the plaintiff could not prove that the merged firm would sell 
below cost. In ironic tones, the court explained that the "facially 
sensible proposition" that a competitor "of a monopolist always has 
standing to challenge the conduct forcing it from the market ... has 
been undermined by Cargill" and that' "merely facing the specter of 
a monopoly" does not create standing.17 Conceding that it would 
be difficult for a competitor to make a showing of predation in ad-
vance of a merger, the court could only suggest that if "bad acts" 
occurred, the victim might be able to sue afterward for treble 
damages.18 
The Second Circuit took a different approach to competitor 
standing in R. C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N. V. 19 The court held 
that evidence that the merger would create a dominant firm having 
a market share of eighty-four percent, with the plaintiff remaining 
as its only rival, was sufficient in itself to create an inference of 
antitrust injury requiring a trial on the merits. The plaintiff had 
produced no evidence of past predatory pricing or present intent to 
engage in predatory behavior, but the court gave plaintiff "the ben-
efit of all reasonable inferences" that those who deliberately ac-
quire monopoly will use it to eliminate competition by such acts as 
16. 842 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1023 (1988). 
17. 842 F.2d at 100. 
18. 842 F.2d at 102; see also Treasurer, Inc. v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 682 F. Supp. 269 
(D.N.J.), affd. mem, 853 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1988) (requiring proof of actual predation in com-
petitor suit). 
19. 867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S., 815 (1989). 
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reducing the plaintiff herbal tea manufacturer's access to supermar-
ket shelf space.20 
The lower courts are similarly divided on the standing of take-
over targets - the other significant private merger litigant. In 
Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol Medical Products, Inc.,21 the Fifth Circuit read 
Cargill to preclude a target from challenging the legality of a 
merger that would "dramatically decrease competition and raise 
prices" because the target would suffer no injury relating to the an-
ticompetitive effects of the violation.22 Although the target would 
lose its independence as a result of the merger, it would suffer the 
same "loss" whether or not the takeover violated the antitrust laws. 
Moreover, far from being injured by the merger, the target and its 
shareholders would benefit from the resulting increased prices and 
reduced competition.23 A district court, taking a similar view, com-
mented that the target "is a poor private attorney general" because 
its managers may seek "to defend their own positions, not . . . to 
vindicate any public interest."24 
By contrast, in Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, 
S.A.,25 the Second Circuit held that a takeover target suffered anti-
trust injury because it faced curtailment of its production as a partly 
owned subsidiary of a rival firm, because it would lose its independ-
ent decisionmaking authority as to price and output, and because 
the standing of target firms is necessary for effective private merger 
enforcement.26 The court would not speculate whether in some 
sense the target might derive economic benefit from the merger be-
cause the antitrust laws protect the target from loss of its right to 
compete in the marketplace by mergers that violate the antitrust 
laws. Indeed, the court could not conceive of a more direct injury 
to competition than "the elimination of a major competitor's power 
to determine its prices and output."27 The court supported its de-
termination by relying on the absence of other viable private 
merger enforcers and the need to construe standing doctrines to 
20. 867 F.2d at 111. The Second Circuit distinguished Cargill on the grounds that the 
postmerger market share in Cargill (20%) was insufficient to justify an inference of predatory 
conduct. See Cargill, 419 U.S. at 119 n.15. 
21. 976 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 491 (1993). 
22. 976 F.2d at 250. 
23. 976 F.2d at 251. 
24. Bumup & Sims, Inc. v. Posner, 688 F. Supp. 1532, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1988). 
25. 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989). 
26. 871 F.2d at 258. 
27. 871 F.2d at 258. 
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promote effective enforcement.28 This concern with effective en-
forcement articulates an important theme of this article. 
C. Enforcement Failure 
Restrictive judicial decisions have limited the ability of private 
litigants to challenge unlawful mergers.29 This result was not a de-
liberate policy choice; in Cargill, the Supreme Court rejected argu-
ments calling for general disqualification of competitors - key 
private litigants in merger cases. Rather the isolated focus of the 
courts on one element of the enforcement system - antitrust injury 
- has jeopardized the system as a whole. By creating doubt as to 
whether competitors and takeover targets - the only two viable 
private merger enforcers - can challenge unlawful mergers, recent 
merger decisions threaten to destroy the private merger action as a 
viable enforcement instrument. 
This weakening of private merger enforcement has occurred at a 
time when private enforcement would have been of utmost value in 
filling an enforcement void. During the 1980s, federal authorities 
drastically reduced merger enforcement against all but the most 
egregious mergers.30 As a result, market-concentrating mergers 
and joint ventures that violated existing judicial standards were not 
challenged. 31 This departure was all the more serious in view of the 
incipiency standard of the Clayton Act,32 which rests on the prem-
ise that merger enforcement provides the first best policy for con-
trolling anticompetitive conduct.33 The combined effect of 
28. 871 F.2d at 260. Recent district court decisions in New York and Louisiana have 
followed this analysis. See Square D Co. v. Schneider S.A., 760 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); 
A. Copeland Enter. v. Guste, 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'l[ 68,713 (E.D. La. Nov. 28, 1988). 
29. Indeed, the plight of private litigants has worsened in recent years. In 1991-94, pri-
vate litigants (excluding state attorneys general) obtained standing in only 6 of 16 reported 
cases, and in 2 of these, the standing issue was somewhat mooted by the joinder of a state as 
co-plaintiff. These statistics were obtained through a search of 1991 through 1994 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) and an electronic search on 8/10/95 of Westlaw Allfeds library, search terms: "Clay-
ton Act" & Acquisition! Merger! & DA (after 12/90). See Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dept 
Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Stanley Works v. Newell Co., 1992-2 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) 'l[ 70,008 (D. Conn. Oct. 2, 1992). 
30. See Krattenmaker & Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 213, 225-28. 
31. See U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 45 (discussing the failure to 
bring cases clearly violating existing judicial standards); Krattenmaker & Pitofsky, supra note 
2, at 213, 225-28 (describing tacit abandonment of already lenient merger enforcement guide-
lines). To be sure, judicial standards needed updating; the Supreme Court had not decided a 
substantive merger case since 1978. The lack of up-to-date law was no justification for not 
presenting the Court with cases that would have allowed modernization of merger law. 
32. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957) (recogniz-
ing that the Clayton Act protects against incipiency effects). 
33. Cf. Joseph F. Bradley, Post-Chicago Economics and Workable Legal Policy, 63 ANTI-
musr L.J. 683, 689-90 (1995) (describing how effective merger enforcement avoids costly 
10 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 94:1 
diminished public and private enforcement led to a clear un-
derdeterrence of mergers violating core antitrust standards.34 
An effective policy toward private merger enforcement requires 
a global or systems approach. Such an approach would concentrate 
on the operation of the enforcement system as a whole, attempting 
to assure a viable private enforcement remedy, as Congress surely 
intended. This article shows how the courts may achieve these 
objectives within the statutory framework Congress created. 
II. FOUNDATIONS OF COHERENT POLICY 
Underlying antitrust policy, including private merger enforce-
ment, is a limited set of basic principles derived from the antitrust 
statutes, legislative history, and judicial decisions. These principles 
consist of key enforcement goals and the incentive-shaping proce-
dures that implement these goals. In developing a coherent policy 
toward private merger enforcement, it is necessary to make the 
principles explicit because cases and commentary often lose sight of 
them - whether by simple neglect, subtle distortion, or opaque 
formalistic doctrine. 
A. Enforcement Goals 
Three crucial goals motivate private enforcement, most particu-
larly merger enforcement, and each contains an essential public in-
terest component. First, private enforcement strengthens public 
enforcement because it creates private remedies that augment pub-
lic remedies - the dual enforcement goal. Second, though antitrust 
enforcement has both compensation and deterrence goals, deter-
rence is the primary goal of private merger enforcement - the de-
terrence goal. Third, private enforcement vindicates the same 
substantive goals as public enforcement - the substantive uniform-
ity goal. Although these objectives may appear noncontroversial, 
disagreement on the scope of antitrust procedures often rests on 
neglect or implicit rejection of one or more of these basic premises. 
and complex proceedings under the Sherman Act, thereby enhancing legal predictability, 
promoting transactional freedom within unconcentrated markets, and reducing the need for 
disruptive takeovers to discipline managers because competition does the job). 
34. See U.S. GEN. AccoUNTINo 0FF1CE, supra note 1, at 47-52 {describing how fewer 
resources and changed policies hindered merger enforcement); Robert Pitofsky, Proposals 
for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. LJ. 195, 196-98 
(1992) (explaining that weak antitrust enforcement was a "contributing factor" to the unprec-
edented merger wave of 1980s). 
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1. Dual Enforcement 
The dual enforcement goal, which recognizes that private en-
forcement augments public enforcement, is reflected in the statutes, 
legislative history, and consistent judicial articulations. The anti-
trust statutes contain exceptionally powerful private remedies, com-
parable in scope and effect to the remedies available under public 
enforcement. The statutes thereby create a parallel enforcement 
system, complete with punitive sanctions, enforcement funding, and 
enabling processes. Thus, the statutes contain the striking penalty 
of treble damages, attorney's fees by right for successful plaintiffs, 
expansive venue provisions, and other powerful procedures.35 
Comparison of public and private remedies makes the statutory 
plan transparent. The trebling of damages is the private analogue 
to the public penalty of imprisonment and :fine.36 The awarding of 
attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff is the analogue to the public 
funding of the Attorney General. Expanded venue and injunction 
remedies apply without distinction in both public and private ac-
tions. 37 Moreover, Congress expanded these remedies in 1976 by 
extending mandatory attorney's fees for prevailing plaintiffs to pri-
vate injunction actions, including merger cases.38 
Legislative history also reflects an intent to strengthen public 
enforcement through private suits - an intent particularly appar-
ent in the Clayton Act and the 1976 Antitrust Improvements Act.39 
The House Report on the 1976 Antitrust Improvements Act - the 
most recent legislation on private antitrust actions - explained 
that private actions "reflect the national policy of encouraging pri-
vate parties ... to help enforce the antitrust laws. "40 
35. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994) (treble damages and attorney's fees); 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1994) 
(prima facie evidence); 15 U.S.C. § 25 {1994) (expanded venue). 
36. Although some have argued that trebling simply reflects discounting for the difficulty 
of detecting a hidden offense, RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 
549-53, 555-59 {2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1984), the ability to conceal is not a condition for treb-
ling, which is mandatory. Thus, trebling adds a punitive amount, as the courts have noted. 
See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 {1977) (citing legis-
lative histories of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act that discuss how treble damages meet 
punitive purposes as well as other goals). 
37. 15 u.s.c. §§ 15, 22, 26 (1994). 
38. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 302 
(3), 90 Stat. 1383, 1396 {codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1994)). 
39. 15 u.s.c. § 1311 (1994). 
40. H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 {1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2572, 2589; see also S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1976); 21 CoNG. REc. 3146 
(1890) (statement of Sen. Hoar) (asserting that a private remedy would be "a very efficient 
measure •.. in suppressing [antitrust violations]"); Daniel Berger & Roger Bernstein, An 
Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 845-50 {1977); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1, 21-30 (1989). 
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Finally, the courts have repeatedly emphasized that private anti-
trust enforcement is designed "not merely to provide private relief, 
but ... to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust 
laws."41 To that end, the antitrust statutes designate antitrust plain-
tiffs as" 'private attorneys general' to enforce the antitrust laws,"42 
and thereby to maintain "an ever-present threat" against antitrust 
wrongdoers.43 In private merger enforcement, these aspirations can 
be realized only if there are viable private enforcers, able and moti-
vated to bring merger actions. 
2. The Deterrence Goal 
Although private antitrust enforcement has both deterrence and 
compensation goals, deterrence is primary in private merger en-
forcement. To be sure, Supreme Court decisions in nonmerger 
cases differ in their relative emphasis on deterrence and compensa-
tion depending on the specific context of the case, but even here, 
the Court often emphasizes the deterrence aspect.44 Although 
some decisions have emphasized the compensation goal,45 in most 
of its decisions, the Supreme Court has recognized the key impor-
tance of deterrence. 46 
41. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969), 
cited with approval in califomia v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284 (1990). 
42. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977). 
43. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); see 
also Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 214 (1990) (stating that § 4 of the Clayton 
Act "must promote the vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws"); Associated Gen. Con-
tractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542 (1983); Blue Shield 
v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) 
(stating that private action "encourages private challenges to antitrust violations"); Pfizer Inc. 
v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, 
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). 
44. See, e.g., American Socy. of Mechanical Engrs., Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 
556, 572 (1982) (holding that imposing liability for nonprofit standard-setting association de-
ters such conduct in future); Pfizer, Inc., 434 U.S. at 314-15 (extending the right to seek treble 
damages to foreign plaintiffs due to the enhanced deterrent effect); Perma Life Mufflers, 392 
U.S. at 138-39 (rejecting the equal fault doctrine as a defense to private suit). 
45. In Brunswick, the Supreme Court said that "the treble-damages provision • • • is 
designed primarily as a remedy." 429 U.S. at 485-86. Yet even in that case, which was a suit 
for damages, the Court acknowledged that "treble damages also play an important role in 
penalizing wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing," 429 U.S. at 485, and the Supreme Court 
has cited the case to support the notion that the antitrust laws seek both deterrence and 
compensation. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989). 
46. See, e.g., Utilicorp United, Inc., 491 U.S. at 226 (promoting "twin antitrust goals of 
ensuring recompense for injured parties and encouraging the diligent prosection of antitrust 
claims") (White, J., dissenting); ARC Am Corp., 490 U.S. at 102 (stating that the purposes of 
federal antitrust law are "deterring anticompetitive conduct and ensuring the compensation 
of victims"); Blue Shield, 451 U.S. at 472; Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 745-46; Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); Fortner Enter. v. United 
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969); see also H.R. REP. No. 499, supra note 40, 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2589 (stating that national policy should encourage private 
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Deterrence is paramount in private merger enforcement be-
cause the action is typically filed before the merger occurs and the 
remedy sought is an injunction to bar the merger. Thus, there is no 
present injury to be compensated but only a future injury to be pre-
vented. For this reason, the injunction remedy in private merger 
enforcement functions wholly as a deterrent.47 
3. Substantive Uniformity 
The substantive policy goals of antitrust enforcement remain the 
same whether enforcement is public or private.48 Strange as it may 
appear, this principle is sometimes challenged in the interpretation 
of the antitrust injury doctrine. As we have seen, that doctrine re-
quires that the claimed private injury be within the anticompetitive 
rationale of the statutory violation. The problem of substantive 
uniformity arises because some would hold that an anticompetitive 
rationale sufficient to establish antitrust injury requires proof of a 
direct causal link between plaintiff's injury and the output restric-
tion of a monopoly or cartel that has entered its exploitive stage.49 
But this formulation, which registers only the immediate and short-
run allocative effects of anticompetitive behavior, omits the vital 
long-run goals of preserving competitive processes and market 
structures and promoting dynamic efficiency. To be sure, one way 
of attempting to achieve both short-run and long-run goals would 
be to penalize only immediately exploitive behavior or conduct 
antitrust suits both to compensate victims and to punish and deter violations). See generally 
Berger & Bernstein, supra note 40, at 845-46. 
47. The Brunswick decision, which declared that the private action was designed primar-
ily as a remedy, is not contrary because there the plaintiff sought damages from a past merger 
rather than an injunction to prevent a future merger. 429 U.S. at 485-86. Thus, the Court's 
dictum was not addressed to the merger injunction suit, which is the subject of this article and 
which constitutes almost the whole of private merger enforcement. In addition, as discussed 
supra in note 45, the Court now interprets Brunswick as upholding the importance of both 
compensation and deterrence. 
48. To be sure, antitrust goals have changed in recent years, at least in emphasis. See 
generally Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Wel-
fare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020 {1987). My point is simply that the 
correctly formulated goals of public enforcement also articulate the goals of private 
enforcement. 
49. See, e.g., Local Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Lamaur Inc., 787 F.2d 1197, 1202-03 (7th Cir. 
1986) {finding that termination of dealer for price cutting in resale price fixing violation was 
not within anticompetitive rationale); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust 
Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1155, 1160 {1982) ("[P]laintiff's injury is 
part of or flows directly from the allocative efficiency loss of monopoly."). See generally 
Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 V AND. L. REv. 1539 
{1989); Wtlliam M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 652 
{1983); William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REv. 
1445 {1985). 
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closely linked to such demonstrably exploitive behavior.so But this 
is not the path our antitrust enforcement system has taken - or 
indeed that of any other developed antitrust regime.st Thus, 
though exploitive or monopoly pricing stemming from collusion or 
predation provides an important indicator of antitrust violation, the 
law is not confined to final stage intervention to prevent cartel or 
monopoly price exploitation. 
Antitrust law also protects the competitive mechanisms by 
which free markets achieve the goals of higher output and con-
sumer welfare. Thus, particularly in merger enforcement, antitrust 
law strives to maintain competitive market structures that preclude 
collusive and predatory conduct. While ultimately antitrust antici-
pates that injuries to competitive conditions will raise prices and 
lower output, the essence of illegality for many antitrust violations, 
including merger violations, lies in the injury to competitive condi-
tions themselves. In these cases, antitrust accepts the identified re-
straint of trade as a proxy by which an ultimate pricing or other 
output effect is deemed likely.s2 As then-Judge Breyer recently ex-
plained, antitrust law protects the competitive process in order to 
achieve "low, economically efficient prices, efficient production 
methods, and innovation. "53 
50. The viability of such an approach requires the heroic assumption that the probability 
and magnitude of the eventual penalty would achieve the desired optimum and that all eco-
nomic actors would reach common and accurate assessments of these magnitudes - which 
assumes unbounded rationality contrary to the prescription in Eastman Kodak. See Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 470-72 (1992). See generally Stephen 
McG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge, Knowledge About Legal Sanctions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 261, 
268-69 (1993) (arguing that legal sanctions are inherently imprecise due to incomplete infor-
mation); Eric Rasmusen, How Optimal Penalties Change with the Amount of Harm, 15 INTL. 
REv. L. & EcoN. 101 (1995). 
51. See D.G. GoYDER, EC COMPETITION LAw 11-12 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that the EC 
protects process of competition); Mrrsuo MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COM· 
PETITION LAW IN JAPAN 87 (1993) (stating that the antimonopoly law restricts anticompeti-
tive market structure). 
52. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 505-11 
(1988) (finding unlawful deliberate biasing of a standard-setting body in order to injure ri-
val); FTC v. Indiana Fedn. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 461-62 (1986) (holding disruption of 
market information flow to be unlawful even absent proof of higher price or reduced output); 
American Socy. of Mechanical Engrs., Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 570-72 (1982) 
(finding illegal biasing of a standard-setting body); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas 
Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1961) (holding that trade association's arbitrary 
refusal to certify rival product violated Sherman Act without showing of specific public 
harm). 
53. Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New Eng., Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir. 1988); see also 
7 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANITIRUST LAW 'l[ 1052 (1980); Bradley, supra 
note 48, at 1023; Wtlliam K. Jones, Concerted Refusals to Deal and the Producer Interest in 
Antitrust, 50 Omo ST. L.J. 73, 88-90 (1989). 
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Thus, conduct is anticompetitive under the antitrust laws not 
only when it is directly exploitive and output reducing but also 
when it damages the long-run competitive conditions by which anti-
trust seeks to achieve superior performance in pricing, production, 
and innovation. This is most especially true of section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, which regulates market structure - by definition a 
long-run market condition. Consistent with this view, the Clayton 
Act forbids mergers that "may" injure competition and typically in-
volves enforcement action before economic effects are visible and 
before the merger has occurred. As the Supreme Court stated re-
cently in Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
"it has long been settled that excessive concentration, and the oligo-
polistic price coordination it portends, may be the injury to compe-
tition the [merger] Act prohibits."54 
Most assuredly, private antitrust enforcement raises issues for 
judicial management, and these are discussed below. What the pol-
icy uniformity principle holds, however, is that procedural controls 
cannot shrink the substantive policies enforceable by private suit. 
To hold otherwise would cripple the private action as an instrument 
of substantive policy, distort the will of Congress, and reduce our 
ability to maintain dynamically competitive markets.55 Thus, the 
meaning of competition is invariant as between public and private 
cases. 
B. Standing and Incentive Management 
To achieve its goals, private antitrust enforcement relies on the 
efforts of private litigants. But private enforcers, driven by their 
own self-interest, may deviate from antitrust goals, and the strong 
penalties and litigation advantages available to private litigants 
magnify the mischief such litigation may cause. In order to reduce 
deviations between private incentives and public goals, the courts 
have created standing rules designed to prevent both overdeter-
rence and underdeterrence of antitrust violations.56 I shall argue 
54. 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2591 (1993) (citing United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 
321 (1963)). 
55. See JOHN VICKERS & GEORGE YARROW, l'RivATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
67-69 (1988) (competition provides market participants indispensable feedback on econmnic 
performance); Oliver D. Hart, The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme, 14 BELL J. 
EcoN. 366, 366 (1983) (competitive markets "reduce[] managerial slack"); see also Joseph F. 
Bradley, Massive Industrial Size, Classical Economics, and the Search for Humanistic Value, 
24 STAN. L. REv. 1155, 1174-78 (1972) (book review) (discussing the teaching function of 
competition). 
56. The antitrust statutes are virtually open-ended in their description of injured persons 
who may sue. The antitrust remedies are available to any person whose business or property 
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that at bottom these rules, most especially the antitrust injury doc-
trine, are incentive managing devices to assure that private enf orc-
ers promote public competition goals. 
To prevent overdeterrence, the courts limit the magnitude and 
uncertainty of recovery and have evolved a special standing rule 
called antitrust injury to bar plaintiffs from pursuing private actions 
incompatible with antitrust goals. General standing rules, such as 
limitations on duplicate recovery and complex damage apportion-
ment, do not apply to merger injunction actions, where damages are 
not involved.57 It is thus the antitrust injury requirement that pro-
vides the key limitation on standing in merger cases. 
To prevent underdeterrence, the courts apply a pragmatic doc-
trine of "effective private enforcement," which limits the preclusive 
thrust of standing rules to assure that viable private enforcers re-
main available to vindicate antitrust goals. In merger cases, effec-
tive private enforcement requires injunction actions to achieve 
effective deterrence. Together, the two principles - antitrust in-
jury and effective private enforcement - provide a guiding stan-
dard for shaping standing procedures in private antitrust cases. 
1. Antitrust Injury 
The antitrust injury doctrine addresses the problem of the 
wrongly motivated private litigant by scrutinizing the plaintiff's in-
jury to determine whether the self-interest the plaintiff seeks to vin-
dicate is consistent with antitrust goals. Although it might appear 
that any recovery against an antitrust violator would promote anti-
trust goals, the courts have barred such recoveries when the plain-
tiff's injury is unconnected with the antitrust wrong. 
The antitrust injury requirement is typically expressed in terms 
of whether the injury is of the type that the antitrust laws aim to 
prevent.58 That formulation, however, is deceptively simple and 
subject to manipulation, particularly as applied to a merger law 
\vith the broad public purpose of preserving future competitive con-
is injured or threatened with injury "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 
15 U.S.C. § 15 {1994). It would be difficult to fonnulate a remedy at any higher level of 
generality. The legislative history of the Clayton Act provides little illumination beyond an 
intent to provide an effective remedy to consumers and small competitors who must battle 
large producers. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 40, at 845-46; Hovenkamp, supra note 
40, at 27-31. Necessarily, therefore, it was left to the courts to shape a body of procedural law 
to guide private antitrust enforcement. 
57. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 n.6 {1986); Hawaii v. Standard 
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261-62 {1972). 
58. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
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ditions, implemented by a remedial statute that gives any person 
the right to sue "against threatened loss or damage."59 Whether an 
injury is within the rationale of a substantive statute with such a 
broad purpose requires a judicial characterization that is far from 
inevitable.60 Indeed, in each of the Supreme Court's antitrust in-
jury decisions discussed below it is possible to recharacterize the 
injury to reach the opposite result. A deeper rationale, however, 
can provide a coherent explanation for the decisions. 
Thus, I shall argue that the antitrust injury requirement is at 
heart a principle of incentive compatibility. It examines whether 
the plaintiff's litigation incentives, objectively viewed in terms of 
the injuries sustained or threatened, are compatible with antitrust 
goals.61 Expression of the antitrust injury principle in incentive 
compatibility terms provides a transparent and operational mean-
ing for this otherwise opaque doctrine.62 
The antitrust injury doctrine stems from the 1977 merger deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-
59. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1994): "Any person ... shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive 
relief .•. against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws .... " 
60. Cases under other public interest statutes illustrate the flexibility of the injury charac-
terization. Thus, in Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors v. 
City of Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2300-03 (1993), the lower court found that white con-
tractors sustained no injury from minority set asides because they could not show that they 
would otherwise have obtained the contracts, while the Supreme Court found injury through 
loss of the opportunity to compete. Similarly, in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978), the Supreme Court upheld a challenge to an affirmative 
action program without a showing that the plaintiff would otherwise have been admitted to 
medical school. These examples demonstrate that the injury precondition for maintaining a 
suit under public interest statutes is highly manipulable. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Inju-
ries, 1993 SuP. Cr. REv. 37, 41-42. The antitrust injury requirement is subject to the same 
elasticity of interpretation. See Blair & Harrison, supra note 49, at 1541-42, 1556; see also 
Jean Wegman Bums, The Paradox of Antitrust and Lanham Act Standing, 42 UCLA L. REv. 
47, 94 & n.204 (1994) (citing other commentators). 
61. The antitrust injury doctrine thus addresses the principal-agent problem of public in-
terest litigation in antitrust law. The government acts as the principal and establishes induce-
ments in the form of treble damages, attorney's fees, and other litigation advantages to 
induce its agents, capable private enforcers, to bring antitrust cases that serve the public 
interest. The agents, motivated by their own private interest, augmented by the generous 
reward system of private antitrust enforcement, are motivated to bring suits even when they 
do not promote the principal's interest in competition. Anticipating such deviations, the 
principal - acting through the courts - establishes the antitrust injury test to screen out 
enforcers with incentives adverse to the principal, thereby reducing agency risk. But as we 
shall see in Part III, analysis of the agency problem of private enforcement is incomplete and 
does not consider the multistage nature of the interaction between the government and pri-
vate enforcers. 
62. It is possible to criticize the antitrust injury doctrine as an unjustified narrowing of the 
substantive statute and contrary to congressional intent. See John J. Flynn, Which Past Is 
Prolog? The Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 879, 902-04, 910-
11 (1990). The doctrine, however, is now well-settled in Supreme Court jurisprudence. My 
goal here is to place that jurisprudence on a more sound basis by making the standing inquiry 
operational and consistent with the foundational principles of private antitrust enforcement. 
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Mat, Inc., 63 decided after the number of private antitrust actions 
had tripled over an eleven-year period.64 The plaintiff claimed in-
jury from a merger that had prevented the failure of one of plain-
tiff's rivals, and thereby increased competition in the market. 
Plaintiff's damages were the profits it would have made had its rival 
failed. Rejecting the plaintiff's claim as "inimical to the purposes" 
of the antitrust laws because it sought damages for losses from con-
tinued competition, the Court formulated the principle of antitrust 
injury.65 The plaintiff must show more than an injury causally 
linked to an antitrust violation. The Court also stated that 
"[p]laintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the 
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows 
from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful."66 Subsequent 
courts rephrased the doctrine more simply - as a requirement that 
the injury be within the rationale of the violation.67 
The Court's formulation of the antitrust injury principle in 
Brunswick might on first consideration appear to be no more than a 
rendering of the statutory language of the Clayton Act, which re-
quires that a plaintiff claiming damages "be injured in his business 
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."68 
But the Clayton Act language scarcely compelled the Brunswick 
holding that the plaintiff must be injured by effects themselves an-
ticompetitive and in close nexus with the violation. 
In fact, the Brunswick decision expressed the germ of the incen-
tive compatibility idea in its explanation that the antitrust laws were 
not merely indifferent to the injury claimed but would be under-
mined if the plaintiffs were to· be awarded damages for the profits 
they would have earned from reduced competition. To hold the 
defendant liable for any loss "causally linked" to the defendant's 
illegal presence in the market "divorces antitrust recovery from the 
purposes of the antitrust laws. "69 These expressions suggest that 
antitrust damages can be awarded only to a private litigant with 
63. 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
64. Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction 
and Framework, in PRlvATE AmTrn.uST LmoATION: NEw EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING 4 tbl. 
1.1 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988) [hereinafter PRIVATE AmTrn.uST LmoATION]. 
65. 429 U.S. at 488. 
66. 429 U.S. at 489. 
67. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 [hereinafter ARCO] 
(1990); see also 2 PmLLIP E. AREEDA & liERBERT HoVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 'lI 362a 
(rev. ed. 1995). 
68. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1994). 
69. 429 U.S. at 487. 
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economic motivation consistent with the competitive aspirations of 
the law. Certainly, as the Court viewed the facts, Brunswick re-
vealed a direct incentive incompatibility between plaintiff's litiga-
tion interest and the goals of the merger statute because the 
plaintiff sought to recover damages from increased competition. 
The incentive compatibility principle implicit in Brunswick re-
ceived clear expression in the Court's most recent antitrust injury 
decision, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co. 70 In ARCO, 
as in Brunswick, the plaintiff claimed injury from the pro-
competitive effects of a violation. Using language of incentive com-
patibility, the Court explained that the antitrust injury requirement 
is satisfied when a plaintiff is within " 'an identifiable class of per-
sons whose self interest would normally motivate them to vindicate 
the public interest in antitrust enforcement.' "71 Contrary to that 
dictum, the ARCO plaintiff claimed injury from a vertical maxi-
mum price fixing agreement that limited the ability of its rivals to 
raise prices. The plaintiff, which was not a party to the agreement, 
thus was attempting to claim damages not from reduced competi-
tion but from intensified rivalry.72 The ARCO plaintiff therefore 
sustained no antitrust injury because 
[a] competitor is not injured by the anticompetitive effects of vertical, 
maximum price-fixing ... and does not have any incentive to vindi-
cate the legitimate interests of a rival's dealer .... In short, a competi-
tor will be injured and hence motivated to sue only when a vertical, 
maximum-price-fixing arrangement has a pro-competitive impact on 
the market. Therefore, providing the competitor a cause of action 
would not protect the rights of dealers and consumers under the anti-
trust laws."73 
Such a plaintiff was therefore not qualified "to perform the office of 
a private attorney general."74 Incentive compatibility thus provides 
an operational and straightforward meaning for antitrust injury.75 
70. 495 U.S. 328 (1990). 
71. 495 U.S. at 345 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council 
of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542 (1983)). 
72. Moreover, the Court determined that the rule against maximum price fixing under 
which plaintiff sued was intended to preserve the competitive freedom of the manufacturer's 
own dealers and to protect consumers from disguised minimum price fixing. It was not 
designed to shield a rival dealer in competition with the manufacturer's own dealers, 
threatened by low, but nonpredatory, prices. 495 U.S. at 335-41. 
73. 495 U.S. at 345. 
74. 495 U.S. at 345 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 542); see also Frank 
H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TExAs L. REV. 1, 33-39 (1984), cited in Brunswick 
Corp., 429 U.S. at 345. 
75. The incentive interpretation readily accounts for other leading antitrust injury cases. 
Thus, in Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982), consumers sustained antitrust injury 
when a group health plan refused to reimburse them for treatment by psychologists despite 
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The Supreme Court's Cargill decision, which applied the anti-
trust injury principle to merger injunction suits, is also explainable 
in incentive compatibility terms. The Court in Cargill denied stand-
ing because the competitor-plaintiff claimed injury from lower but 
nonpredatory prices resulting from a cost-reducing merger, which is 
to say from "increased competition." Thus, the plaintiff's litigation 
incentives were incompatible with the antitrust goal of maintaining 
competition and low prices in consumer markets.76 
Functionally, therefore, the antitrust injury doctrine narrows the 
potential reach of the broad statutory language of the Clayton Act 
to screen out cases in which the plaintiff's motivation, objectively 
viewed in terms of its economic interests, fails to promote antitrust 
the fact that the object of the boycott by the group health plan was not to injure consumers 
but to disadvantage psychologists who competed with the M.D. members of the plan. The 
consumers suffered antitrust injury because their injury was "inextricably intertwined" with 
the injury to the psychologists, 457 U.S. at 484. In incentive compatibility terms, the con-
sumer's self-ipterest in being reimbursed for psychological services under the group health 
plan was fully compatible with the interests of the targeted psychologists to compete free 
from boycott disadvantages. Thus, in incentive terms, the consumers' injury was compatible 
with antitrust goals. 
By contrast, in Associated General Contractors, the Supreme Court rejected the standing 
of a union to challenge an agreement between employers that would have restrained compe-
tition in the building construction market. The Court doubted that the plaintiff union had 
sustained antitrust injury because it was unclear that the union's members would be hurt and 
indeed they might benefit from an agreement that raised prices and reduced competition in 
the product market. Thus, the union's litigation incentive was not clearly compatible with the 
antitrust goal of protecting competition and competitive pricing in the product market. The 
Supreme Court's denial of standing was based on other grounds as well, but its application of 
the antitrust injury principle was consistent with the incentive interpretation. 459 U.S. at 
539-45. 
76. As noted earlier, the Court stated that it would be "anomalous" to read the Clayton 
Act to allow an injunction suit against a threatened injury for which it could not obtain dam-
ages if the injury actually occurred. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 112 
(1986). The Cargill dissenters feared that this cryptic passage might be read to require proof 
of a postmerger Sherman Act violation. 479 U.S. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But such 
a reading would be contrary to the Court's later decision in California v. American Stores 
Co., 495 U.S. 271, 281-82 (1990), finding the antitrust injury requirement "unquestionably 
satisfied" by proof that a merger would substantially increase concentration and oligopoly 
conditions, without inquiry whether this would justify independent Sherman Act recovery. 
Thus, the brief Cargill dictum should not be read to require proof of a Sherman Act violation 
but simply a threat of injury from the anticompetitive effects the Clayton Act aims to prevent 
- for example, oligopolistic price coordination. 
Indeed, a contrary reading of the Cargill dictum - holding that only proof of actual 
injury would suffice for standing - might jeopardize the ability of State Attorneys General 
to challenge mergers in the federal courts. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, the states may 
bring parens patriae actions only for injury to natural persons under the Sherman Act. Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(l) (1994). 
Thus, if a merger threatened to cause future damage that violated the Clayton Act, but not 
necessarily the Sherman Act, states would be barred from suit. See ABA ANTITRUST SEC-
TION, MONOGRAPH No. 21, STATE MERGER ENFORCEMENT 14-17 (1995). But such a conclu-
sion would undermine almost the whole of state merger enforcement. Thus, the anomaly 
language of Cargill must be read cautiously and with attention to specific context. See Penn-
sylvania v. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) <JI 70,224, at 70,088-89 
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (rejecting preclusive reading of Cargill). 
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goals. So understood, the antitrust injury doctrine complements the 
concept of plaintiff as a private attorney general or agent for the 
public interest. That is to say, the antitrust injury doctrine screens 
the economic interests of the plaintiff to assure that a disabling con-
flict of interest or other motivation inconsistent with competition 
does not hamper plaintiff's capacity to serve the public interest.77 
A coherent system of private antitrust enforcement, however, re-
quires more than the antitrust injury principle. 
2. Effective Private Enforcement 
The courts apply a pragmatic policy of "effective private en-
forcement" as a counterweight to the antitrust injury doctrine and 
as a protection against underdeterrence. In recent years, as the 
modern doctrines of standing and antitrust injury have evolved, the 
Supreme Court has made the policy more explicit, stating that ef-
fective private enforcement requires an effective class of private en-
forcers and, in merger cases, injunction actions that achieve 
divestiture remedies. 
Thus, effective private enforcement requires that one or more 
classes of private litigants be motivated and capable of challenging 
antitrust violations. The Court has articulated this requirement in 
both indirect purchaser and antitrust injury decisions. In lllinois 
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 78 California v. ARC America Corp., 79 and Kan-
sas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 80 the Court, holding that only direct 
purchasers from a price-fixing conspiracy may sue, explained that 
enforcement was concentrated on a single class of enforcers to as-
sure that there be a class of plaintiffs with "sufficient incentive to 
sue."81 In Associated General Contractors v. California State Coun-
77. The antitrust injury doctrine is thus similar to the process interpretation of the state 
action doctrine. According to that interpretation, financially interested persons are not enti-
tled to antitrust immunity under the state action doctrine because such persons cannot be 
entrusted to act as disinterested and politically accountable agents for the state. See Einer 
Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REv. 668 (1991). Similarly, 
under the antitrust injury principle, private antitrust plaintiffs cannot be entrusted with the 
authority of private attorneys general when instituting burdensome and costly antitrust litiga-
tion if their economic interests are not compatible with public enforcement goals. As we 
shall see, just as active supervision by the state overcomes the objection to regulatory action 
by interested state officials, judicial supervision can overcome the problems of incompatible 
litigation incentives in merger suits. 
78. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
79. 490 U.S. 93 (1989). 
80. 497 U.S. 199 (1990). 
81. 490 U.S. at 104; see also Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council 
of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542 (1983). · 
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cil of Carpenters, 82 the Court, denying standing to the plaintiff 
union that failed to meet several of the enumerated standing crite-
ria, including antitrust injury, noted that denial of standing was not 
likely "to leave a significant antitrust violation undetected or un-
remedied. "83 In its recent ARCO decision, the Court held that 
competitors had not sustained antitrust injury in a maximum-
pricefixing case only after finding that two other classes of litigants 
remained available to "vindicate the public interest in antitrust 
enforcement."84 
The controlling principle that emerges from these cases is the 
need to assure effective private enforcement. Whether a single 
class of enforcers will suffice depends on the type of antitrust viola-
tion and the remedy sought. In Illinois Brick, the Court found that 
a single class of enforcers - direct purchasers able to recover the 
entire cartel overcharge - would constitute an effective enforcing 
class,85 but a merger injunction case requires a different analysis. 
First, there are no damages to be concentrated in a single litigant 
class because damages have not yet occurred when a merger suit is 
brought. Second, free-rider effects reduce litigation motivation, 
even within a single litigant class, because other class members may 
benefit, but the absence of damages discourages class actions.86 Fi-
nally, no single class of litigants will have incentive to sue in all 
types of cases.87 Thus, effective merger enforcement requires more 
than one class of enforcers. 
3. Injunctions 
Injunctions are the standard remedy in merger enforcement 
cases because postmerger damage suits provide insufficient deter-
rence, and the flexible remedies and judicial controls of injunction 
actions ideally serve the preventive purpose of the merger law. 
Merger law is preventive due to the imperfect ability of the Sher-
man Act to constrain anticompetitive conduct in highly concen-
82. 459 U.S. 519 (1983). 
83. 459 U.S. at 542. 
84. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 345 (1989) (quoting Asso· 
ciated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 542). 
85. 431 U.S. at 729. 
86. See infra text accompanying note 140. I found no private merger case that was 
brought as a class action. 
87. See infra text accompanying notes 137-46. For example, competitors may be affected 
unequally by a merger, and takeover targets will have no incentive to challenge friendly 
mergers. 
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trated markets.88 For that reason, merger enforcement aims to stop 
mergers "in their incipiency" before they have worked competitive 
harm - a purpose manifest in the legislative history of the Clayton 
Act and reaffirmed in the 1976 Antitrust Improvements Act.89 
Economic analysis supports the congressional premise that in-
junction actions are necessary for effective merger enforcement. 
Such analysis concludes that ex ante injunction remedies are desira-
ble when ex post damage remedies alone provide insufficient deter-
rence, whether by reason of low probability of suit, widely 
dispersed victims, difficulties of proof, uncertainties in the legal 
standard, or inadequacy of future damage recoveries to offset real-
ized illicit gains.90 As the previous discussion has made clear, most 
of these conditions hold for mergers.91 
Nevertheless, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have taken 
the position that merger injunction actions are inherently inferior to 
damage actions.92 They argue that injunction actions create acute 
holdup problems hecause each plaintiff can threaten to block the 
acquisition unless paid the merger's full transactional value, a sum 
likely to exceed any threatened injury to the plaintiff.93 In addition, 
merger plaintiffs other than consumers cannot bargain effectively 
with the acquiring firm to reach a desirable social result because 
88. Shennan Act damage remedies are not available for tacit interdependence and are 
less than fully effective against collusion, which may involve subtle facilitating practices or 
hidden agreement. Although predatory conduct appears more amenable to damage enforce-
ment, proof of predation, especially predatory pricing, must overcome deliberately underin-
clusive liability rules. See, e.g., Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 
s. Ct. 2578, 2586 (1993). 
89. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962) (amended Clayton Act); 
H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2596, 2597 
(Antitrust Improvements Act); S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess 1 (1914) (original Clayton 
Act). 
90. See Charles D. Kolstad et al., Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regula-
tion: Substitutes or Complements?, 80 AM. EcoN. REv. 888 (1990); Steven Shaven, Liability 
for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984). An important corollary 
of this analysis is that when both ex ante and ex post remedies are applicable, the ex ante 
standard should be set below what would be the social optimum if ex post liability did not 
exist. See Kolstad et al., supra, at 889. The pennissive nature of current merger regulation 
would appear to satisfy this requirement. 
91. Thus, difficulties of proof and uncertain legal standards reduce the probability of ex 
post damages. Transaction costs impede organization of dispersed victims of collusive pricing 
from maintaining suits when they cannot proceed on the strength of a prior government 
adjudication. Treble damages do not adjust for these difficulties when the time value of 
money and other costs are considered. In fact, treble damages turn out to be closer to single 
damages when current losses, litigation costs, and future recovery are discounted to present 
value. See Joseph F. Bradley, Critical Factual Assumptions Underlying Public Policy, in PRI-
VATE ANnTRUST LmGATION, supra note 64, 252-54; Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust 
"Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 Omo ST. LJ. 115 (1993). 
92. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 49. 
93. Id. at 1169. 
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they have not sustained the type of injury the statute seeks to pre-
vent. 94 These arguments, however, neglect the realities of merger 
enforcement and fail to consider systemwide effects. 
To begin with, the holdup argument is exaggerated. Plaintiffs 
cannot credibly threaten to block most unlawful mergers because 
the typical injunction does not prohibit the merger; rather it 
restructures the merger transaction to remove antitrust risks.9s This 
reduces the amount of any holdup fee to the cost of restructuring. 
Equity supervision and other procedural mechanisms, discussed be-
low, can minimize remaining holdup and delay costs. Although 
consumers generally have more compatible enforcement incentives 
than other types of litigants, they lack capability as merger litigants 
and have rarely brought suit.96 
Second, even if consumers were willing to sue, the immediate 
consumer interest in lower prices does not reflect the totality of an-
titrust concerns in merger enforcement. Merger policy also seeks to 
prevent probable future collusion and predation that threaten no 
immediate loss to consumers, to promote dynamic efficiency and 
innovation,97 to maintain the disciplining effect of competitive mar-
kets, and to preserve alternative centers of decisionmaking.9s 
Finally, the holdup argument proves too much. Consumers also 
have incentives to exact holdup payments that exceed their injury, 
especially in class actions brought by self-appointed lawyers. Thus, 
the holdup argument is really an argument against injunctions. As 
we have seen, however, the incipiency standard of the merger law 
can be vindicated only by injunction actions.99 Although the 
holdup problem remains - for all types of merger litigants - its 
prevention requires not the elimination of merger injunction ac-
tions but effective judicial supervision and procedural mechanisms. 
In its recent American Stores100 decision, the Supreme Court 
recognized the key importance of vigorous private merger enforce-
94. Id. at 1160-64. 
95. Cf. Clifford H. Aronson & James A. Keyte, Innovative Solutions to Merger Challenges 
by the DOJ and FTC, ANrrrRusr, Summer 1992, at 26 (increasing willingness of enforcement 
authorities to allow merger relief short of divestiture). 
96. See discussion infra text accompanying note 141. 
97. See Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1559 §§ 0.1-0.2 (Supp. 1992) [hereinafter 
Merger Guidelines]. 
98. Joseph F. Bradley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 'Of YALE 
L.J. 1, 40-42 & n.164 (1977); cf. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 
(1984) {discussing independent centers of decisionmaking). 
99. See supra section II.B.3. 
100. California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990). 
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ment through injunction actions.101 Upholding the availability of 
the divestiture remedy in a private merger suit, the Court declared 
that the injunction remedy - as well as other provisions of the 
Clayton Act -
manifest a clear intent to encourage vigorous private litigation against 
anticompetitive mergers. Section 7 itself creates a relatively expan-
sive definition of antitrust liability . . . . Private enforcement of the 
Act was in no sense an afterthought; it was an integral part of the 
congressional plan for protecting competition .... [within] a statutory 
scheme that favors private enforcement, subjects mergers to searching 
scrutiny, and regards divestiture as the remedy best suited to redress 
the ills of an anticompetitive merger.102 
American Stores and other recent Supreme Court decisions evi-
dence an awareness that standing and antitrust injury are compo-
nents within a larger private enforcement system and that no single 
doctrine can be pursued in isolation. For example, a single-minded 
attempt to root out any trace of incentive incompatibility could 
eliminate all capable and motivated antitrust plaintiffs. Thus, in or-
der to assure that private enforcement remains an effective supple-
ment to public enforcement, the courts in applying the antitrust 
injury principle must balance incentive compatibility gain against 
enforcement loss. The failure of courts to engage in such balancing 
in recent private merger cases is perhaps the single most important 
reason for the threatened breakdown in private merger 
enforcement. 
III. A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO Pruv ATE MERGER 
ENFORCEMENT 
Coherent private merger enforcement requires a unified or sys-
tems approach. A systems approach would view the goals and pro-
cedures of private merger enforcement as a single mechanism 
designed to provide an effective supplement to public enforcement. 
The critical test for determining whether private enforcement meets 
this objective is whether in the absence of government challenge 
against a merger that violates core judicial standards, legally quali-
fied litigants with the capability and motivation to mount an effec-
tive merger challenge exist. Because private merger enforcement 
currently fails to meet this minimum condition, there is a need to 
restore its viability. To do this, we must modify the private enforce-
101. But see Aronson & Keyte, supra note 95, at 27 (stating that divestiture is not im-
posed frequently). 
102. 495 U.S. at 284-85 (citations omitted). 
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ment system to assure that the most capable and informed litigants 
are able to pursue the most seriously anticompetitive mergers with 
the least divergence between the private and public interest. 
A. Criteria for Effective Enforcement 
Effective private antitrust enforcement depends on four critical 
factors: (i) enforcement capability, (ii) gravity of the antitrust viola-
tion, (iii) incentive compatibility between the enforcer's interest 
and the public interest, and (iv) availability of equity or other cor-
rective procedures to modify incompatible litigation incentives. In 
an ideal world, we would maximize each factor, but that is, of 
course, impossible. Indeed, the tendency to focus on a single factor 
in isolation from others threatens the viability of private merger en-
forcement. Instead, the global objective of achieving effective pri-
vate enforcement requires a pragmatic balancing of all four 
criteria.103 But first, we must understand why each factor is 
indispensable. 
1. Enforcement Capability 
Effective private merger enforcement depends on plaintiffs who 
have the financial resources, knowledge of the industry, legal so-
phistication, and motivation to mount a powerful case with speed 
and precision. The need for such litigation capability is critical in 
injunction cases because of the short time frame allowed for ob-
taining preliminary relief, which may be as little as fifteen days,104 
and the absence of a treble damage incentive. Unless plaintiffs gain 
preliminary relief before the merger takes place, the chances for 
effective injunctive relief are remote. The target's assets have been 
melded into the acquiring firm, and the best that can be achieved is 
a divestiture of already-scrambled assets to some third firm, a 
remedy that has not typically been effective in restoring premerger 
competitive conditions.105 Thus, enforcement capability is the first 
indispensable condition for an effective system of private 
enforcement. 
103. Cf. Burns, supra note 60, at 90-93 (suggesting a similar approach to antitrust stand-
ing based on seriousness of violation, indispensability of plaintiff, and judicial ability to man-
age litigation by a less-than-ideal plaintiff). 
104. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 18a 
(b)(l)(B) (1994) (15 days for cash tender offers, 30 days for other mergers). 
105. See Laidlaw Acquisition Corp. v. Mayflower Group, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1513, 1517 
(S.D. Ind. 1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do, REGULATION, Nov.-
Dec. 1981, at 25; Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories, 12 J.L. & 
ECON. 43, 53-61 (1969). 
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2. Gravity of Violation 
The second requirement for effective enforcement is that pri-
vate enforcers must be able to challenge the most egregious merger 
violations. Public enforcers consider the gravity of the violation in 
exercising enforcement discretion and are able to concentrate pub-
lic resources on the most serious antitrust violations. Similarly, in 
shaping procedural rules to control private actions, courts should 
also consider this factor as an indicator of the social harm from the 
violation. 
Indeed, in its antitrust injury decisions, the Supreme Court ap-
pears to have implicitly considered the seriousness of the violation. 
In the Court's key decisions creating and extending the antitrust 
injury principle, the marginal nature of the antitrust violation is, to 
say the least, a striking coincidence. Thus, in the Brunswick deci-
sion, which first enunciated the antitrust injury principle, the sub-
stantive violation was a discredited deep-pocket theory.106 In the 
recent ARCO decision, which denied standing in a nonmerger case, 
the substantive violation was maximum vertical price fixing - a 
theory that, as the Court itself noted, is now rejected by most com-
mentators.107 In Cargill, the challenged merger caused only moder-
ate concentration, and theories of competitive injury were weak.108 
Had the Court been convinced in these cases that the challenged 
transaction was strongly anticompetitive, it conceivably could have 
upheld standing, given the elasticity of the antitrust injury 
doctrine.109 By contrast, in Blue Shield v. McCready,110 which up-
held standing in expansive terms, the substantive violation was a 
professional boycott of rival health providers that was injurious to 
106. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1977); cf. 
Bradley, supra note 98, at 31-33. 
107. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 343 n.13 (providing 
detailed analysis); see The Supreme Court, 1989 Term - Leading Cases, 104 HARv. L. REv. 
129, 324 (1990) (stating that ARCO "all but overruled" decisions holding maximum price 
fixing per se unlawful). 
108. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116-17, 119 & n.15 (1986). 
109. For example, in Brunswick, the Court might have found that plaintiff had survived 
through competitive merit and that its resulting monopoly, free from disruption by an unlaw-
ful merger, was the appropriate reward for competitive success. See Easterbrook & Fischel, 
supra note 49, at 1157 & n.7. In Cargill, the Court might have found, as Salop suggests, that 
the defendant was engaged in a strategic price squeeze, forcing up the plaintiff's input prices 
while lowering prices in the plaintiff's downstream market See Steven C. Salop, New Eco-
nomic Theories of Anticompetitive Exclusion, 56 ANTITRusr LJ. 57, 58 (1987). In ARCO, 
the Court might have found that other enforcers were not reasonably available because con-
sumers would have no incentive to challenge maximum vertical price fixing, and the manu-
facturer's own single-brand dealers would be inhibited by fears of incurring the ill will of 
their sole supplier. See generally Bums, supra note 60, at 94 & n.204 (citing commentators). 
110. 457 U.S. 465 (1982). 
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consumers and obviously a serious violation.111 These cases suggest 
that the Court implicitly recognizes and considers the gravity of the 
violation. 
In merger cases, the gravity of violation determination is rela-
tively straightforward. Authorities agree that horizontal mergers 
raise the most serious competitive risks; Congress also held this 
view in adopting the modem antimerger law.112 Thus, in an early 
private merger injunction case, the Second Circuit, exercising eq-
uity discretion, upheld a denial of an injunction against a 
nonhorizontal merger.113 After that decision, antitrust lawyers con-
cluded that an injunction in a private suit against a nonhorizontal 
merger was generally unobtainable.114 
A standard for assessing gravity of the violation is readily avail-
able in the Department of Justice and FTC Merger Guidelines,11s 
which contain structural indicia for appraising anticompetitive risk 
created by mergers.116 This guides the Department's exercise of en-
forcement discretion and can be useful in making gravity determi-
nations in private cases. Thus, consistent \vith the tenor of Supreme 
Court decisions and the Merger Guidelines, the gravity of the anti-
trust violation should be considered explicitly in shaping an effec-
tive system of private merger enforcement and in determining 
appropriate equity relief.117 
3. Incentive Compatibility 
Effective antitrust enforcement also requires an essential com-
patibility between the plaintiff's private interest in attacking the 
merger and the public interest in competition. Critics of merger 
suits by competitors and takeover targets often exaggerate the con-
flict between the incentives of merger plaintiffs and antitrust 
goals.us Nevertheless, private enforcement clearly raises incentive 
compatibility risks. A competitor might challenge a merger be-
111. 457 U.S. at 483. 
112. See Bradley, supra note 98, at 41-42 (stating that horizontal mergers between com-
petitors or potential competitors were the object of greatest congressional concern). 
113. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 883 (1974). 
114. Cf. ABA ANIITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 1, THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
OF SECTION 7 OF THE CIAYTON Ac:r 32-36 (1977). 
115. Merger Guidelines, supra note 97, § 2.1. 
116. Id. § 2 (identifying market concentration, entry barriers, and similar structural 
factors). 
117. Cf. California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990) (allowing for equity bal-
ancing in issuing merger divestiture remedy). 
118. See infra section IV.A. 
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cause it fears that the merged fiim will become a more efficient 
rival; a takeover target might try to block a merger because its man-
agers fear loss of their jobs. As discussed in Part II, the antitrust 
injury principle addresses this issue by screening the plaintiff's eco-
nomic interest for its consistency with antitrust goals, and that in-
quiry is based essentially on an incentive compatibility rationale.119 
The antitrust injury principle alone, however, cannot assure in-
centive compatibility without risk of undermining effective private 
merger enforcement. To rely solely on antitrust injury to assure in-
centive compatibility is to assume that courts can divide merger liti-
gants into two neatly bifurcated groups - bad litigants with 
incompatible incentives and good litigants with compatible incen-
tives. Litigants cannot be so neatly separated into those with com-
patible and those with incompatible incentives. To be sure, cases of 
clear incompatibility can be identified, as in Brunswick, in which 
the plaintiff claimed injury from increased competition caused by a 
merger.120 It does not follow, however, that in other cases the 
plaintiff's incentives are necessarily compatible. Assured compati-
bility with antitrust goals arises only when the plaintiff can prove 
actual anticompetitive conduct or a specific intent by the defendant 
to engage in such conduct. Such cases will be rare because litigants 
typically bring suit before the merger is consummated and hence 
before postmerger conduct has occurred.121 
As a result, many cases will involve issues of uncertain compati-
bility, as the plaintiff's incentives will be hidden from judicial scru-
tiny at the time of suit. In such cases, the plaintiff will allege a 
future injury that is within the anticompetitive rationale of the 
merger law but will lack clear and definitive proof that the injury 
will occur, apart from the anticompetitive structure of the post-
merger market. If courts deny antitrust standing to litigants of un-
certain incentive compatibility, they effectively bar some 
competitors and takeover targets with compatible incentives as 
merger litigants. On the other hand, if courts allow unregulated 
pursuit of merger claims by ·all merger litigants who assert anticom-
petitive injury, they allow )Vasteful and disruptive litigation. 
Abandonment of the myth that courts can effectively divide all 
merger plaintiffs into good and bad litigants allows for policies that 
119. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
120. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl·O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1979). 
121. Even if the litigation continues into the immediate postmerger period, anticompeti-
tive conduct injurious to the plaintiff appears most unlikely in the face of ongoing litigation 
and expected judicial scru~iny. 
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promote socially productive private merger enforcement. Instead 
of limiting the incentive compatibility inquiry to a single-stage de-
termination of whether the plaintiff sustains antitrust injury, the 
courts should follow a two-stage process. The first stage would use 
the antitrust injury principle as a threshold screen to eliminate 
plaintiffs with clear and apparent incentive incompatibility. In the 
second stage, courts would apply procedural controls and mecha-
nisms to discourage plaintiffs with hidden incentive incompatibility 
from pursuing merger litigation and to prevent litigation abuse by 
any plaintiffs not so discouraged.122 The availability of the second-
stage procedure allows the first-stage procedure to be less demand-
ing than the current antitrust injury analysis because the second 
stage operates as an additional constraint and offers protection 
against suits by incentive-incompatible plaintiffs. A brief overview 
of the second-stage equity procedure will facilitate an understand-
ing of my proposed approach. 
4. Equity Controls and Mechanisms 
Antitrust courts should use their equity powers to assure that 
the litigation conduct of merger plaintiffs promotes antitrust goals. 
Courts need not accept flawed litigation incentives as immutable. 
Instead, antitrust courts can utilize a powerful array of procedural 
mechanisms to control and regulate the skewed incentives of plain-
tiffs who pass the antitrust injury screen - a possibility largely ig-
nored by previous discussions of standing and antitrust injury. 
Stating the mechanism design problem in exaggerated terms will 
serve to clarify our understanding. The plaintiff knows whether the 
merger is lawful or unlawful - for example, whether it promotes 
increased efficiency or injures competition - but the plaintiff's de-
cision to sue does not reliably signal its knowledge because some 
plaintiffs seek to block lawful mergers and mergers that cannot 
threaten them with anticompetitive injury. The antitrust injury 
principle screens out cases of clear incentive incompatibility, but it 
cannot by itself eliminate all incentive problems without undermin-
ing private merger enforcement. 
Thus, despite application of the antitrust injury screen, the risk 
remains that plaintiffs whose incentives are hidden from judicial 
122. Expressed in principal-agent tenns, the second stage recognizes that in regulating 
private merger enforcement, the government as principal need not restrict its supervision to a 
single, one-time only response to the private enforcement agent's suit - an in-or-out deter-
mination of antitrust injury. Instead, the interaction between principal and agent can be 
continuing and interactive, responsive to the case at hand. 
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scrutiny will bring merger suits incompatible with antitrust goals. 
Such plaintiffs may (i) engage in strategic litigation, filing suits with-
out intrinsic merit in order to block or delay a merger; (ii) induce 
wrong outcomes by causing courts to misidentify lawful mergers as 
unlawful; (iii) enter into anticompetitive or collusive settlements 
that do not promote and may harm competition; (iv) fail to brief 
the court on the complexities of merger relief, leading to inappro-
priate relief; and (v) defer merger challenge until after the acquired 
assets have been integrated into the postmerger firm when divesti-
ture becomes costly and often impractica1.123 
What previous analysis has ignored, however, is that the merger 
court, sitting in equity, has extensive powers - both actual and po-
tential - to prevent litigation abuse by merger plaintiffs.124 Two 
basic mechanisms are available through the court's supervisory 
powers. First, the court can use litigation management controls to 
regulate the plaintiff's litigation conduct. Second, the court can 
utilize costs and rewards, which operate as separating mechanisms 
to discourage plaintiffs with incompatible incentives from pursuing 
merger litigation.1zs 
123. An additional risk in private merger litigation is that it might upset international 
coordination of antitrust enforcement. A recent cooperation agreement between the United 
States and the European Economic Community bound the contracting parties to notify and 
coordinate enforcement actions, including merger proceedings, when they affect important 
interests of the other party. Agreement on the Application of Their Competition Laws, Sept. 
23, 1991, U.S.-E.C., 30 I.L.M. 1487, reprinted in 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 
1534, at 382 (Sept. 26, 1991). The agreement does not prevent suits by private plaintiffs, 
which could cause jurisdictional and comity conflict. 
Contemplating possible jurisdictional conflict, however, the agreement allows EEC offi-
cials to ask their U.S. counterparts to file an amicus brief in a private case and vice versa. See 
61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. at 377. Indeed, the United States can file an amicus brief in 
any case in which it perceives a conflict problem; defendants, eager to enlist federal agencies 
to intervene on their behalf, will surely notify federal authorities of any potential conflict. Of 
course, ultimate resolution of the issue - whether by denying the injunction or shaping relief 
to avoid conflict - would be up to the courts, but on a matter of foreign relations, the 
government's views are likely to be persuasive. Finally, most cases involve no jurisdictional 
conflict. See 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. at 375 (only 11 % of significant mergers in 1991 
involved EEC-located firms). 
124. See generally llA CHARLEs A. WRimrr ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE §§ 2947-48 (1995) (detailing judicial discretion in issuing preliminary injunction and 
imposing conditions); John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HAR.v. 
L. REv. 525, 526 (1978) (stating that absence of standards for preliminary injunctions in-
creases court's discretion). 
Although courts recite several specific factors to be considered in preliminary injunction 
cases - for example, threatened harm to plaintiff, impact of the injunction on defendant, 
likelihood of success on the merits, and the public interest in antitrust enforcement - these 
are not rigid requirements but balancing factors in exercising equitable discretion. See llA 
WRIGIIT ET AL., supra, § 2948; 1 ABA AN'llTRUST SECTION, AN'llTRuST LAW DEVELOP-
MENTS 365-69 (3d ed. 1992) (describing the factors courts should consider in merger cases). 
125. A separating mechanism is a commitment by one party that forces the other party to 
reveal its type. Thus, an auction house that requires a $10,000 guaranteed deposit to engage 
in bidding forces impecunious bidders to reveal themselves. 
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a. Litigation Management Controls. Courts have extensive 
powers to prevent delaying tactics that obstruct mergers and to su-
pervise litigation to assure that it promotes the public interest. 
Merger cases require skilled judicial management because such 
suits can upset the delicate timing and financing of a merger and 
because issuance of a preliminary injunction is often dispositive. 
Available judicial controls to achieve these objectives include: (i) 
expedited hearings, which can significantly reduce delay and litiga-
tion costs by shortening preliminary injunction proceedings to only 
a few weeks;126 (ii) hold-separate orders, which allow the merger to 
go forward with the acquired assets held separate until the antitrust 
issues are resolved, thereby allowing the bidder to acquire the tar-
get and the target's shareholders to sell their shares, while preserv-
ing the court's ability to achieve effective divestiture relief;127 (iii) 
possible appointment of an equity trustee to hold the target's shares 
during the pendency of the merger litigation, which functions in 
similar fashion to the hold-separate order, with the added benefit of 
preventing the target from using anticompetitive litigation tac-
tics;128 (iv) amicus participation by federal or state enforcement 
agencies to advise the court on the government's views, particularly 
on remedial issues - advice that when offered has been highly in-
fluential in the courts;129 (v) the /aches doctrine, which bars unrea-
sonable delay in filing and prosecuting merger challenges;130 (vi) 
"curative relief" proposals by which merger defendants agree to 
divest themselves of particular assets raising competitive risks, 
thereby rendering the balance of the acquisition lawful and frustrat-
ing suits by plaintiffs whose real objection is to block the merger's 
126. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co v. Cargill Inc., 498 F.2d 851 {2d Cir.) (grant-
ing preliminary injunction 17 days after filing of complaint), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); 
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'll 65,848 (N.D. Okla.) (denying pre-
liminary injunction 22 days after complaint filed), affd., 1984-1 Trade Car. (CCH) 'll 65,896 
(10th Cir. 1984); Elco Corp. v. Microdot, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741 (D. Del. 1973) (granting 
preliminary injunction relief 9 days after filing); see also Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina 
Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (deciding complex merger challenge in 5 months); cf. 
Texas Teller-Machine Case Resolved by Law Professor, in 6 ALTERNATIVES TO nm HmH 
CoST OF LmGATION 161 (1988) (describing complex antitrust case involving electronic funds 
transfer network tried in a few weeks, based on focused attention of counsel and arbitrator). 
127. See, e.g., FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981); FTC v. PepsiCo., 
Inc., 477 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. American Technical Indus., Inc., 1974-1 
Trade Cas. {CCH) 'l[ 74,873, at 95,875 (M.D. Pa. 1974); United States v. G. Heileman Brewing 
Co., 345 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United States v. International Tel. & Tel Corp., 306 
F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969); United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'll 
68,244 (E.D. Mo. 1956), affd., 370 U.S. 294 {1962). 
128. See, e.g., United States v. BNS, Inc., 848 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1988). 
129. See U.S. GEN. AccoUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 54-60. 
130. California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 297-98 (1990) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
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pro-competitive aspects;131 and (vii) judicial balancing of the equi-
ties to determine whether to issue a preliminary injunction, al-
lowing consideration of public interest factors, including strategic 
litigation, incentive incompatibility, and gravity of the antitrust 
violation.132 
b. Separating Mechanisms. The separating mechanism ad-
dresses the problem of the plaintiff with hidden incentives - the 
plaintiff who claims probable future injury from the merger but 
cannot present clear proof that such injuries will actually occur. 
The separating mechanism uses costs and rewards that induce the 
actor to reveal whether its incentives are compatible or incompati-
ble with antitrust goals. Such mechanisms reduce the ability of 
wrongly motivated plaintiffs to pursue anticompetitive suits but do 
not suppress the litigation effort of plaintiffs with compatible 
incentives. 
Separating mechanisms available in merger injunction actions 
include: (i) Rule 11 sanctions against litigants and their attorneys 
where the suit lacks a legal basis or the plaintiff uses improper liti-
gation tactics;133 (ii) litigation bonds, authorized by both the Clay-
ton Act and Rule 65(c), requiring the plaintiff to post a bond to 
compensate defendant for losses from an injunction improvidently 
granted, which imposes costs on plaintiffs who bring nonmeritori-
131. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) «JI 
68,607, at 61,200 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (approving joint venture contingent upon divestiture of 
certain assets); United States v. Waste Management Inc., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) «JI 68,481, 
at 60,650 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (approving acquisition conditioned on divestiture of assets in 
limited geographic area); Aronson & Keyte, supra note 95, at 28 (stating tbat alternative 
relief includes licensing of key assets or technology and regulation of conduct). See generally 
1 ABA ANTITRUST SEcnoN, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENI'S, supra note 124, at 344-51 
nn.24-26. 
132. See 1 ABA ANTITRUST SEcnoN, supra note 124, at 365-69. See generally Consoli-
dated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 258, n.6 (2d Cir.) (construing an 
equity remedy as "flexible and capable of 'nice adjustments and reconciliation between pub-
lic interest and private needs'" (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944))), 
cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989). 
133. FED. R. Crv. P. 11; see, e.g., Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 
253-54 (2d Cir. 1985) (ordering plaintiff to pay defendant's attorney's fees for failure to con-
duct a reasonable inquiry tbat would have revealed no antitrust injury), modified, 821 F.2d 
121 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); Ford Piano Supply Co v. Steinway & 
Sons, 1990-91 Trade Cas. (CCH) «JI 68,920, at 62,934-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (imposing sanction 
after all complaints were dismissed due to insufficient inquiry); Danik, Inc. v. Hartmarx 
Corp., 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) «JI 67,915, at 57,592-94 (D.D.C. 1988) (imposing sanction 
where reasonable inquiry would have revealed alleged anticompetitive practice did not ex-
ist), a!fd., 875 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1989), modified sub nom. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 
Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990). But compare FED. R. Crv. P. ll(c), which was recently amended 
to make tbe penalty discretionary rather tban mandatory. 
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ous suits;134 and (iii) the existing statutory remedy of attorney's fees 
for prevailing plaintiffs, which creates a large differential in ex-
pected reward as between meritorious and nonmeritorious 
plaintiffs.135 
Moreover, courts can strengthen separating procedures by in-
creasing the amount of litigation bonds above their current modest 
levels, issuing preliminary injunctions conditioned on plaintiff's 
agreement to make advance public disclosure of proposed settle-
ment terms, thereby discouraging collusive settlements and recog-
nizing voluntary undertakings by plaintiffs that demonstrate pro-
competitive motivation as a public interest factor bearing on the 
issuance of a preliminary injunction - for example, adoption by a 
takeover target of governance procedures that separate control of 
the litigation from continued managerial tenure.136 
Thus, effective private merger enforcement does not require 
draconian standing rules that bar private merger litigants who can-
not demonstrate actual injury under a Sherman Act standard. In-
stead, courts can effectively constrain private enforcement using 
existing or judicially augmented equity controls and mechanisms. 
The choice of mechanisms depends, of course, on the particular 
facts, including most importantly, the competitive relationship of 
the potential merger enforcer to the merging firms, whether as a 
competitor, takeover target, supplier, or customer. Hence, it is crit-
ical to determine which of these possible plaintiffs have the capabil-
ity and motivation to serve as effective enforcers of merger law. 
B. Possible Merger Enforcers 
Possible merger enforcers include purely private litigants, of 
which there are several types, and state attorneys general suing in a 
quasi-governmental representative capacity. Because the two 
groups present different issues, they are discussed in separate 
sections. 
134. FEo. R. CIV. P. 65(c); Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. OMNI Promotions Co., 815 F.2d 1407, 
1422-23 (11th Cir. 1987) (imposing $150,000 bond on order enjoining tying arrangement); 
Laidlaw Acquisition Corp. v. Mayflower Group, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1513 (S.D. Ind. 1986) 
(issuing $250,000 bond on injunction against takeover attempt); Grumman Corp. v. LTV 
Corp., 527 F. Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y.) (imposing $5 million bond on preliminary injunction), 
affd., 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 
(D. Conn.) (requiring $10,000 bond on injunction against voting stock in merger target), affd., 
206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953). 
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994). 
136. See infra text accompanying notes 367-69. 
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1. Private Enforcers 
Purely private enforcers fall into five groups - takeover 
targets, competitors, consumers, suppliers, and business customers. 
Competitors and takeover targets are ideal litigants in terms of 
litigation capability because they are likely to have the skill, knowl-
edge of the industry, financial resources, legal sophistication, and 
motivation to mount a powerful case with the speed and precision 
necessary in merger injunctions. Indeed, such litigants may possess 
litigation capability superior to the government itself. The rela-
tively modest litigation staff the government can field in a typical 
case, subject to a high turnover rate at junior levels, is not compara-
ble to the litigation capability of a well-financed target or competi-
tor, with expert knowledge of the industry, the most seasoned and 
distinguished counsel, the most noted economic experts, and 
whatever litigation support it needs. This is particularly true under 
the hydraulic pressures of merger injunction litigation, when a case 
that would normally require months, if not years, of preparation 
must be presented within weeks. 
The superior capability and motivation of competitors and take-
over targets as litigants is borne out by statistical data; these data 
show that over a fourteen-year period, 1977 to 1990, competitors 
and takeover targets brought fifty-four out of sixty-six reported pri-
vate merger injunction cases, or eighty-two percent of such cases, 
and obtained thirteen of the fourteen preliminary injunctions 
granted in such cases.137 A further indicator of the litigation capa-
bility of competitors and takeover targets appears in a recent study 
of the relative success rates of private litigants and the federal anti-
trust agencies in cases actually litigated. Over a roughly compara-
ble period, 1982-1992, private litigants in merger cases succeeded in 
sixty-two percent of the cases tried, a figure subst~tially equivalent 
to the Federal Trade Commission's success rate and far exceeding 
the Justice Department's twenty-seven percent success rate.138 The 
merit of the private merger cases is further indicated by a study of 
detailed economic findings in the somewhat smaller number of 
cases in which findings appeared, showing the presence of highly 
137. See app. (merger statistics); see also ABA ANTITRUST SEcnON, supra note 1, at 11-
12. The measuring period ends in 1990 because that year marked the end of the merger wave 
of the 1980s. . 
138. See Malcolm B. Coate, Merger Analysis in the Courts, in MANAGERIAL & DECISION 
EcoN. 3-4 (1995) (defining success as obtaining preliminary injunction or full trial on the 
merits). 
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oligopolistic market structures and collusive risks and a low likeli-
hood of efficiencies.139 
Litigation capability, however, is a double-edged sword. Due to 
their superior capabilities, competitors and takeover targets are the 
litigants who can most seriously obstruct mergers by strategic litiga-
tion. Moreover, such litigants raise the worst incentive compatibil-
ity problems because target firms may oppose mergers to preserve 
the jobs of their managers, and competitors may seek to block 
mergers because they fear their efficiency consequences. 
Consumers are the least capable litigants in merger injunction 
cases. No individual consumer is likely to have a large enough 
stake to justify investment in the litigation, and a class action poses 
severe organizational problems within the few weeks or days avail-
able to challenge the merger. Moreover, success in merger litiga-
tion does not lead to damages because the monetary inducements 
that typically drive consumer class actions are absent.140 In addi-
tion, neither consumers nor their lawyers are likely to have the de-
tailed knowledge of the industry held by business litigants who are 
directly engaged in the relevant market. The statistics support this 
low assessment of consumer litigation capability: over the fourteen-
year period studied there were only two reported consumer suits, 
neither of which obtained an injunction.141 
Consumers appear to have strong incentive compatibility advan-
tages because their desire for competitive prices accords with anti-
trust goals. Consumer incentives, however, are not perfectly 
aligned with merger goals. Consumers want to buy at low prices 
now, without regard to the effect such prices have on competitive 
conditions necessary to sustain productivity and low prices in the 
future. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in 1916, the antitrust laws 
aim to protect the long-run interests of consumers and not always 
139. Id. at 4-5 (showing that average Herfindahl index approached 4000, high entry barri-
ers were present in 78% of private cases as compared with only 42% of Justice Department 
cases, efficiencies were present in only 11 % of the private cases as compared with larger 
percentages in the government cases, and an overall index of the evidentiary strength of the 
cases found private cases to be stronger than either FI'C or Justice Department cases). The 
study of evidentiary findings necessarily excluded cases in which findings were not entered. 
Id. 
140. To be sure, the successful merger plaintiff can recover attorney's fees, but these are 
unlikely to motivate counsel when there is no pool of damages in which counsel can share 
and which can be used to justify a generous fee award. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private En-
forcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 669, 677-84 
(1986). 
141. See app. (merger statistics). 
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their short-run desire for "an immediate fall in prices. "142 This is 
especially true of merger enforcement, which seeks to preserve 
competitive market structures over the long run and often produces 
no immediate gains for consumers. Moreover, suits by consumers 
are typically class actions, brought by lawyers who seek to earn 
fees, with considerable room for slippage between that objective 
and the public interest.143 In sum, consumers have compatible, but 
not perfectly compatible, enforcement incentives. Consumers, 
however, lack the capability and motivation to be· effective enforc-
ers of the merger law.144 
Suppliers and businesss customers of merging firms fall into an 
intermediate category. They are likely to be more capable litigants 
than consumers but less capable than competitors and target firms. 
In addition, suppliers often face standing difficulties based on the 
directness of the injury when their losses result from a breakdown 
in competition in the end product market rather than in the up-
stream input market to which they sell.145 Neither suppliers nor 
customers necessarily possess detailed knowledge about the indus-
try because they are sellers or buyers, not direct participants in the 
market. 
Suppliers and business customers also occupy an intermediate 
position in terms of incentive compatibility. They would not, of 
course, welcome a merger that creates monopolistic conditions in 
the market from which they must buy or to which they must sell, 
but their motivation to sue is often limited. First, their purchases or 
sales to the threatened market may only be a small fraction of their · 
total sales or purchases. Second, their decision to sue creates a 
free-rider problem because their action would benefit other buyers 
and sellers who bear none of the costs. Third, even if the supplier 
or customer believed the merger would reduce its earnings suffi-
ciently to justify litigation, it would have to weigh these concerns 
against the loss of goodwill likely to result from a suit against a 
customer or supplier. 
In fact, suppliers and business customers have played only a mi-
nor role in private merger litigation. Over the fourteen-year period 
142. United States v. Com Prods. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal 
dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919). 
143. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the 
Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 Mn. L. REv. 215 (1983). 
144. See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 260 (2d Cir.) 
("Consumers are unlikely to face the prospect of suffering a sufficient amount of damage to 
justify the cost of seeking a pre-acquisition injunction."), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989). 
145. See 1 ABA ANrrrn.usT SEcnoN, supra note 124, at 364. 
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from 1977 through 1990, customers and suppliers brought only four 
reported cases and failed to obtain any preliminary injunctions.146 
Thus, suppliers and customers cannot fulfill the role of effective pri-
vate enforcer of the merger law. 
Our survey of purely private enforcers leads to the conclusion 
that the only effective private merger enforcers are competitors and 
takeover targets and that without their effort there would have 
been virtually no private enforcement of the merger law. 
2. States Suing as Parens Patriae 
A final possible private litigant is the state suing in a quasi-
governmental or representative capacity as parens patriae on behalf 
of consumers or for injury to its general economy.141 Can the states 
fulfill the role of effective private enforcer of the merger law, re-
moving the need for other private litigants in merger cases? This 
question assumes increasing importance as the standing of other 
private litigants becomes more precarious.14s 
Despite the importance of their enforcement effort in recent 
years, the states cannot by themselves vindicate the dual enforce-
ment principle. They lack the enforcement capability to replace all 
other private merger plaintiffs in an effective manner; their incen-
tives, while generally superior to those of competitors and takeover 
targets, are subject to their own distorting influences; and the states 
- under whatever legal mantle they act - remain agencies of gov-
ernment, not aggrieved private persons applying the self-help rem-
edy embodied in dual enforcement. 
The durability of the present state enforcement effort is not as-
sured, due to drastic fluctuations in state enforcement over the 
years. State enforcement, active in the early years of the Sherman 
Act, virtually ceased over a fifty year period, reviving only in the 
mid-1980s.149 State merger enforcement is confined to a relatively 
few merger-enforcing states and is dependent on the views of 
changing state attorneys general and state budgetary support in a 
time of increasing financial stringency. The narrowness of state 
146. See app. (merger statistics). Since 1990, the number of customer cases has increased, 
but customers have been singularly unsuccessful in gaining standing, succeeding in only one 
out of six cases during 1991-1995. See supra note 29 (search description). 
147. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972). A state may also bring 
merger injunction suits as a purchaser in the restrained product market, but it then acts as a 
purely private litigant. 
148. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
149. See Robert H. Lande, When Should States Challenge Mergers: A Proposed Federal! 
State Balance, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1047, 1053-56 (1990). 
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economic interests and local political concerns that may be incom-
patible with national antitrust goals can distort the incentives of 
state enforcers. Moreover, the need to conserve limited state en-
forcement resources and to avoid federal-state conflict has drawn 
the states into an ever more intimate partnership with federal anti-
trust authorities - a governmental, not a private, enforcement 
role. Thus, it would be a startling interpretation of congressional 
intent in creating the dual enforcement system to hold that the only 
entity with standing to maintain a private merger suit is an agency 
of government itself. 
Resources and personnel limit state merger enforcement. 
Merger cases are the most resource-intensive antitrust litigation.150 
Within a matter of weeks, sometimes even days, the plaintiff must 
marshall a sophisticated antitrust case involving proof of complex 
economic facts, including market definition, market power, and 
oligopolistic conduct - an awesome task, even for a large team of 
lawyers and economists representing a billion-dollar corporation. 
Yet most states have only three to five antitrust lawyers, others no 
more than one or two, and some states none at all.151 In addition, 
almost none of the states has a staff economist,152 and the tight time 
limits of merger litigation tend to hamper the effective multi-state 
coordination that occurs in other types of state antitrust 
litigation.153 
Financial pressures also inhibit state merger capability and 
growing budgetary limitations on state finances may intensify these 
pressures. Many state legislatures expect antitrust enforcement to 
150. Roundtab/e Discussion with Enforcement Officials, 63 ANrrrRuST L.J. 951, 968 
(1995) (statement of Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, 
U.S. Department of Justice); Telephone Interview with Robert M. Langer, former Connecti-
cut Assistant Attorney General and Head of the Antitrust-Consumer Protection Department 
and former Chair of NAAG Antitrust Task Force (July 31, 1995). 
151. Telephone Interview with Kevin J. O'Connor, Wisconsin Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral and Head of Antitrust Department, and Chair of the NAAG Antitrust Task Force (Aug. 
3, 1995). 
152. Roundtable Discussion, supra note 150, at 968 (statement of Laurel A. Price, Chair, 
NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task Force); Telephone Interview with Kevin J. O'Connor, supra 
note 151. Absence of in-house economic expertise has been ameliorated in recent years 
through access to federal agency economists and financial support from a treble damage re-
covery. Telephone interview with Kevin O'Connor, supra note 151. But there is no assur-
ance that such resources will continue to be available in a time of growing budgetary 
stringency. 
153. Telephone Interview with Robert M. Langer, supra note 150. Other factors hamper-
ing effective coordination include differences in enforcement philosophies, economic impact, 
and antitrust expertise as between the states. ABA ANrrrRuST SEcnoN, supra note 76, at 
70-71. See generally Lande, supra note 149, at 1064, 1085 (discussing how states lack re-
sources and expertise). 
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be self-supporting.154 Unlike treble-damage claims and civil penal-
ties in Sherman Act cases, merger injunction cases make no contri-
bution to state revenues apart from a possible attorney's fee 
award.155 Federal support for state antitrust enforcement under the 
Federal Crime Control Act,156 which subsidized state antitrust en-
forcement beginning in the 1970s,157 is no longer available.158 
While the lack of direct :financial subsidy is offset to some extent by 
in-kind help, such as federal training and expert economic assist-
ance,159 future federal support is by no means assured in a time of 
severe budgetary reduction and differing political views as to the 
merits of state merger enforcement.160 
Reflecting these influences, state merger enforcement has been 
limited. Probably no more than eight or ten states are strongly en-
gaged in merger enforcement.161 As recently as 1985, in several 
states merger enforcement did not exist.162 States have taken a 
more active enforcement role only in the last few years, and they 
became a major enforcement factor only in the 199Qs.163 The viabil-
154. See Susan Beth Fanner, Introduction to 18 J. REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & ECON., 
1, 4 (1988). In at least 14 states, penalties and damages go into a revolving fund to support 
antitrust enforcement. Id. 
155. Even if the attorney's fee award is computed at the prevailing private compensation 
rate, it will not approximate the return from a significant treble damage award. 
156. State Antitrust Grant Program Amendment to Crime Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3739 
(1978). . 
157. See Fanner, supra note 154, at 3. 
158. Telephone Interview with Kevin J. O'Connor, supra note 151. 
159. See ABA Spring Meeting Scrutinizes Redirected Antitrust Enforcement, 66 Antitrust 
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1659, at 411, 413 (Apr. 14, 1994) (statement of Laurel A. 
Price); Telephone Interview with Kevin J. O'Connor, supra note 151. 
160. See Donald L. Flexner & Mark A. Racanelli, State and Federal Antitrust Enforce· 
ment in the United States: Collision or Harmony?, 9 CoNN. J. INTL. L. 501, 534 (1994) (dis· 
cussing the "destructive potential" of competition between state and federal antitrust 
enforcement agencies). Significantly, Donald Flexner was Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for the Antitrust Division during the Reagan administration. 
161. Telephone Interview with Robert M. Langer, supra note 150; see Lande, supra note 
149, at 1050, 1056-59 (revealing that over a 10-year period, 1980-1990, seven states conducted 
most of the merger enforcement activity). More recent data, collected since 1990, combined 
with earlier data, show that only 10 states have been involved in more than one reported 
merger case (including consent decrees) from 1980 through 1994: California, Connecticut, 
MassacJtusetts, Maine, Minnesota, North carolina, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and 
Washington. See supra note 29 (search description). 
162. See Lande, supra note 149, at 1054-55, 1085 (noting that during a 50-year period, 
1930-1980, states filed only 4 merger cases, and none of these occurred from 1930 through 
1960, and that most states have never brought a merger case). 
163. Over the 14-year period, 1977-1990, there were only 7 reported state-instituted 
merger decisions in the federal courts out of a total of 66 reported private merger cases. See 
app. As recently as 1990, leading antitrust practitioners considered a merger suit by a state to 
be an unlikely occurrence. See, e.g., Edwin M. Zimmennan, Section 7 and the Evolving Role 
of Economics, 35 ANTITRUST Buu .. 447, 460 (1990). By contrast, between 1990 and 1994, the 
states brought 11 out of 27 reported private merger cases. 
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ity of state merger enforcement depends on the views of changing 
attorneys general in the relatively few active enforcing states.164 
Consumers in other states, comprising large regions of the country, 
remain unprotected by effective state merger enforcement. 
The states have been very selective in their enforcement efforts, 
concentrating on cases having local consumer impact in a few highly 
visible consumer markets or adverse employment effects on vital 
local industries.165 Budgetary constraints, both state and federal, 
could reduce state enforcement efforts in the future or focus it even 
more exclusively on purely local transactions.166 Indeed, the states 
themselves have recognized their inability to sustain private merger 
enforcement alone and have urged Congress to amend the Clayton 
Act to broaden the standing of competitors, takeover targets, and 
other business litigants in merger cases.167 Thus, the state enforce-
ment effort is incomplete, leaving many mergers that have serious 
anticompetitive impact outside the zone of state enforcement 
infiuence.168 
Further, the state's enforcement incentives are not always com-
patible with national antitrust goals. As we have seen, state en-
forcement is intensely local.169 The state is concerned with the 
164. See ABA ANITIRUST SECTION, supra note 76, at 69-70 (suggesting that localized 
political factors may influence enforcement decisions); Robert M. Langer, Commentary: The 
Impact of Antitrust on Merger Activity in the 1980s - Suggestions for Change, 29 WASHBURN 
L.J. 290, 290 (1990). In New York, one of the most active merger enforcing states, a change 
of Attorney General and Governor led to a 65% decrease in the previous antitrust staff of 17 
lawyers. Interview with Lloyd E. Constantine, former Assistant Attorney General in New 
York and former head of NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task Force (Aug. 8, 1995). 
165. See ABA ANITIRUST SECTION, supra note 76, at 70 & n.345, 80 (describing state 
merger activity predominantly local); Michael H. Byowitz, Mergers, Acquisitions and Joint 
Ventures, in BASIC ANITIRuST LAw 309 (1994) (stating that state merger enforcement is most 
active in wholesale and retail businesses, including supermarkets, department stores, and 
hospitals). My survey of reported state merger cases brought from 1991 through 1994 
showed that only 3 out of 11 cases involved allegations not focused on purely local effects. 
At present, at least 50% of state merger activity involves hospital mergers. Telephone Inter-
view with Kevin J. O'Connor, supra note 151. 
166. The Justice Department currently attempts to persuade state attorneys general to 
limit their antitrust prosecutions to transactions that " 'do not have a national character.' " 
See Bingaman Details Division Priorities in International Antitrust Enforcement, 65 Antitrust 
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1637, at 568-69 (Oct. 28, 1993) (quoting Anne K. Bingaman, 
Asst. Atty. Gen. in charge of antitrust). 
167. See NAAG Resolution on Standing and Divesture in § 7 Cases, 54 Antitrust & Trade 
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1372, at 1175 (June 30, 1988); cf. NAAG Task Force Report, 7 Trade 
Reg. Rep. (CCH) q[ 50,068, at 48,751 (Nov. 12, 1991) (statement of Robert M. Langer, former 
Chair ofNAAG Multistate Antitrust Task Force) (saying that competitors should have stand-
ing to challenge mergers without proof of predation); Lloyd E. Constantine, Speech to New 
England Antitrust Conference (Nov. 2, 1990), in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 131, at 5 (Nov. 
6, 1990) (discussing limited role of states in merger enforcement). 
168. See generally Richard Blumenthal et al., Antitrust Review of Mergers by State Attor-
neys General: The New Cops on the Beat, 61 CoNN. B. J. 1 (1993). 
169. See supra note 165. 
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impact of the merger on economic interests within the state - its 
workers, consumers, communities, and tax revenues. But these 
objectives can be inconsistent with the national goal of competitive 
markets. As a result, the states are motivated to oppose mergers 
that cause losses to their own economies, without balancing gains 
that may be realized outside the state.17° On the other hand, the 
state may not oppose a merger that increases employment within 
the state even when it reduces competition generally.171 The state 
will have relatively little incentive to challenge mergers that cause 
generalized national injury but have no particularized impact on the 
state, such as mergers among manufacturers of nationally sold 
products.172 
Finally, it would be a startling reading of the antitrust statutes 
and their legislative history to hold that the states alone comprise 
the effective class of private merger litigants required by the dual 
enforcement principle. Congress created a private antitrust action 
to enable suits by consumers and, perhaps most of all, competitors 
and potential competitors.173 The states did not play a part in this 
private enforcement scheme. Congress viewed state antitrust en-
forcement as governmental: the states were parallel sovereigns en-
forcing state antitrust laws, many of which had existed before the 
Sherman Act.174 The Sherman Act would enable the federal gov-
ernment to enforce antitrust law in interstate commerce, thereby 
supplementing state enforcement and closing any gap in public 
enforcement.175 
The role of the states in antitrust enforcement differs today but 
remains essentially governmental. The governmental character of 
current state antitrust enforcement arises not from a separate intra-
170. State attorneys general have expressed concern about loss of jobs and local facilities 
within the state - local losses that do not necessarily injure competitive interests. See ABA 
ANTIIRUST SEcnON, supra note 76, at 70 & n.345; Blumenthal et al., supra note 168, at 12-13 
(stating that state enforcers may take job protection into account when deciding among cases 
that "make sense" on traditional economic grounds); Lande, supra note 149, at 1068 (same). 
171. Indeed, state merger enforcement may be a zero-sum game in that a merger em-
braced in one state because it strengthens a local enterprise may be "vilified" in another state 
because it raises prices or reduces local employment. ABA ANTIIRUST SEcnoN, supra note 
76, at 70-71. 
172. See Blumenthal et al., supra note 168, at 10 (stating that local factors almost always 
influence a decision to prosecute a merger violation); Lande, supra note 149, at 1082 (discuss-
ing how states rarely challenge mergers unless they have a disproportionate intrastate 
impact). 
173. See 21 CoNo. REc. 2569 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman); Hovenkamp, supra 
note 40, at 23-27. 
174. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Federalism, and the Theory of 
the Firm: An Historical Perspective, 59 ANTIIRuST LJ. 75 (1990). 
175. See ABA ANTIIRUST SEcnoN, 1 State Antitrust Practice and Statutes 19-20 (1990). 
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state enforcement sphere but from the state's inescapable status as 
a governmental entity and the resulting need for close federal-state 
collaboration to avoid transaction-deterring intergovernmental con-
fiict.176 Such collaboration now includes institutionalized liaisons 
between federal and state enforcement authorities, federal training 
of state personnel, joint federal-state filings of merger suits, propos-
als for deputization of state personnel as acting U.S. attorneys to 
assist in federal prosecutions, and federal plans to divide merger 
enforcement responsibilities with the states.177 While such collabo-
ration conserves enforcement resources and helps to avoid federal-
state conflict, it undermines the states' role as independent victim-
driven enforcers of the antitrust laws that can functionally replace 
purely private enforcers. 
The legislative history of the antitrust statutes further negates 
the conclusion that the state parens patriae suit satisfies the dual 
enforcement requirement. When Congress originally enacted the 
private antitrust remedies, the federal courts had not yet accepted 
the antitrust parens patriae action.178 But we need not speculate on 
whether the state parens patriae action, recognized by the Supreme 
Court in 1945,179 displaces suits by other private litigants. In 1976, 
Congress codified the parens patriae action and made clear that the 
federal authorization, far from displacing the rights of other private 
litigants, sought to provide an alternative procedural means to vin-
dicate substantive antitrust claims.1so Indeed, the 1976 legislation, 
which authorized the states to bring Sherman Act damage claims on 
behalf of consumers,181 specifically excluded the states from repre-
senting any business entity because such entities "are able ... to 
fend for themselves"182 and to pursue their antitrust remedies inde-
176. Such conflict may arise from differing enforcement criteria reflected in separate 
state and federal merger guidelines, differences between regional and national enforcement 
goals, and differing degrees of antitrust expertise. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 
76, at 66-70, 72, 78. 
177. Some commentators would go further and require a fixed division of responsibility 
between federal and state antitrust authorities mandated by enforcement agency guidelines 
or statutory enactment. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 76, at 83-85. 
178. Private remedies were contained in the original Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 
209, 210 {1890). The Supreme Court first recognized the state parens patriae antitrust action 
in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 324 U.S. 439 {1945). 
179. 324 U.S. at 450. 
180. See Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 218-19 {1990); Illinois Brick Co. v. 
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 734 n.14 (1977). 
181. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 15c{a){l) 
{1994). 
182. H.R. REP. No. 499, supra note 40, at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2579. 
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pendently.1s3 Thus, in authorizing the state parens patriae action, 
Congress assumed the continued presence of other private enforc-
ers, most especially business entities.184 It follows that the state 
parens patriae action neither satisfies the dual enforcement man-
date nor precludes the courts from recognizing that suits by take-
over targets and competitors are necessary for effective private 
enforcement of the merger law. 
C. Effective Private Enforcers 
A review of the advantages and disadvantages of private merger 
enforcers shows that purely private litigants - apart from target 
firms and competitors - have been ineffective as merger litigants 
and that the states standing alone cannot fulfill the role of effective 
private enforcers of the merger law. Thus, the only effective private 
enforcers are takeover targets and competitors. Yet, we have seen 
that these are precisely the litigants whose credentials are most vig-
orously challenged under the antitrust injury doctrine. Indeed, 
some lower courts, echoing commentators, have asserted that the 
litigation incentives of competitors are inherently perverse and 
those of target firms oblivious to the public interest. 
Thus, we appear to confront a dilemma. Stated in exaggerated 
terms, competitors and targets know whether a merger is unlawful 
and have the resources and expertise to prove illegality in court, but 
these merger litigants also have distorted incentives that lead them 
to misrepresent lawful and beneficial mergers as anticompetitive. 
The flaw in current thinking about standing and antitrust injury is to 
conclude that the dilemma is incurable and that the courts must 
therefore bar competitor and target suits. Such a conclusion, how-
ever, repudiates the dual enforcement principle and risks serious 
underenforcement of the merger law. Instead, courts should follow 
a more constructive approach, screening out cases of clear incentive 
incompatibility through the antitrust injury principle and eliminat-
ing remaining incentive incompatibility through equity and other 
incentive management controls. 
Some may object to any revitalization of private merger en-
forcement because it will authorize suits by some litigants with 
183. Id. at 9-10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2577. 
184. The 1976 statute does not, by its tenns, bar the states from representing business 
entities in Clayton Act merger cases, the statute having been adopted in response to a judi-
cial ruling hostile to state parens patriae actions in Shennan Act damages cases. But it would 
be strikingly inconsistent to conclude that the states can represent business entities in merger 
cases when the states are forbidden to represent them in Shennan Act cases because such 
entities are able to fend for themselves. 
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flawed incentives. But to admit to such an objection is to pursue 
the illusion of purity of litigation motivation. Litigants in antitrust 
cases, like other economic actors, seek to benefit themselves, not to 
promote social welfare. Most assuredly, therefore, competitors and 
target firms will use merger litigation to pursue their own self-
interest but so will all other litigants; no litigant's personal agenda 
will correspond fully with the social agenda. 
Nor are federal agencies ideal enforcers, as public choice theory 
teaches and as we have seen in connection with state enforcement. 
Government enforcers have bureaucratic and political agendas that 
motivate their actions in ways that are quite distinct from concerns 
for social welfare.185 Congress itself recognized the tension be-
tween bureaucratic agendas and the public interest when authoriz-
ing the state parens patriae action: it required the state to pay 
defendant's attorney's fees in actions filed for oppressive 
reasons.186 
Certainly, federal merger enforcement has experienced drastic 
swings from one extreme tp the other - from zealous enforcement 
in the 1960s to high permissiveness in the 1980s. Political agendas 
raise special risks in antitrust law for enforcement policy may be-
come the captive of changing economic ideologies or the unin-
tended victim of drastic government-wide budgetary constraints. If 
the public interest is defined as coinciding with judicial interpreta-
tions of antitrust statutes, then the alignment between the public 
interest and government enforcement policy is far from perfect. In-
deed, the 1980s witnessed an unwillingness by federal antitrust 
agencies to enforce significant areas of antitrust law because enforc-
ers disagreed with judicial precedent. In some instances, purely 
political considerations influence government merger enforcement 
policy- as the Nixon tapes revealed.187 Indeed, a chief merit of a 
dual enforcement system is its ability to offset such occasional ideo-
logical or political bias.1ss 
185. See SUZANNE WEAVER, DECISION TO PROSECUTE: ORGANIZATION AND PUBUC 
PouCY IN THE ANTITRUST DMSION 171 (1977) (noting a strong tendency to prosecute cas~s 
that can be won easily even when not of economic significance). 
186. 15 u.s.c. § 15c(d)(2) (1994). 
187. ELEANOR M. Fox & LAWRENCE A. SuLUVAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTI-
TRUST 847-50 (1989) (describing how the Nixon tapes show politically motivated interference 
by the White House with federal merger enforcement). 
188. See generally Coffee, supra note 143, at 227 (stating that private enforcement helps 
assure "stability of legal norms by preventing abrupt transitions in enforcement policy that 
have not been sanctioned by the legislature"). 
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It is true of course that antitrust litigants must meet the antitrust 
injury test the courts have required as a condition for evoking the 
powerful antitrust remedies. But the statutory standard requires 
only that the plaintiff's threatened injury occur "by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws."189 Nothing in that language 
prohibits, and common sense requires, that courts apply the statu-
tory test to vindicate the congressional purpose of an effective sys-
tem of private enforcement.19° As we shall see, courts have an 
ample basis for finding threatened antitrust injury in suits by com-
petitors and takeover targets. 
Thus, the illusion of unattainable enforcement ideals should not 
deter us from our earlier conclusion that an effective system of pri-
vate merger enforcement requires that courts permit the most 
litigation-capable plaintiffs to challenge the most seriously anticom-
petitive mergers, subject to appropriate equity and other controls. 
It remains to apply these enforcement criteria to competitors and 
takeover targets - the two classes of litigants who alone can pro-
vide an effective supplement to public enforcement. 
IV. COMPETITORS 
Competitors should have standing to challenge egregiously un-
lawful mergers because they are highly capable litigants, because 
Congress sought to protect their freedom to compete without risk 
of predatory injury from market powerful firms created by anticom-
petitive mergers, and because effective private enforcement of sec-
tion 7 does not appear possible without their participation. 
Although suits by competitors may raise incentive compatibility 
risks, competitors' incentives are not systematically and perversely 
opposed to the public interest in competition. Instead, courts 
189. 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1994). 
190. Courts follow such a common-sense approach to private enforcement in other con-
texts. Thus, they allow patent licensees to challenge the validity of patents even when the 
licensees have expressly agreed not.to do so (and presumably have been compensated for so 
agreeing) because only they may have the economic incentive to test patent validity. See, 
e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). Rival bidders and target firms have standing 
to sue under the securities laws for misstatements of material facts even though Congress 
intended these provisions for the protection of investors because bidders and targets are the 
only litigants capable of policing the SEC filings. See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 
719-21, 722 n.27 (2d Cir. 1971), cerl denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); see also Electronic Specialty 
Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 946 (2d Cir. 1969); Burlington Indus., Inc. 
v. Edelman, 666 F. Supp. 799 (M.D.N.C. 1987). Perhaps most striking of all, injured competi-
tors may bring false advertising suits under the Lanham Act without any showing of con-
sumer injury, despite the fact that the false advertising law has output perfecting and 
consumer welfare goals similar to the Sherman and Clayton Acts. See Bums, supra note 60, 
at 64-69. 
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should evaluate competitors' incentives realistically, screening out 
those with clearly incompatible incentives and controlling and mod-
ifying the incentives of other competitors through equity mecha-
nisms, thereby facilitating challenges by competitors of the most 
seriously anticompetitive mergers. Under these circumstances, 
competitors can be highly effective enforcers of the merger law. 
A. Enforcement Capability 
As compared with other business litigants, competitors are gen-
erally the best-placed firms to pursue merger litigation. The special 
advantages a competitor has as a merger litigant by virtue of its 
knowledge and proximity to the market were well summarized in 
Judge Fullam's recent opinion in Tasty Baking Co.:191 
[C]ompetitors - with specialized knowledge of their market - may 
recognize that an acquisition will enable the acquiring company to 
harm competition by harming the remaining competitors; with this 
special knowledge that enables rapid action, together with their access 
to resources needed to prosecute an antitrust action, competitor-
plaintiffs well may assure that "a plaintiff adequately represents the 
interests of 'victims' of the antitrust violation" and that "in fashioning 
relief fiudges] appropriately address and remedy the actual violation 
rather than simply correct an incidental injury."192 
Although competitors do not have the immediate insight of the 
target firm, whose assets will form a part of the merged entity, com-
petitors frequently have enforcement advantages over targets, who 
will not wish to challenge a friendly merger and typically will be 
unable to challenge an unfriendly merger beyond the preliminary 
injunction stage. An unfriendly merger challenge cannot survive a 
denial of a preliminary injunction because after the bidder acquires 
the target the first order of business of the new board of directors, 
now under the bidder's control, will no doubt be to dismiss the anti-
trust suit. A competitor suffers no such disability. 
Competitors also have litigation advantages over customers and 
suppliers because they need not be concerned about maintaining a 
continuing business relationship with the merging firms. Moreover, 
a competitor with a major stake in the impacted market will have 
greater motivation to prevent restraints of trade injurious to it than 
191. Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1256 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
192. 653 F. Supp. at 1256; see Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 
404, 407-08 (1st Cir. 1985) ("We cannot conceive of a more appropriate plaintiff to challenge 
.•. [a predatory] merger."); cf. California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 278, 279 & 
n.4, 292 n.21, 294-95 (1990) (adopting Cia. Petro/era's view as to availability of divestiture 
remedy in private merger cases and its interpretation of the legislative history of the merger 
injunction provision of Clayton Act). 
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will a supplier or customer whose sales or purchases within the re-
strained market may constitute only a fraction of the total opera-
tions in that market. Finally, competitors with first-hand 
knowledge of the industry are best qualified to evaluate an efficien-
cies defense. 
Historically, competitors are the most numerous private merger 
litigants, and their relative importance has increased in recent 
years.193 Competitors obtained six of eleven preliminary injunc-
tions granted against mergers between 1977 and 1990, with targets 
obtaining almost all of the balance. Competitors have been the 
most important class of merger litigants, and together with targets, 
they have brought eighty-two percent of the reported private cases 
during the above fourteen-year period.194 
B. Incentive Compatibility and Threatened Injury 
The objection to competitor standing in merger cases is based 
on an absence of threatened injury or incentive incompatibility. In 
Cargill, the Solicitor General asserted that competitors who attack 
mergers on predatory pricing grounds have perverse incentives: 
that competitors will challenge only efficient mergers that 
"threaten" them with lower prices and vigorous competition.19s 
Some commentators have joined the negative chorus, asserting that 
competitors in antitrust cases are almost always wrongly moti-
vated;196 that even if some competitor cases have merit, they should 
nevertheless be barred because of their infrequency and the diffi-
culties courts face in analyzing modem theories of anticompetitive 
injury to competitors;197 and that "[t]he identity of the plaintiff is all 
193. Competitors brought 31 of the 66 private merger cases reported during the period 
1977-1990 and 19 of the 34 cases reported during the more recent 1984-1990 period. See app. 
Although these data reflect only reported cases, a comprehensive study of case filings over an 
11-year period also showed that competitors were the most numerous type of private merger 
plaintiff. See also Salop & White, supra note 64, at 9 (stating that competitors are the most 
numerous type of private merger plaintiff). 
194. See app. 
195. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9-12, Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of 
Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (No. 88-473). 
196. See William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competi-
tion, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 247, 256-59 (1985). But see Bradley, supra note 91, at 257-63 (asserting 
that cost-benefit analysis using empirical data indicates value of private antitrust suits, includ-
ing competitor suits); James C. Miller III, Comments on Baumol and Ordover, 28 J.L. & 
EcoN. 267 (1985) (stating that academic fears are exaggerated in view of declining case fil-
ings and reduced substantive liability). See generally Salop & White, supra note 64 (explicat-
ing 1985 Georgetown study of private antitrust litigation). 
197. See Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The 
Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REv. 551, 554-60, 567-76 (1991). Professors Snyder and 
Kauper's negative conclusions on competitor suits were based on their appraisal of the merits 
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the court needs to know."198 These statements present an oversim-
plified and incomplete account of collusive behavior and the dy-
namics of business rivalry, however. 
In fact, competitors may rationally'fear injury from mergers that 
create high concentrations of economic power. Although rivals 
may be able to reap short-run benefits from a collusive merger, the 
rivals' advantage is precarious. The dominant firm or group of 
firms has an incentive not only to collude but also to prevent outsid-
ers who did not contribute to the collusive investment from sharing 
the gains and to exclude rivals who threaten to undermine the col-
lusion.199 Thus, market-concentrating mergers can make the com-
petitive firm a potential target for cartel punishment or market 
elimination through exclusionary and predatory strategies.zoo In-
deed, coalescing merger standards, consistent With developments in 
economic theory, indicate that anticompetitive mergers will be pre-
cisely those that create the exclusionary or predatory capability to 
of 74 cases docketed in 5 district courts within a 2350 case sample used in the Georgetown 
private litigation study, covering the period 1973 to 1983. Applying the standards of recent 
economic analysis of exclusionary transactions to files that were often fragmentary, they 
found the cases largely lacked merit. But perhaps it is not totally surprising that files in cases, 
most of which were brought in the quite different antitrust climate of the early- to mid-1970s, 
see id. at 599-603, should lack evidence to fit economic theories not yet articulated. In any 
event, a study of more recent cases covering the period 1982 to 1992, most of which were 
competitor cases, showed that private merger cases actually tried had a success rate of 62%, 
comparable to the FfC's success rate, and much better than the Justice Department's success 
rate of only 27% on approximately the same number of cases tried; moreover, the private 
cases were based on strong evidence of probable anticompetitive effects - stronger in fact 
than was present in the government cases. See Coate, supra note 138, at 3-4. 
In addition, whatever the defects of filed cases, they do not inform us of the deterrence 
effect of competitor suits - an issue not explored in the Georgetown data. See Bradley, 
supra note 91, at 262 (stating that other empirical studies show important deterrence effects). 
Finally, turning to recent economic theory, see infra text accompanying notes 204-05, it seems 
premature to dismiss its legal utility when commentators are only beginning to craft detailed 
legal approaches. See, e.g., Michael H. Riordan & Stephen C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical 
Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST LJ. 513 (1995). Professors Snyder and 
Kauper also make insightful suggestions on the legal applications of the new theories. Sny-
der & Kauper, supra, at 563-64. 
198. Easterbrook, supra note 74, at 36. 
199. See KARL PRmRAM, CARTEL PROBLEMS 64-71 (1935) (stating that a struggle against 
outsiders is essential to the protective goal of cartels); Leonard W. Weiss, Carte~. in 1 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE: A DICI10NARY OF ECONOMICS 372, 373 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) 
(stating that the growth of fringe firms threatens a cartel and may evoke disciplinary action). 
See generally R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Bidding Rings, 82 AM. EcoN. REv. 579 
(1992). 
200. The terms "predatory" and "exclusionary" are often used interchangeably. See 
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985). But a distinc-
tion between the two can sometimes be analytically helpful. Thus, I shall generally use "pre-
dation" to mean welfare reducing conduct by a dominant firm to drive out a smaller rival and 
"exclusionary action" to describe a broader range of strategies that encompass both market 
exclusion and raising rivals' costs as well as foreclosure of new entry. 
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exclude rival firms or to raise their costs.201 It follows that the in-
centive incompatibility of competitors is exaggerated and that such 
firms, confronted with market exclusion or higher costs, may realis-
tically be threatened with injury from collusive mergers. 
To be sure, we normally assume that competitors will benefit 
from collusion in their market, choosing either to follow the oligop-
oly consensus or to deviate only to the point where they do not 
provoke punishment. But the existence of exclusionary capability 
limits the firm's independence and adds strategic uncertainty to its 
other risks. The firm must henceforth constrain its actions in defer-
ence to the predatory power of its rivals. No doubt some would say 
that is a small price to pay for a rigged market, but why should the 
independent-minded firm be barred from challenging the creation 
of exclusionary market power in its market when plausible condi-
tions exist in which unconstrained independence will benefit the 
firm more in the long run and when possible litigation abuses can 
be controlled by the procedures and mechanisms suggested below? 
Thus, the Cargill decision wisely rejected a broad assault on 
competitor standing and instead denied standing based on a specific 
failure of proof. The plaintiff, though claiming injury from preda-
tory pricing, had neither alleged nor proved predation, and the 
structure of the market made claims of predatory pricing implausi-
ble. Cargill did not hold that competitors were unqualified as a 
class, nor did the Court follow the urging of the amicus briefs of the 
Solicitor General and the Business Roundtable to bar competitor 
suits in predatory pricing cases.202 Most significantly, the Court did 
not decide whether the plaintiff might have sustained antitrust in-
jury from other predatory or collusive effects of the merger.203 Ac-
cordingly, the Court refused to rule whether the market power 
created by a merger might place smaller rivals at a disadvantage by 
means other than predatory pricing. Cargill, therefore, does not 
foreclose an evolution of standing doctrine to permit rivals to chal-
lenge mergers that threaten them with injury arising out of highly 
concentrated markets and oligopolistic conditions. 
201. Thus, the 1992 Merger Guidelines, reflecting modem economic views, identify collu-
sive mergers as those where detection and punishment of deviating firms serve to enforce the 
collusion. As discussed below, the punishment of deviant firms is anticompetitive conduct 
that may harm competitors. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 97, § 2.1, and infra text ac-
companying notes 230-52. 
202. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9-12, Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of 
Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (No. 85-473); Brief for the Business Roundtable as Ami-
cus Curiae at 4-5, 9-10, Cargill (No. 85-473). 
203. Cargil~ 479 U.S. at 114 n.9. 
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C. The Economics of Competitor Injury 
Competitors face possible injury from anticompetitive mergers 
as probable targets of exclusionary strategies by colluding or mar-
ket dominant firms. Exclusionary strategies may encompass cartel 
punishment or dominant firm predation. 
1. Cartel Punishment 
Cartel theory teaches that effective collusion requires the ability 
to punish or exclude deviants and new entrants who would under-
mine the cartel. Colluding firms 'confront a classic prisoner's di-
lemma. Despite the mutual advantage of strict adherence to the 
collusive agreement, individually maximizing firms will deviate and 
thereby destroy the collusion unless the colluding firms have a fea-
sible means to identify and punish cheatmg.204 Thus, the power to 
punish deviating rivals is essential to effective collusion. The pun-
ishment of rivals requires the ability to raise their costs or to place 
them at other harmful disadvantage - in short the ability to exer-
cise exclusionary market power. Exclusionary market power in-
volves the power to exclude rivals or to reduce their output and 
thereby raise prices.205 Typically, the exclusionary mechanism will 
involve the withholding of a necessary input or the denial of access 
to an essential downstream outlet. 
Consequently, when we identify the market conditions under 
which the dominant firm or dominant group of firms possess exclu-
sionary market power, we also identify the conditions under which 
effective collusion is likely.206 This leads to the striking result that 
under cartel theory analysis, the issues of collusive risk and exclu-
sionary capability become one and the same. The cartel theory of 
collusion is now well-accepted and has been incorporated in the 
Justice Department's Merger Guidelines: mergers that reduce com-
petition are precisely those where firms, having reached profitable 
terms of "coordinated interaction," have "an ability to detect and 
204. See Alexis Jacquemin & Margaret E. Slade, Cartels, Collusion, and Horizantal 
Merger, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 415, 417-24 (Richard Schmalensee 
& Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). 
205. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & STEPHEN C. SALOP, You KEEP ON KNocKING BUT You 
CAN'T COME IN: EVALUATING RESTRicnONS ON ACCESS TO INPUT JOINT VENTURES 26 & 
n.33 (University of Chicago Center for the Study of the Economy and the State Working 
Paper No. 111, 1995); Joseph F. Bradley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARv. L. 
REV. 1521, 1532-34 (1982); Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market 
Power in Antitrust Law, 16 GEo. L.J. 241, 249-50 (1987). 
206. In addition to an enforcement system, a cartel requires agreed terms of coordina-
tion, but coordination is probable if an effective enforcement system exists. See Merger 
Guidelines, supra note 97, § 2.1. 
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punish deviations,"207 and for that purpose, a credible threat of 
punishment can be as effective as actual punishment. 
Although some fringe firms may thrive for a time under a re-
gime of collusive prices, no permanent sanctuaries exist for poten-
tial targets of exclusionary strategies. When a cartel group has 
exclusionary capability, the fringe firm faces an ever present risk of 
market exclusion. The risk can be particularly acute for the maver-
ick firm - the firm with low costs, high excess or divertible capac-
ity, superior innovation, an ability to disguise output increases, or 
other factors that make it a "disruptive" or competitive influence in 
the market.2os The maverick firm is at risk because its conduct 
threatens to disrupt the cartel and because its elimination may al-
low a larger increase in prices than eliminating other rivals.209 
To be sure, exclusionary capabilities may not be exercised. The 
exclusionary target may gain more by remaining within the cartel 
than by deviating. The maverick firm, for example, in addition to 
the cartel profit earned by an average firm, stands to gain both an 
efficiency rent to the extent it has lower costs and a bargaining rent 
from threatened defection. On the other hand, defection may re-
main attractive to the maverick and other firms because of the even 
greater profit it can earn from undercutting the cartel due to lags in 
detection and punishment. Thus, the positive probability remains 
that pro-competitive conduct by a competitor may provoke an ex-
clusionary response that threatens injury to the target and restricts 
its independence. In challenging a merger that would give its rivals 
exclusionary market power in its home market or in a market it 
realistically seeks to enter, the potential target of cartel punishment 
acts under incentives compatible with antitrust goals and thereby 
suffers antitrust injury.210 
207. Id. 
208. See id. § 2.12. Another factor likely to make a firm a disruptive influence is its small 
size. See Steven N. Wiggins & Gary D. Libecap, Firm Heterogeneities and Cartelization Ef-
forts in Domestic Crude Oi~ 3 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 1 (1987) (stating that price cutting in 
defiance of a regional crude oil cartel in the 1930s primarily involved small producers in low 
cost fields while larger producers adhered to the cartel price); Merger Enforcement Guide· 
lines Under Canada's Competition Act Adopted by the Director of Investigation and Research, 
60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1513 § 4.8 (Apr. 25, 1991) (asserting that small 
firms exercise a disproportionately large influence on competition). 
209. Of course, this situation also increases the maverick's bargaining power within the 
collusive group. But that increased bargaining power also heightens the cartel's incentive to 
exclude the maverick and avoid sharing its profits. 
210. Threatened injury from cartel punishment stands in sharp contrast to the claim made 
in ARCO that a competitor-plaintiff in a nonmerger case sustained antitrust injury based 
simply on "broad allegations of harm to the 'market' as an abstract entity." Atlantic Rich-
field Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338-40 & n.8 (1990). In a cartel punishment 
case, the threatened injury results from the likelihood that the competitive firm will itself 
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2. Dominant Firm Predation 
Competitors also face threatened injury from mergers that cre-
ate dominant firms. The dominant firm case is an extension of the 
cartel punishment case.211 Indeed, dominant firms have even 
greater incentive to use exclusionary strategies against smaller ri-
vals than a collusive group because the benefits from predation in-
crease with the market share of the predator.212 The conclusion 
that dominant firm mergers threaten injury to competitors draws 
support from economic theory, empirical studies, the views of busi-
ness strategists, and the· under-inclusiveness of Sherman Act rules 
against predation. 
Earlier economic views questioned the rationality of predation 
because it cost the predator more than the prey. These views, how-
ever, require modification under the critique of modem theory. 
The old approach, which was essentially a single market, static anal-
ysis, has given way to a strategic analysis in which reputation effects 
and signaling strategies based on information asymmetry between 
the predator and the prey show that predation can be both profita-
ble and feasible.213 Although the Supreme Court has questioned 
the plausibility of predatory pricing in cases where market struc-
tures were only moderately concentrated,214 it has vigorously up-
become the target of predatory moves. As a result, the Supreme Court did not question the 
standing of a plaintiff who claimed injury from cartel-punishment tactics by a dominant collu-
sive group in its recent Brook decision. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993); see also Volvo N. Am. v. Men's Intl. Professional Tennis Coun-
cil, 857 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988), discussed infra text accompanying notes 244-48. 
211. The Merger Guidelines describe the dominant firm case in terms of the "[u]nilateral 
[e]ffects" of a merger, where the merged firm "find[s] it profitable to alter [its] behavior 
unilaterally ... by elevating price and suppressing output." Merger Guidelines, supra note 97, 
§ 2.2. 
212. See Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust, 
in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 204, at 537, 567. 
213. Thus, pricing predation is rational under modified "long purse" models, where the 
predator's strategy is to reduce the prey's assets or profits in order to cut off its access to 
bank credit, see Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, A Theory of Predation Based on 
Agency Problems in Financial Contracting, 80 AM. EcoN. REV. 93 (1990); Ordover & 
Saloner, supra note 212, at 548-50, reputation models, where the predator prices below cost 
in one market in order to establish a reputation as a predator in other markets, see Malcolm 
R. Bums, Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors, 94 J. Por.. EcoN. 266 
(1986); Ordover & Saloner, supra note 212, at 550-56; Balder Von Hohenbalken & Douglas 
S. West, Empirical tests for predatory reputation, 19 CAN. J. EcoN. 160 (1986), signaling mod-
els, where a predator operating in a market of incomplete information, fixes its price and 
output level to mislead rivals into believing that the market is unprofitable, inducing exit and 
preventing new entry, Ordover & Saloner, supra note 212, at 556-61; Garth Saloner, Preda-
tion, mergers, and incomplete information, 18 RAND J. EcoN. 165 (1987). 
214. See Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Wtlliamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993) 
(discussing the implausibility of a predatory pricing scheme orchestrated by a jointly acting 
oligopoly); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (same). 
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held enforcement against nonprice predation and exclusionary 
practices. 21s 
Nonprice predation provides a more plausible and legally ac-
ceptable setting for predatory conduct because it is not subject to 
the objection that the predatory strategy may impose higher costs 
on the predator than the prey. Nonprice predation includes raising 
rivals' costs or reducing the demand for the rival product by such 
stratagems as exclusive dealing; foreclosure of essential inputs; driv-
ing up common input costs;216 refusing to engage in mutually profit-
able joint marketing;217 predatory system design, which makes 
components produced by rivals incompatible with the system; pred-
atory product innovation, which prevents or reduces the demand 
for the rival's product but is otherwise nonoptimal;21s predatory 
vertical restraints, with which a dominant upstream producer in-
duces the exit of a more efficient rival by extending its market 
power to the downstream market and then engages in exclusive 
dealing;219 and penalty contracts, which are long-term contracts 
designed to deter entry or to capture economic rent from a lower 
cost producer entered into by a monopolistic supplier and its 
customers.220 
Empirical evidence also documents the reality of both price and 
nonprice predatory strategies. Studies of business behavior and 
case experience reveal unmistakable instances of attempted and 
consummated predation.221 A particularly striking example ap-
pears in a recent study of the early years of the American Tobacco 
215. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (citing 
modem theory in tying lock-in case); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 
U.S. 585 (1985) (holding that refusal to deal by dominant firm may be characterized as 
exclusionary). 
216. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965) (holding 
that labor union and large mine operators conspired to fix labor costs of smaller operators). 
217. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 610-11. 
218. See Thomas J. Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust: The Case of Fun-
gible Goods, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1625, 1646-52 (1987). 
219. See Oliver Hart & Jean 1irole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, in 
BROOKINGS p APERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 205, 206 (1990); Janusz A. 
Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. EcoN. REv. 127 (1990). But see 
Snyder & Kauper, supra note 197, at 591-96 (challenging economic analysis of vertical ar-
rangements as speculative). 
220. See Joseph F. Bradley & Ching-to Albert Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing 
Strategies, and Antitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1993). 
221. See F.M. SCHERER & DA YID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET SmucruRE AND Eco-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 339-46 (1990); Ordover & Saloner, supra note 212, at 545-46; B.S. 
Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 129, 137-42 (1972); 
see also Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 589-95; United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 
299-301 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977). 
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Company that reveals repeated instances of predatory pricing by 
the dominant firm to reduce the acquisition price of rivals, both 
directly and through reputation effects.222 Moreover, business 
strategists treat predatory strategies as real phenomena.223 
Thus, modem economic theory shows that dominant firm preda-
tion is rational and plausible; empirical evidence confirms the exist-
ence of predatory conduct, as theory predicts; and business people 
make decisions based on predatory strategies. At the same time, 
Sherman Act suits to recover for predatory injury face great obsta-
cles due to the difficulty courts have encountered in devising legal 
rules to distinguish between predation and welfare-increasing com-
petition.224 These :findings underscore the importance of maintain-
ing vigorous merger enforcement to prevent the market 
concentration that makes predatory strategies feasible.22s Because 
competitors are the only private litigants with the incentive to op-
pose mergers that create predatory and exclusionary capability, 
they should have standing to challenge such mergers - subject to 
appropriate equity controls. 
222. Bums, supra note 213. Unlike earlier empirical studies of predation, which are es-
sentially ad hoc case studies that rely on impressionistic readings of case records and are 
often cited by courts, see, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 589-
90 (1986) (citing Roland H. Koller II, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 
ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. REv. 105 (1971), and John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The 
Standard Oil (NJ.) Case, 1 J.L. & EcoN. 137 (1958)), Bums undertakes a mathematically 
sophisticated scientifically based study using a multiple regression model. Thus, his findings 
give powerful support to predation. Bums, supra note 213, at 267; see also Yun Joo Jung et 
al., On the Existence of Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry 
Deterrence in the Chain-Store Game, 25 RAND J. EcoN. 72 (1994) (providing experimental 
evidence that showed incentive in markets with incomplete information to engage in preda-
tion in order to deter entry); Von Hohenbalken & West, supra note 213, at 176-77 (providing 
an empirical study of entry and exit in Edmonton supermarkets that confirmed predatory 
reputation hypothesis, showing deterred entry in new markets). 
223. MICHAEL E. PORTER, CoMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 482-536 (1985); MICHAEL E. 
PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 88-107 (1980). 
224. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121 n.17 (1986); Zenith Ra-
dio, 415 U.S. at 594; see also Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. 
a. 2578 (1993) (stating sustained below-cost pricing insufficient to prove predation without 
proof of recoupment). 
225. Objections can be made about the persuasive force of modern predatory conduct 
theory and its empirical support. See generally Franklin M. Fisher, Organizing Industrial Or-
ganization: Reflections on the Handbook of Industrial Organization, in BROOKINGS PAPERS 
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS (1991). Moreover, the Supreme Court still 
cites outdated theory without recognizing recent modifications. See, e.g., Cargill, 419 U.S. at 
122 n.17. But antitrust analysis must follow consensus approaches, and the modern theory of 
strategic behavior is clearly central to the contemporary theory of the firm. Reflecting such . 
consensus is the use of modern economic theory in the 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 
97, adopted by a Republican administration and adhered to by a successor Democratic ad-
ministration, as well as in the recently adopted Canadian Merger Guidelines. See Merger 
Enforcement Guidelines Under Canada's Competition Ac~ supra note 208. Finally, even if 
residual doubts about modern theory limit Sherman Act applications, use of modern theory 
is justified under the prophylactic goals of the merger law. 
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D. Proposed Approach: Antitrust Injury Screen 
An effective policy for competitor merger suits requires a two-
stage approach. In stage one, the courts would apply an antitrust 
injury screen to eliminate cases that raise no significant threat of 
exclusionary injury to rivals. In stage two, discussed in the next sec-
tion, the courts would apply equity controls and mechanisms to dis-
courage suits by plaintiffs with hidden incentive incompatibility and 
to assure that prosecution of the merger suit promotes antitrust 
goals. The second stage is vital because the threshold antitrust in-
jury screen cannot identify every case of incentive incompatibility 
unless given a draconian interpretation that would threaten to bar 
all competitor suits. Thus, the stage-two procedure operates as a 
necessary corrective mechanism to prevent anticompetitive prose-
cution of incentive incompatible suits that escape the stage-one 
screen. 
The stage-one inquiry rests on existing standing doctrine, but, as 
applied to competitors, that doctrine is neither settled nor fully ra-
tionalized with enforcement goals. Indeed, since Cargill, the lower 
courts have followed three distinctive approaches in competitor 
cases. First, under the "Sherman Act" approach, the plaintiff must 
prove either actual predatory acts that threaten the plaintiff with 
injury or the defendant's specific intent to engage in such acts. Sec-
ond, under the "exclusionary capability" approach, the plaintiff can 
establish standing by showing that the merger creates structural 
conditions and specific market mechanisms that would expose com-
petitors to significant risks of either predatory exclusion or cost-
raising tactics that threaten to reduce their output. Third, under the 
"threatened market dominance" approach, the plaintiff need only 
prove that the merger creates a market structure likely to lead to 
single-firm market dominance. Analysis will show that a combina-
tion of the second and third approaches is necessary for effective 
private merger enforcement. 
1. Sherman Act Approach 
The first approach requires proof of specific predatory acts 
based on the defendant's past conduct or a present intent to engage 
in predation following the merger - conduct that would suffice to 
show a violation of the Sherman Act. The Fifth Circuit followed 
this approach in Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak,226 which held 
that in the absence of specific proof of predatory conduct, the plain-
226. 842 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988). 
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tiff had no standing to challenge a merger that would create a domi-
nant position in the upstream supply market. The court believed 
that the Cargill decision compelled it to reject the "facially sensible 
proposition" that a competitor has standing to challenge a merger 
that results' in a monopoly.227 The dissenting Justices in Cargill had 
expressed similar fears.228 As we have seen, however, neither the 
facts nor the language of Cargill compels such an expansive 
reading. 
To hold that competitors have standing to challenge a merger 
only upon specific proof of predatory conduct would make the 
Clayton Act redundant for competitors. Proof of specific preda-
tion, whether based on past conduct or present intent, is enjoinable 
under the Sherman Act. To require the same showing for a Clayton 
Act violation would defeat the Act's underlying policy to stop 
mergers before they become Sherman Act violations. Among other 
adverse effects, a Sherman Act standard would bar suits where the 
merger creates market power that did not previously exist because, 
absent previous market power, there could be no past history of 
predation, and well-advised firms would avoid any expressions of 
predatory intent. Thus, the first approach is untenable. 
2. Exclusionary Capability 
The second approach would find the antitrust injury require-
ment satisfied when the merger creates economic conditions that 
expose competitors or clearly identified potential competitors to 
significant risks of market exclusion or reduced output from cost-
raising stratagems. Such risks arise when a collusive group or a sin-
gle dominant firm has exclusionary capability. By exclusionary ca-
pability, I mean the ability to exclude rivals or clearly identified 
potential rivals or to reduce their output significantly by raising 
their costs, thereby threatening to reduce economic welfare. Proof 
of exclusionary capability requires identification of the structural 
conditions and specific mechanisms that make exclusionary prac-
tices or cost-raising strategies feasible.229 As we have seen, under 
the Merger Guidelines, this will be substantially the same analysis as 
227. 842 F.2d at 100. Similar conclusions have been reached in several other lower court 
cases. See, e.g., Treasurer, Inc. v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 682 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.J.), affd. 
mem, 853 F.2d 921 {3d Cir. 1988). 
228. Cargil~ 479 U.S. at 123 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
229. Cf. 2 AREEDA & HoVENKAMP, supra note 67, § 373d2 (explaining that the Cargill 
standard requires proof of "market conditions that make predation economically feasible"). 
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the inquiry into whether the merger creates collusive risks that 
threaten substantial injury to competition.23o 
The cartel theory of collusion is well accepted by economists 
and has been incorporated into the 1992 Merger Guidelines. Econ-
omists generally agree that the economic conditions under which 
effective collusion is likely include (1) high concentration; (2) high 
sunk costs and other entry barriers; (3) excess capacity in the collu-
sive group; (4) ability to raise rivals' costs, for example, constrained 
sources of supply or customer access that can be foreclosed by ex-
clusive dealing contracts; (5) hostage exchange methods, such as 
joint ventures, that enable cartel participants to punish deviants; (6) 
segmented markets that enable the collusive group to target punish-
ing price reductions on limited markets; (7) information asymme-
tries between an informed collusive group and outside rivals, which 
enhance the market power of the disciplining group;231 (8) agree-
ments that directly punish price reductions, such as meeting-
competition and most-favored nation clauses, or that exclude or dis-
advantage potential entrants, such as take-or-pay-for clauses and 
penalty contracts;232 or (9) special vulnerability of the predatory 
target to exclusionary and cost-raising tactics.233 
Similarly, under the Merger Guidelines, acquisitions that reduce 
competition are precisely those where firms, having reached profit-
able terms of "coordinated interaction" have "an ability to detect 
and punish deviations,"234 and deviations will be deterred "where 
230. The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 
479 U.S. 104 (1986), Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990), and 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) do not bar 
courts from adopting a predatory capability approach to competitor standing. In Cargill, the 
Court found that the market did not have the anticompetitive structure necessary to support 
predatory pricing, and thus the merger could have created no predatory capability. 479 U.S. 
at 119 n.15. Similarly, in ARCO and in Matsushita, both of which arose under the Sherman 
Act, the facts failed to show predatory capability. ARCO, 495 U.S. at 336-39; Matsushita, 475 
U.S. at 587-88. 
231. Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp.1250, 1262-71 (E.D. Pa.1987); 
PAUL KLEMPERER, COMPETITION WHEN CONSUMERS HA VE SWITCHING COSTS: AN OVER-
VIEW {Centre for Royal Economic Society 1992); Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Struc-
tural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 295, 308-09 (1987); Richard J. 
Gilbert, Mobility Barriers and the Value of Incumbency, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION, supra note 204, at 475; Paul Klemperer, Markets with Consumer Switching 
Costs, 102 Q.J. EcoN. 375, 377, 386-87 {1987); Ordover & Saloner, supra note 212, at 591. 
232. See Ayres, supra note 231, at 316-18; Brodley & Ma, supra note 220. 
233. See Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 213 {describing the susceptibility of capital 
constrained firm dependent on outside financing to predatory tactics); Judith A. Chevalier, 
Capital Structure and Product-Market Competition: Empirical Evidence from the Supermar-
ket Industry, 85 AM. EcoN. REV. 415 {1995) (same). 
234. Merger Guidelines, supra note 97, § 2.1. 
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the threat of punishment is credible. "235 In enumerating the criteria 
for determining whether these conditions are present, the guide-
lines incorporate several of the specific factors enumerated 
above.236 Thus, the examination required under the Merger Guide-
lines is essentially the same as that called for under the second 
approach. 
A possible refinement of the second approach would limit 
standing to competitors who can show economic characteristics that 
make them a particular target for cartel punishment or predatory 
exclusion. Firms with such characteristics, often called "maverick 
firms," may have low costs, excess or divertible capacity, an aggres-
sive expansionary business strategy, or a past record or reputation 
as a price cutter or disruptive market in:fluence.237 Confinement of 
competitor standing to maverick firms would reduce the feared pos-
sibility that an underperforming competitor might launch antitrust 
litigation to foil an efficiency-producing merger; it would still en-
able suit by the smaller firms that have been among the most com-
petitive elements in collusive markets.238 
Nevertheless, to limit competitor standing to maverick firms 
would threaten effective private enforcement. Such a limitation in-
troduces a complex issue of the plaintiff's economic performance 
and gives defendants a weapon to frustrate competitor suits. It 
would enable defendants to conduct searching discovery into plain-
tiff's costs and business strategies, putting sensitive business data at 
risk and turning the case into an inquisition into plaintiff's own 
business operations.239 Proof of general market conditions that fa-
cilitate exclusionary strategies should suffice to establish exclusion-
ary or predatory capability. Equity supervision and judicial 
controls on litigation abuse, rather than confinement of standing to 
maverick firms, provide the better approach to the problem of 
wrongly motivated competitor suits in markets where exclusionary 
strategies are likely. 
The second approach also applies to potential entrants when 
mergers threaten to block entry into a highly concentrated market. 
To be sure, the identification of potential entrants is fraught with 
235. Id. § 2.12. 
236. Id. §§ 2, 2.12. 
237. See id. § 2.12 (emphasizing competitive threat posed by maverick firms, which con-
stitute an "unusually disruptive and competitive influence"). 
238. See supra note 208. 
239. Although the plaintiff could, on its own initiative, introduce evidence of its maverick 
character and specific risks of inducing cartel punishment or exclusionary tactics, thereby 
placing the issue in controversy, courts should not require it to make such a showing. 
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difficulty, requiring a showing that an entrant is in close proximity 
to the market, has the capability and incentive to enter, and pos-
sesses entry advantages over other firms.240 Exclusionary capability 
against potential entrants typically involves the power to withhold 
an indispensable input, the control of which the merger consoli-
dates within a single firm or small group of jointly acting firms.241 
These conditions will not often occur, but strikingly, when they are 
present, suit by a potential entrant may present a less acute incen-
tive incompatibility problem than suit by an existing rival. The in-
centive incompatibility risk is reduced because, apart from a pure 
strike suit, the outside firm has no incentive to block a merger un-
less it actually intends to enter the market - a competition-
improving step.242 Thus, particularly when other qualified litigants 
are not available - for example, because no competitors remain in 
the market, suits by potential entrants can serve a vital private en-
forcement need.243 
240. See Joseph F. Brodley, Potential Competition Under the Merger Guidelines, 71 CAL. 
L. REv. 376 (1983); see also Justice Department Merger Guidelines, 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 1169 § 4.1, at S-8 (Supp. 1984). See generally 2 AREEDA & HoVENKAMP, 
supra note 67, lj[ 374. 
241. See, e.g., Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860 (W.D.N.Y. 
1994), decision supplemented by 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) lj[ 70,917 (Mar. 6, 1995) discussed 
infra text accompanying note 252; cf. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commn. v. National 
Football League, 791 F.2d 1356, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987) 
(holding that football stadium foreclosed from bidding by NFL rule restraining location of 
teams had standing to sue NFL). 
242. Of course, an inefficient potential entrant might in theory seek to stop an efficient 
merger in order to maintain its prospect for future entry. But it seems implausible that an 
outside firm would seek to enter a market in which a future consolidation of assets would 
place its entry investment at risk. 
243. A similar analysis supports the standing of an unsuccessful bidder in a takeover. 
Although the cases are split on the issue, compare Santa Cruz Medical Clinic v. Dominican 
Santa Cruz Hospital, 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) lj[ 70,915 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 1944) (standing 
granted) with Axis, S.P.A. v. Micafil, Inc., 870 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 823 
(1989) (standing denied), and the commentators are largely negative, see 2 AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, § 373e, standing for unsuccessful bidders promotes antitrust 
goals when (1) the merger creates intensely oligopolistic conditions; (2) high entry barriers 
preclude de novo entry; and (3) other likely challengers are not available. 
Conditions warranting standing were present in Axis, 870 F.2d at 1106, where the merger 
between two of only four competitors in the market, created a postmerger firm with a 50% 
market share in a three-firm market. The merger foreclosed the only available means by 
which plaintiff could compete in the market because patent barriers blocked de novo entry. 
In the absence of the challenged merger, plaintiff would surely have entered the market 
because the target was for sale, the plaintiff had matched the defendant's bid, and there was 
no other likely purchaser, the plaintiff being the only producer not already in the U.S. mar-
ket. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff's incentives were entirely compatible with anti-
trust goals because the plaintiff stood to profit from increased competition, and there was no 
other available private litigant. Thus, the plaintiff suffered antitrust injury and should have 
been accorded standing. The court's contrary conclusion illustrates the danger of applying a 
formalistic standing doctrine without sufficient reflection on underlying policies. 
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Three recent lower court cases uphol4ffig competitor standing 
illustrate how the second approach can be applied. The first case 
involves exclusionary cartel restraints, the second involves preda-
tory capability by a dominant firm, and the third involves exclusion-
ary foreclosure of new entry. In Volvo,244 the Second Circuit held 
that participants in a cartel had standing tp challenge exclusionary 
cartel restrictions that hampered their ability to compete with other 
cartel members. The challenged cartel rules prevented the plain-
tiffs, who were producers of tennis events, from sponsoring separate 
tennis matches in competition with league-sponsored events. Re-
jecting the defendants' argument that competitors could only bene-
fit from membership in a cartel, the court explained that even 
though a rule "presumably operates to the cartel's aggregate bene-
fit, the restraint may operate to the detriment of an individual 
member."245 Individual members may have different costs or other 
characteristics that make competition attractive. Under these con-
ditions "the [cartel] member's interest coincides with the public in-
terest in vigorous competition . . . [satisfying] the antitrust injury 
requirement. "246 
The Volvo decision thus supports competitor standing in merger 
cases when market conditions facilitate exclusionary practices by 
cartel members. In Volvo, these conditions included denial of ac-
cess to an essential input, that of league-sponsored players; hostage 
exchange dependencies based on the need for continuing coopera-
tion from the other members of the tennis league; and other rules 
that raised the costs of deviating rivals.247 The plaintiffs were likely 
targets for cartel discipline or market exclusion because they were 
seeking to compete in innovative ways and to expand the number 
of tennis matches offered to the public.248 
In Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc.,249 the court upheld 
the standing of a competitor to challenge a merger based on evi-
244. Volvo N. Am. v. Men's Intl. Professional Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988). 
245. 857 F.2d at 67. 
246. 857 F.2d at67-68 (citations omitted); see also NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104-08 (1984) (asserting that restrictions by sports league on individual 
competitors' freedom to compete can be anticompetitive); 2 AREEnA & Ho'VENKAMP, supra 
note 67, 'H 340.2f to -.2g. 
247. 857 F.2d at 60-62. 
248. See 851 F.2d at 58-60. The fact that the Volvo case involved actual restraints within a 
presently operating cartel does not bar its application to merger cases. If a competitor has 
standing to challenge exclusionary cartel practices under the Shennan Act, then under the 
incipiency standard of the Clayton Act, it should be able to challenge a merger that creates 
the exclusionary capability to engage in such practices. 
249. Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
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dence of exclusionary capability by a dominant firm. The merger 
threatened the plaintiff with antitrust injury because exclusionary 
conduct was feasible in the impacted baking industry and would 
benefit the market dominant defendant. Evidence of exclusionary 
capability rested on proof of market dominance, high entry barri-
ers, excess capacity in the dominant firm, and other market charac-
teristics that made predatory tactics feasible, including customer 
leverage through control of dominant brands, localized markets 
that enabled existing producers to target exclusionary moves, and 
similar structural features.250 Although proof of past predation in 
other markets and proof of intent to monopolize the present mar-
ket buttressed the showing of exclusionary capability in Tasty Bak-
ing, the court's finding that the plaintiff-competitor was threatened 
with antitrust injury essentially rested on proof of exclusionary 
capability. 251 
In Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Department Stores Co.,252 the 
court upheld the standing of a potential department-store entrant 
to challenge a merger that would have foreclosed entry into a 
highly concentrated market. The plaintiff's status as a potential en-
trant into the Rochester, N.Y. regional market was clear because 
plaintiff, which owned a chain of department stores elsewhere in 
the Northeast, was engaged in a general expansion of locations in 
western New York and had ten stores in nearby Buffalo. The 
merger clearly threatened to foreclose the plaintiff's entry into the 
Rochester market because the merged firm would control all pres-
ently available space in the four major regional shopping malls criti-
cal for effective department-store competition. Thus, the case 
provides an apt illustration of potential entrant standing where the 
merged firm has the capability to bar effective entry by a clearly 
identifiable potential entrant into a highly concentrated market. 
3. Threatened Market Dominance 
The third approach, a simplified version of the second, would 
give competitors standing to challenge mergers when the merger 
250. 653 F. Supp. at 1260-70. Other factors included (1) constrained access to customers 
due to limited retail shelf space and an unwillingness by retailers to carry more than three or 
four brands; (2) large cash resources, allowing credible predatory threats; and (3) a capacity 
to absorb the market share of rivals who leave the market. 653 F. Supp. at 1273-75. 
251. Similar results were reached in White Consol. Indus. v. Whirlpool Corp., 612 F. 
Supp.1009, 1027, 1032 (N.D. Ohio), injunction vacated, 619 F. Supp.1022 (N.D. Ohio 1985), 
affd., 781 F.2d 1224 (6th Cir. 1986), and Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman 
Brewing Co., 753 F.2d 1354, 1357-58 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985). 
252. 881 F. Supp. 860 (W.D.N.Y. 1994), decision supplemented by 1995-1 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) <JI 70-917 (Mar. 6, 1995). 
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creates a market structure that results in single-firm market domi-
nance. The third approach simplifies the issue of antitrust injury 
when the market structure meets two essential preconditions, high 
concentration and significant entry barriers - conditions explicitly 
recognized in the Cargill case as necessary for predatory pricing. 
The presence of these conditions permits a presumption of both 
collusive and exclusionary risk. The presumption is justified be-
cause both collusion and exclusionary conduct are most likely in 
markets dominated by a single firm, where organizational costs are 
low, and benefits need not be shared with outside firms.253 
The simplified presumption the third approach permits roughly 
follows the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, which draw a 
distinction between horizontal mergers in highly concentrated mar-
kets and those in less concentrated markets.254 The guidelines pre-
sume that in highly concentrated markets a significant merger is 
"likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise," 
while in less concentrated markets, mergers are suspect only when 
other factors indicate significant risks of collusive action and cartel 
enforcement capability.255 
Economy of enforcement leads to a preference for the third ap-
proach when structural conditions strongly indicate the probable vi-
olation of section 7. Using the definition of predatory capability 
outlined in Cargill, suspect market structures for dominant firms 
can be defined in terms of a postmerger market share of at least 
sixty percent and the presence of significant entry barriers.256 If a 
plaintiff has established that these two conditions are present and 
that the merger would significantly increase concentration, it has 
made a sufficient showing of threatened injury under the Clayton 
Act.257 
253. See OLIVER E. WILUAMsoN, MARKE-rs AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTI-
TRUST IMPLICATIONS 245-46 (1975) (explaining that dominant finns more easily maintain 
collusion because they need not write a contract specifying terms of coordination but need 
only work out punishment system); Ordover & Saloner, supra note 212, at 567 (explaining 
that benefits of predation increase with market share). 
254. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 97, §§ 1.51, 2.0. 
255. Id. 
256. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119 n.15 (1986). 
257. In Cargil~ the Court also noted a third condition: the excess capacity sufficient to 
serve the market after the victim is excluded. 479 U.S. at 119-20 n.15. This condition was a 
realistic constraint in Cargil~ where the alleged predator would have a postmerger market 
capacity share of only 28%, but it becomes Jess important as the dominant firm achieves 
preponderant market control. Except in economic booms, markets generally have some ex-
cess capacity, presumably capacity sufficient to allow a dominant firm to serve the supply 
gaps that the exit of small fringe rivals creates. Thus, as applied to dominant firm mergers, 
the use of an excess capacity precondition weakens the simplicity and predictability of the 
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The third approach thus permits a finding of antitrust injury 
where the risks of predation or exclusionary conduct are highest, 
and the probability of efficiencies loss is least because the firms are 
already of large market size.258 These are in fact the mergers that 
require the most careful scrutiny and also those where private chal-
lenge by competitors can best supplement public enforcement. 
The Second Circuit decision in R. C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever 
N. V. 259 essentially followed the third approach. The court held that 
a plaintiff-competitor satisfied the antitrust injury requirement by 
proving that a merger would increase the market share of the lead-
ing firm from fifty-two to eighty-four percent, leaving the market 
with only two significant competitors. Despite this high market 
concentration that resulted in an extraordinary postmerger two-
firm market share of ninety-seven percent,26° the district court 
ruled that the plaintiff had suffered no antitrust injury because it 
had offered no proof of past predation or present predatory intent. 
Reversing the district court, the Second Circuit held that a mar-
ket share "indicative of substantial market power . . . constitutes 
sufficient evidence, in and of itself, of antitrust injury to a competi-
tor to create a genuine issue for trial."261 The Second Circuit found 
no inconsistency with Cargill, where the postmerger market share 
of twenty-one percent was too low to support an inference of 
threatened predation.262 
The Bigelow decision thus permits an inference of both anticom-
petitive risk and threatened predatory injury when the merger 
would create a dominant firm in a market with high entry barriers. 
Under these extreme structural conditions, the same evidence that 
supports a prima facie presumption of injury to competition from 
acquisition of "substantial monopoly power" permits a finding of 
dominant firm predatory or exclusionary capability that threatens 
injury to a competitor.263 Thus, the Second Circuit held that, at 
third approach. Although it remains possible that an excess capacity constraint hampers 
predatory capability, courts should place the burden of proof on the dominant firm. 
258. See Alan A. Fisher et al., Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CAL. L. REV. 777, 
778·91 {1989). 
259. 867 F.2d 102 {2d Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 815 (1989). 
260. 867 F.2d at 111. 
261. 867 F.2d at 111. The court made no explicit entry barrier findings, probably because 
such barriers were self-evident in a merger between the two leading brands of highly adver-
tised consumer products that created a two-firm market share of 97%. 
262. 867 F.2d at 109-10. 
263. The court suggested that predatory injury might occur "inter alia, [by] reducing [the 
plaintiff's] access to supermarket shelf space for its products." 867 F.2d at 111. But this 
example was simply one of several possible examples the plaintiff had offered to show how 
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least on the issue of standing to seek a preliminary injunction, the 
plaintiff need not show the precise mechanism of future predatory 
injury from a merger that effectively creates a market dominating 
firm.264 
The Supreme Court's recent ARCO ruling,26s discussed earlier, 
which denied standing to a competitor who sought to challenge a 
vertical maximum price fixing agreement, does not bar the third 
approach. The antitrust injury issue in ARCO differed from that 
presented in a horizontal merger because the alleged antitrust vio-
lation challenged in ARCO - vertical maximum price fixing -
was designed to protect a manufacturer's own dealers from compet-
itive domination by their supplier but not rival dealers such as the 
ARCO plaintiffs, who remained independent actors in the market. 
By contrast, as Cargill recognized,266 Congress did not intend the 
merger statute to preclude protecting competitor-plaintiffs' ability 
to compete free of threatened injury from predatory restraints by 
market dominating firms. Moreover, in ARCO, the Court found 
that other classes of private enforcers were available to enforce the 
much criticized rule against vertical maximum price fixing whereas 
in a merger case the competitor-plaintiff will typically be the only 
available private enforcer.267 Thus, ARCO does not foreclose the 
third approach to competitor standing nor undermine the persua-
sive force of Bigelow. 26s 
In the first stage of antitrust injury analysis, therefore, courts 
should follow a combination of the exclusionary capability and 
threatened market dominance approaches. Where the merger leads 
to market concentration falling short of single firm dominance, 
courts should use the exclusionary capability approach, finding 
the dominant finn might use the monopoly power created by the merger to injure the plain-
tiff and was not a proven fact. There was no finding that the dominant finn was likely to use 
any specific predatory tactic. 
264. 867 F.2d at 111. 
265. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990). 
266. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121-22 (1986). 
267. In addition, in ARCO, serious incentive incompatibility was present because the 
plaintiff claimed injury from increased competition in a market where the participants lacked 
market power. See USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 577 F. Supp. 1296, 1304-06 
(C.D. Cal. 1983), revd., 859 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1988), revd., 495 U.S. 328 (1990). By contrast 
under the third approach, the plaintiff claims injury from a merger that would create a 
market-dominant finn with presumed predatory capability. 
268. But see Remington Prods. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 755 F. Supp. 52, 57-58 (D. 
Conn. 1991) (declining to follow Bigelow in light of ARCO where plaintiff had failed to prove 
specific predatory practices); William H. Page & Roger D. Blair, Controlling the Competitor 
Plaintiff in Antitrust Litigation, 91 MICH. L REv. 111, 117-18 (1991) (questioning whether 
Bigelow presumption survives ARCO). 
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threatened exclusionary injury when the merger creates market 
conditions that enable a single firm or small group of jointly acting 
firms to exclude rivals or to raise their costs significantly in ways 
that reduce economic welfare. Where the merger leads to single-
firm market dominance with high entry barriers, courts should find 
threatened predatory injury based on those facts alone, subject to 
the affirmative defense of lack of excess capacity. Either finding 
would satisfy the first-tier requirement for standing. But, of course, 
the plaintiff would remain subject to the formidable constraints of 
the second-stage procedure. 
4. Illustration: Aspen Skiing Co. 
The facts in Aspen Skiing Co.269 provide a vivid illustration of 
the proposed first-stage antitrust injury analysis. In Aspen, the 
Supreme Court upheld findings that a market dominant firm had 
engaged in predatory conduct against a smaller rival in violation of 
the Sherman Act. Although the defendant had achieved its domi-
nant position through merger, the plaintiff did not challenge the 
merger, which had occurred many years before. Suppose, however, 
that the plaintiff had sought to enjoin the acquisition when it oc-
curred. Would the plaintiff have been able to demonstrate antitrust 
injury? 
The development of the Aspen skiing area was the work of 
three separate investment groups. The three groups cooperated in 
offering a multi-area ski pass, which had great consumer appeal, 
enhancing the variety of a ski vacation. Subsequently, two of the 
three groups merged, combining three of the four ski facilities in 
Aspen and leaving plaintiff as the sole remaining competitor with 
about twenty percent of the market. For a few years cooperation 
continued, but eventually, the defendant sought to minimize the 
plaintiff's share of revenues and ultimately to exclude it entirely 
from the multi-area arrangement. This left the plaintiff with no ef-
fective way to offer skiers access to the variety of skiing facilities 
that customers preferred, and plaintiff's share of ski revenues fell 
drastically. The Supreme Court upheld a Sherman Act damage 
judgement, ruling that defendant's conduct reduced competition, 
lacked business justification, and injured both the plaintiff and 
consumers.270 
269. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
270. See 472 U.S. at 610-11. 
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Suppose that at the time of the original Aspen acquisition, the 
plaintiff had sought an injunction to prevent the merger. Defend-
ant would no doubt have argued that the plaintiff sustained no anti-
trust injury. The judicial nlling on standing would then have 
depended on which of the three approaches discussed above the 
court followed. Under the first approach, which requires proof of 
past predation or present intent to engage in predation, the court 
would almost surely have found an absence of antitrust injury. The 
defendant, which owned ski facilities in other geographic areas, had 
apparently not engaged in predatory acts elsewhere.211 In Aspen 
itself, predation became possible only after the merger, when the 
defendant obtained market dominance. No doubt the defendant 
would have argued that plaintiff only stood to gain from the collu-
sive effects of the merger. 
Under the second approach, plaintiff could have made a strong 
argument that the merger would give the defendant exclusionary 
capability, threatening the plaintiff with future injury, but the issue 
would not have been free from doubt. Tending to show exclusion-
ary capability are: the merger would have created a market domi-
nant firm in a market with high entry barriers and high sunk costs; 
entry required governmental approvals, which were difficult to ob-
tain due to environmental concerns; defendant could have raised 
plaintiff's costs by denying access to three of the four ski facilities; 
defendant apparently had excess capacity, giving it an incentive to 
either exclude plaintiff or to reduce its market share; a hostage ex-
change mechanism existed enabling the defendant to punish the 
plaintiff because the existing multi-area pass by necessity required 
the defendant's continuing cooperation on a variety of procedural 
matters; and plaintiff was particularly vulnerable to such exclusion-
ary and cost-raising tactics because continued participation in the 
joint pass arrangement was necessary for access to weekly destina-
tion skiers in a market too geographically remote to attract day 
skiers.272 
On the other hand, the product was not homogeneous as the 
mountains differed in skiing characteristics and facilities, and view-
ing the issue prospectively, various counterstrategies by plaintiff ap-
peared possible to offset the effects of exclusion from the multi-area 
arrangement.273 In addition, future predation might have appeared 
271. See 472 U.S. at 589-93, 610-11. 
272. 472 U.S. at 588, 592, 594. 
273. In fact, plaintiff attempted several countermeasures to create its own multi-area ar-
rangement, but all failed. For example, when plaintiff tried to issue cash vouchers redeem-
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implausible in view of Aspen's need to compete with other national 
ski destinations in offering multi-area ski passes. These offsetting 
factors appear insufficient to rebut the strong elements indicating 
exclusionary capability, but a multifactor analysis applied in ad-
vance of the merger transaction can never be fully predictive. 
Under the third, or, threatened market dominance approach, 
plaintiff would clearly have standing. The merger created a firm 
with an eighty percent market share and an HHI concentration ra-
tio of 6800 in a market with very high entry barriers, and there ap-
peared no basis for finding the dominant firm lacked excess 
capacity to serve an increased market share. The court would thus 
presume threatened antitrust injury from the clear prima facie 
showing of market dominance resulting from the merger. Defend-
ant of course could attempt to disprove the threat to competition 
but not by attacking the plaintiff's standing to challenge the 
merger. 
The subsequent history of the Aspen dispute as reflected in the 
plaintiff's drastic loss of market share274 would have justified a 
competitor's concern that a merger creating a market dominant 
firm may eventually threaten it with predatory injury and ultimately 
destroy its ability to compete effectively. In such cases, the compet-
itor should not have to wait until it is actually injured or excluded 
from the market to seek redress. The Aspen illustration shows how 
the courts can prevent antitrust abuse, promote effective merger 
enforcement, and maintain competitive markets by recognizing a 
competitor's standing to challenge mergers that create high concen-
trations of market power. 
E. Equity Controls and Mechanisms 
Although the indictment against competitor suits is overdrawn, 
competitor suits do present incentive problems. At the same time, 
such suits also serve indispensable enforcement purposes, and with-
out them, no viable private enforcement of the merger law can oc-
cur. The proposed two-stage enforcement procedure addresses the 
dilemma directly. After the first-stage inquiry has eliminated com-
petitor plaintiffs with clear incentive incompatibility, the court 
able at local banks for local purchases, defendant refused to honor the vouchers. Similarly, 
defendant refused to sell ski tickets to plaintiff. Plaintiff was thus reduced to issuing trav-
eler's checks for skiers to use at other facilities, obviously a more costly alternative. 472 U.S. 
at 593-94. 
274. After abolition of the four-area ticket, plaintiff became basically "a day ski area in a 
destination resort," and accordingly, plaintiff's market share fell by almost 50% in the fol-
lowing four years. 472 U.S. at 594-95. 
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would then move to the second-stage analysis. In stage two, the 
court would apply procedural controls to prevent litigation abuse 
by plaintiffs who challenge mergers in markets where predatory ca-
pabilities exist and injurious predatory strategies are plausible. 
The incentive compatibility problem of competitor suits arises 
from risks of strategic litigation that can upset the timing of a 
merger, collusive or anticompetitive settlements that compromise 
public interest goals, the lesser problems of wrong outcomes caused 
by the need for speedy resolution, and ineffective relief due to pos-
sible delayed filing or insufficient briefing on remedial issues. Ex-
isting procedures can effectively manage most, if not all, of these 
risks. Suggested improved procedures can control the remaining 
problems, of which the risk of collusive settlement is perhaps 
paramount. 
1. Existing Procedures 
Effective procedures to prevent competitor abuse in merger liti-
gation include: (1) expedited hearings, which can shorten prelimi-
nary injunction proceedings to a few weeks; (2) hold-separate 
orders, which allow mergers to go forward with the acquired assets 
held separately thereby assuring continued independence of the tar-
get until the antitrust issues are resolved; (3) curative relief orders, 
by which defendants agree to divest particular assets raising com-
petitive risks, thereby allowing the merger to proceed while frus-
trating suits by competitors intent on blocking the merger's pro-
competitive aspects; (4) amicus participation by state or federal en-
forcement agencies advising the court on the government's views, 
particularly on issues of effective relief; (5) the /aches doctrine, 
which bars unreasonable delay in filing and prosecuting merger 
suits; ( 6) litigation bonds, requiring the plaintiff to compensate the 
defendant for losses from injunctions improvidently granted, which 
penalize strategic plaintiffs, who face a high probability of bond for-
feiture;275 (7) Rule 11 sanctions, which impose penalties on counsel 
and parties who file nonmeritorious suits;276 and (8) judicial exer-
cise of equitable discretion in issuing preliminary injunctions. 
275. But the failure of the courts to set bonds at sufficiently high levels has limited the 
disciplining effect of this procedure. See infra note 277. 
276. Rule 11 sanctions apparently have not been imposed in merger cases but have been 
exacted in several antitrust cases, see supra note 133, and there is at least some concern that 
the Rule may inhibit antitrust suits. See Daniel E. Lazaroff, Rule 11 and Federal Antitrust 
Litigation, 61 TuL. L. REv. 1033 (1993). 
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2. Improved Procedures 
Although the existing procedures appear sufficient to contain 
most risks of litigation abuse, the courts can strengthen these proce-
dures in at least three ways. First, courts may increase the size of 
litigation bonds to deter strategic litigation more effectively. Sec-
ond, courts may discourage collusive settlements by requiring pub-
lic disclosure of proposed settlements or by encouraging the 
plaintiff's voluntary undertaking to make such disclosure. Third, 
courts may encourage other voluntary undertakings by merger 
plaintiffs that reduce risks of litigation abuse, such as an agreement 
for fee-shifting for suits found to be frivolous or without 
foundation. 
a. Litigation Bonds. Courts can raise the costs of strategic lit-
igation by increasing the size of litigation bonds. Bonds in merger 
cases appear modest, far below the possible costs an improvident 
injunction could inflict on the defendant.277 In setting bonds, the 
courts properly take into account the plaintiff's ability to pay in 
order to assure that the bond requirement does not bar suit alto-
gether. 278 But in many cases, bonds could be much higher than 
their often de minimis level without preventing suit by plaintiffs 
with compatible incentives. This conclusion follows because the 
bond requirement operates differentially, making expected costs 
much higher for incentive incompatible plaintiffs, who face a high 
probability of bond forfeiture, than for the plaintiff whose incen-
tives accord with antitrust goals.279 Thus, the bond operates as a 
separating mechanism, discouraging suits by plaintiffs with incom-
patible incentives, but not by those with compatible incentives. 
277. See, e.g., Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 527 F. Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y.) (requiring $5 
million bond for acquisition of $844 million target), affd., 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981); Hamil-
ton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.) (requiring $10,000 bond in 
acquisition of $18 million company), affd., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953). 
278. See F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 597 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1979); 7 
JAMES W. MOORE ET AL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE q[ 65.09 (2d ed. 1994). 
279. Expected costs depend on the probability, as well as the magnitude, of a loss, and 
the two types of plaintiffs face different probabilities of loss. The incentive incompatible 
plaintiff who attempts to block a pro-competitive merger faces a higher probability of bond 
forfeiture than the incentive compatible plaintiff who challenges an anticompetitive merger. 
Of course, even a small risk of paying a financially crippling bond will deter normally risk 
averse managers. The judicial objective should therefore be to set the bond at the highest 
level that will not discourage the plaintiff with compatible incentives from challenging a 
highly coilusive merger, taking into account the moderate forfeiture risk if plaintiff misjudges 
the merger's illegality. 
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b. Disclosure of Settlement. To discourage collusive and an-
ticompetitive settlements, the court can condition a preliminary in-
junction on plaintiff's agreement to report and publicly disclose the 
terms of any settlement, with notice to enforcement agencies. Suits 
by competitors raise risks of anticompetitive settlement because 
business rivals can use settlement agreements to mask restraints of 
trade and because plaintiffs may settle suits collusively, compromis-
ing the deterrence goal and the public interest purpose of the pri-
vate merger suit.280 
Although courts have no explicitly stated authority to disap-
prove settlements in cases that do not involve class actions,281 a set-
tlement disclosure condition appears well within the equity court's 
inherent powers to protect the integrity of its procedures and to 
assure that an injunction will serve the public interest.282 In view of 
the risk that an anticompetitive settlement may abort the public in-
terest, it appears appropriate for a court to impose a settlement dis-
closure condition. The court is only requiring that the plaintiff 
agree to a "sunshine" requirement to make public disclosure of set-
tlement terms. The condition is imposed in connection with an ex-
traordinary remedy that would halt an ongoing merger. Such an 
order should burden no good faith litigant, and it addresses a seri-
ous problem in public interest litigation. Moreover, precedent ex-
ists for granting a preliminary injunction in a private merger case 
conditioned on the plaintiff's agreement to conduct an expedited 
hearing.283 Thus, it seems no large step to conclude that a prelimi-
nary injunction conditioned on settlement disclosure is within the 
judicial power.284 
280. Abusive and collusive settlements are the bane of private attorney general enforce-
ment in class action cases for damages even when settlements require judicial approval. See 
generally Coffee, supra note 143. 
281. See Wheeler v. American Home Prods. Corp., 582 F.2d 891, 895-96 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(stating that an approval of a settlement was not appropriate in a non-class action case). 
282. An equity court has clear authority to impose conditions on issuance of a prelimi-
nary injunction. Meyers v. Block, 120 U.S. 206, 214 (1887) (ordering an injunction bond); 
Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 438 (1882). Such conditions may either require or prohibit 
specified conduct. See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 157 (1939) (re-
quiring payment of tariff); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (prohibiting voting of stock); modified, 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), revd., 
430 U.S. 1 (1977). Moreover, the court's conditioning power significantly increases when the 
relief is "in furtherance of the public interest." Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 
(1944); Inland Steel, 306 U.S. at 157. Although Congress could limit the equity court's condi-
tioning power, this limitation would require the "clearest legislative direction." Brotherhood 
of Locomotive Engrs. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 363 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1960). 
283. Sun Newspapers, Inc. v. Omaha World-Herald Co., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) q[ 
65,522 (D. Neb.), modified, 713 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1983). 
284. Critics might object that a settlement disclosure condition invades the rights of par-
ties to settle or dismiss lawsuits. See Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1989) 
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c. Voluntary Undertakings by Plaintiff. A voluntary under-
taking by a competitor-plaintiff of a course of action that forecloses 
possible litigation abuse provides a powerful incentive improving 
mechanism. For example, a plaintiff who seeks a preliminary in-
junction might voluntarily commit itself (1) to pay the defendant's 
attorney's fees upon finding a lack of any reasonable basis for the 
suit, or (2) to notify the court and the public of the terms of any 
settlement. By such an undertaking the plaintiff can place itself in 
exactly the same position it would be in if the court issued a condi-
tional injunction requiring such terms.285 But why would the plain-
tiff ever make such a commitment, and should it be a factor in the 
court's decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction? 
The competitor-plaintiff's good fajth is likely to be under attack 
in almost every private merger case, particularly after the ARCO 
case, which made explicit the close connection between the plain-
tiff's incentives and antitrust injury.286 'fypically, the merger de-
fendant will move to dismiss for lack of antitrust injury, and even 
when the court denies the motion, the issue of motivation will lin-
(stating that courts may not condition the rights of parties to dismiss). But a settlement 
disclosure condition does not limit that right. The parties remain free to settle secretly if they 
do not seek a preliminary injunction or to settle with public notice if they obtain a prelimi-
nary injunction. What they may not do is both to obtain a preliminary injunction and settle 
secretly. In the words of the Supreme Court, the preliminary injunction condition is "the 
price of relief when the injunctive powers of the court are invoked." Locomotive Engrs., 363 
U.S. at 531-32. 
A settlement disclosure condition is not contrary to the recent decision in United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995), in which the D.C. Circuit ruled that a lower 
court had abused its discretion in refusing to approve a proposed antitrust consent decree. In 
Microsoft, the trial court reviewed the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by an executive 
agency, a power the court possessed only as result of a specific statute and constrained by 
constitutional limitations on the separation of powers. The court held that the trial court's 
role was to assure that the decree did not "on its face ••. make a mockery of judicial power." 
56 F.3d at 1462. More specifically, the court might examine the clarity of the decree, the 
workability of the compliance terms the court would administer, and any claims of adverse 
impact by third parties. 56 F.3d at 1461-62. By contrast, in a preliminary injunction proceed-
ing, no executive agency is involved, and hence there is no separation of powers issue, the 
district court has plenary jurisdiction, and the court is required to weigh and balance public 
interest factors in determining whether to exercise its broad equitable discretion to block an 
ongoing transaction. 
285. Assuming the court issues a preliminary injunction, it could incorporate the plain-
tiff's voluntary undertaking into its decree, based on the plaintiff's consent. The defendant 
might complain, but the defendant would have difficulty articulating a coherent reason for 
objecting to a plaintiff's stipulation to pay a defendant's attorney's fees or to a disclosure 
provision that makes it more difficult to enter into an anticompetitive or collusive settlement. 
Compliance with the attorney's fees undertaking could be assured by a bond, agreed to by 
the plaintiff. To relieve the court from any administrative burdens, a plaintiff might establish 
an independent mechanism, such as a neutral stakeholder or arbitrator under a binding in-
struction to pay out the bonded funds on the condition specified. 
286. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 335-41 (1990). 
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ger, coloring the court's decision on the preliminary injunction.287 
Why not allow the plaintiff who survives the antitrust injury motion 
to signal its good faith and incentive compatibility in a credible 
manner by binding itself not to settle without either prior notice to 
the court or even the court's approva1?288 Similarly, as discussed 
more fully in the next section, why not allow the plaintiff to make a 
commitment to pay the defendant's attorney's fees if a court or ar-
bitrator later determines that the suit lacked significant merit? 
That is to say, why not allow the plaintiff to propose its own sepa-
rating mechanism to reveal that its incentives are compatible with 
antitrust goals?289 The court could then consider the plaintiff's un-
dertakings in determining whether issuance of a preliminary injunc-
tion would serve the public interest. 
d. Attorney's Fee-shifting. A requirement that plaintiffs pay 
the defendant's attorney's fees if the suit is frivolous or lacks foun-
dation provides a further means to discourage anticompetitive suits. 
Congress could, of course, impose such a requirement by statute, 
but more strikingly, as mentioned in the last section, a competitor-
plaintiff might make such a commitment voluntarily in order to bet-
ter convince the court to issue a preliminary injunction. 
'21!,1. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974). 
'21!,8. A possible objection to a settlement disclosure procedure - whether mandated or 
voluntary - is that the court's settlement disclosure order might be unenforceable. The 
problem is that the normal enforcement mechanism - dissolution of the injunction if the 
condition is breached - would impose no penalty on parties intent on settling the case, and 
some authorities have questioned whether a court retains judicial power to sanction litigants 
after voluntary dismissal under Rule 41. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 124, § 1337, at 131-
32. The Supreme Court, however, has recently held that a court retains the power to impose 
sanctions for Rule 11 violations and for contempt even after voluntary dismissal. Cooter & 
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990). Clearly, the deliberate breach of a judicial 
order on which the court conditioned preliminary relief that was highly favorable to the 
plaintiff and equally burdensome to the defendant would raise issues of bad faith conduct 
justifying Rule 11 and civil contempt sanctions. 
In addition, the plaintiff could establish an independent enforcement mechanism by in-
ducing an appropriate litigant to intervene in the litigation, such as a state attorney general or 
a group of consumers. If the plaintiff then sought to settle secretly, the intervenor would 
have standing to object. A public agency or consumer group in a meritorious case would 
have incentive to intervene for this limited purpose because it need bear no significant litiga-
tion cost. Thus, the plaintiff would have established a credible enforcement mecharusm. I 
am indebted to John Leubsdorf for this suggestion. 
'21!,9. Such a voluntary undertaking amounts to performance bonding by the plaintiff of its 
incentive compatibility. The FTC has used a similar mechanism in consent settlement cases 
in which it doubts the feasibility of the proposed curative steps to be taken by the defendant. 
Under this procedure, the FTC accepts the settlement only on the condition that should the 
defendant not perform the agreed curative steps within a set time period, it will divest itself 
of a more valuable "crown jewel" asset. See Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N. Dahdouh, Infor.-
mation Problems in Merger Decision Making and Their Impact on Development of an Effi-
ciencies Defense, 62 ANTITRusr LJ. 23, 26-27 (1993). 
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An attorney's fee-shifting rule would modify the present system 
of one-way fee-shifting in private antitrust cases under which the 
defendant must pay the attorney's fees of a prevailing plaintiff, but 
the plaintiff has no similar obligation to pay the defendant's attor-
ney's fees. A fee-shifting rule could follow the pattern of several 
federal statutes involving public interest type litigation, which has 
come to be known as the Christiansburg rule.29° Under this ap-
proach, which has been adopted by a recent antitrust statute291 and 
by the authorization of state parens patriae actions in the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act,292 the plaintiff would pay the defendant's attor-
ney's fees if the court finds the action to have been "frivolous, un-
reasonable, or without foundation. "293 
Application of the Christiansburg rule in private merger cases 
would provide a powerful separating mechanism to discourage an-
ticompetitive suits. At the same time, it would create relatively 
small risk of inhibiting pro-competitive suits, particularly because 
the rule would operate in conjunction with the one-sided right of 
the antitrust plaintiff to recover statutory attorney's fees. Thus, the 
wrongly motivated competitor would face a significant penalty risk 
under the Christiansburg rule, while the competitor who brings a 
pro-competitive suit would face a low penalty risk and a strong 
probability of recovering its attorney's fees.294 
The Christiansburg rule appears superior to a litigation bond be-
cause it minimizes the risk that a well-motivated plaintiff will be 
penalized for losing a meritorious case because the penalty is paid 
only if the suit is frivolous. Moreover, even if we assume that the 
wrongly motivated plaintiff gains more from blocking an efficient 
merger than the pro-competitive plaintiff gains from blocking a col-
290. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (construing Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief 
Act of 1980, § 609, 15 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (1988); Jury Systems Improvement Act of 1978, 
§ 6(a)(l), 28 U.S.C. § 1875(d)(2) (1988); Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of 
1976, § 19, 49 U.S.C. § 1686(e) (1988); cf. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 
1976, § 2, 42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1988). 
291. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 4304 (1988), amended 
by National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, 15 U.S.C. § 4304(a) (1994). 
292. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(d)(2) (1994) (awarding attorney's fees on showing of bad faith}. 
293. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421. 
294. Interestingly, this two-sided system of fee-shifting, which combines the pro-plaintiff 
antitrust rule with the defendant-favoring Christiansburg rule in a world where good plain-
tiffs sometimes lose and bad plaintiffs sometimes win, produces a fee-shifting regime that 
somewhat resembles the optimal fee-shifting rule proposed in a recent economic paper. See 
Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee-Shifting Based on the Mar-
gin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11 (Nov. 14, 
1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (proposing fee-shifting rule that depends 
on the margin by which a party prevailed). 
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lusive merger, the Christiansburg rule, possibly augmented by a 
Rule 11 penalty that may exceed attorney's fees, would still provide 
an effective separating mechanism. Although this may appear 
counterintuitive, it is explained by the one-sided right of the pre-
vailing plaintiff to recover attorney's fees together with the low 
probability that a court would impose a Christiansburg award or 
Rule 11 penalty on a well-motivated plaintiff, which together offset 
the greater return the wrongly motivated plaintiff anticipates in 
blocking a merger.29s 
3. Effectiveness of Proposed Procedures 
Existing equity procedures give antitrust courts an impressive 
array of controls by which to ensure that competitor plaintiffs pro-
mote antitrust goals in prosecuting merger suits. In addition, im-
proved procedures would allow courts that remain <;:oncerned about 
possible competitor abuse to achieve an added measure of protec-
295. More specifically, the higher benefit that the wrongly motivated plaintiff gains from 
blocking an efficient merger is discounted not only by the low probability that this outcome 
will occur but also by the substantial probability of a Christiansburg penalty. Similarly, in the 
case of a collusive merger, the relatively lower benefit that the pro-competitive plaintiff gains 
from blocking the merger is increased not only by the higher probability that this outcome 
will occur but also by the mandatory attorney's fees award. 
This result can be illustrated in a simple numerical example. Assume that there are two 
types of plaintiffs, bad plaintiffs who only challenge procompetitive mergers and good plain-
tiffs who only challenge anticompetitive mergers. Naturally, the good plaintiffs will have a 
higher probability of winning ( 60%) than the bad plaintiffs (20% ). Assume that the payoff to 
the bad plaintiff from blocking an efficient merger is $200, while the payoff to the good 
plaintiff from blocking a predatory merger is only $80; the plaintiff and defendant each pay 
attorney's fees of $40; if the defendant loses, he must pay the plaintiff's attorney's fees under 
the antitrust statutes. 
The Christiansburg rule changes this unbalanced scheme of fee-shifting by requiring the 
plaintiff to pay the defendant's attorney's fees if the defendant wins and the court determines 
that the suit was filed without proper basis. The latter condition is not easy to establish even 
in a bad case and is also subject to an erroneous determination in a good case (if the plaintiff 
loses). So to test the analysis, let us make the extreme assumption that in either type of cases 
there is a 50% chance that a losing plaintiff will face Christiansburg liability for the defend-
ant's attorney's fees. Under these conditions, the plaintiff's expected value of suing is its 
expected payoff from winning less its costs from losing, which consist of (1) its own expected 
attorney's fees and (2) its expected liability for paying the defendant's attorney's fees. This is 
expressed in numerical terms as follows: 
Bad Plaintiff 
.2 x $200 - .8 x $40 - (.8 x .5) $40 = - $8 
Good Plaintiff 
.6 x $80 - .4 x $40 - (.4 x .5) $40 = $20 
Thus, the bad plaintiff faces a negative return despite its much higher payoff from litiga-
tion success and is not motivated to sue. On the other hand, the good plaintiff remains moti-
vated to sue despite its lower payoff. Of course, these outcomes are sensitive to the 
assumptions used and do not consider the effect of an abandonment of the merger before 
trial for reasons other than anticipated litigation outcomes, for example, delay costs. The 
outcomes demonstrate, however, that within a plausible range of values the statutory fee-
shifting rule combined with a Christiansburg rule would operate as an effective separating 
mechanism. 
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tion. Similarly, well-motivated competitors who are concerned that 
the court will perceive them as wrongly motivated can credibly sig-
nal their good faith through voluntary undertakings. By these 
means, courts can effectively contain the risks of strategic litigation, 
collusive settlements, and the lesser risks of wrong outcomes and 
ineffective relief. 
a. Strategic Litigation. Existing procedures, which include ex-
pedited hearings, hold-separate orders, curative relief orders, litiga-
tion bonds, the /aches doctrine, and the possibility of Rule 11 
sanctions, reduce the problem of strategic suits filed to block or de-
lay a lawful merger. Supplemental procedures, such as augmenting 
the amount of the bond or procuring the plaintiff's voluntarily 
agreement to an attorneys' fee-shifting arrangement if the court 
holds that the suit is frivolous, might further diminish strategic risk. 
b. Collusive Settlements. Existing procedures do not specifi-
cally address the risks of collusive and anticompetitive settlements. 
Nevertheless, such risks should not be exaggerated. The defendant 
can never be certain the plaintiff will settle short of effective relief, 
and in any event, the defendant must bear settlement and litigation 
costs that may have some independent deterrent effect on anticom-
petitive mergers. Furthermore, settlement would not bar govern-
ment suit, which may become more probable if the plaintiff 
develops strong evidence of anticompetitive effects.296 Although 
the plaintiff and defendant are typically competitors who might set-
tle the case by dividing markets or fixing prices, antitrust law itself 
restrains settlements that actively reduce competition. Moreover, 
antitrust courts can effectively discourage collusive settlements 
through the additional procedures of conditioning the preliminary 
injunction on advance public disclosure by the plaintiff of any set-
tlement terms or recognizing a voluntary undertaking by the plain-
tiff to make such a disclosure. 
c. Wrong Outcomes. Both hold-separate orders, which re-
lieve time pressures because the merger is allowed to proceed, and 
increased litigation bonds, which explicitly penalize the plaintiff 
who induces a wrong outcome, mitigate the problem of wrong out-
296. A possible additional risk in anticompetitive settlements is losing the deterrent effect 
of the litigation cost bond in discouraging ill-founded suits because the defendant will no 
doubt release the bond as part of the settlement. But this risk is less severe than it may 
appear because the existence of the bond necessarily reduces the benefits the plaintiff can 
extract in the settlement. 
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comes caused by compressed time schedules for preliminary injunc-
tion hearings. In addition, the problem appears exaggerated in 
view of the concentrated legal resources typically assembled in pre-
liminary injunction merger cases. What might take a smaller group 
of lawyers months can be done perhaps with even greater effective-
ness by a large team that is able to focus its efforts on a single 
case.297 
d. Ineffective Relief. The !aches doctrine, which can apply to 
private merger cases,298 combined with the prejudice delay causes 
in obtaining a preliminary injunction,299 both reduce the problem of 
ineffective relief caused by the delayed challenge of a merger until 
after assets have been intermingled. The Supreme Court's recent 
ruling that private merger litigants can obtain divestiture relief300 
mitigates the problem of insufficient briefing of the court on reme-
dial issues, as it gives defendants every incentive to develop alterna-
tive remedies short of divestiture. Moreover, plaintiffs will also 
have incentive and resources to evaluate relief proposals closely be-
cause once a defendant's liability has been established, the plain-
tiff's statutory right to recover attorney's fees is assured. Amicus 
participation by government enforcement agencies may also pro-
vide effective briefing on the appropriate remedy.301 Finally, the 
issue of relief will not often arise in view of the dispositive effect of 
the preliminary injunction decision. 
F. Gravity of Violation 
Both first- and second-stage procedures focus the enforcement 
capabilities of competitors on mergers that raise the most serious 
competitive risks. The first-stage antitrust injury screen, whether 
297. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
298. California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 297-98 (1990) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
299. Certainly defendants appreciate this point because they typically consummate the 
merger at the earliest opportunity to forestall preliminary relief. See, e.g., Phototron Corp. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.), temporary stay vacated by 56 U.S.L.W. 3682 (U.S. 
Apr. 5) (vacating temporary stay when, unknown to the Supreme Court, the merger had 
closed before temporary stay issued), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988). 
300. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. at 278-96. 
301. Although it is doubtful that enforcement agencies could be induced to assume a 
greater role in private merger litigation generally, see ABA ANTITRUST SEcnON, supra note 
114, at 19-22, the agencies may be more willing to comment on relief issues. See, e.g., 
Changes to 1WA/Travel Agent Settlement Resolve Division's Competitive Concerns, [Jan.-
June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1715, at 688-90 (June 1, 1995) (Justice Depart-
ment files amicus curiae memorandum stating views on proposed class action settlement 
while taking no views on the merits.). The restructuring of a competitive market presents an 
issue in which the enforcement agencies should have a keen interest in participating. 
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formulated in terms of predatory capability or market dominance, 
registers severity of the violation. Proof of predatory capability re-
quires a showing that a merger will give a small coalition of firms 
the power to discipline or exclu_de rivals. As Cargill made clear in 
rejecting the standing of a competitor claiming predatory injury 
from a merger causing only moderate concentration, such proof is 
likely to exist only when the merger creates highly concentrated 
oligopolistic conditions.302 Proof that a merger would create a mar-
ket dominant firm even more clearly registers violation severity. 
Mergers creating single-firm market dominance raise the gravest 
risks to competition, as almost all antitrust authorities recognize. 
The second-stage procedure also focuses enforcement efforts on 
the most aggravated violations. Assessment of violation severity is 
an essential factor in the equity court's determination whether to 
issue a transaction-disrupting preliminary injunction. Separating 
mechanisms, such as litigation bonds and fee-shifting undertakings, 
also serve to concentrate enforcement on the most serious viola-
tions. The fact that a plaintiff may face liability for delay costs 
under a litigation bond or for attorney's fees under a fee-shifting 
regime serves to discourage suits except where plaintiffs believe 
they have high probability of winning. Thus, both first- and second-
stage procedures focus the litigation-capable enforcement efforts of 
competitors on the mergers of gravest public concern. 
V. TAKEOVER TARGETS 
Target firms in takeover cases should also have standing to chal-
lenge unlawful mergers because such firms are uniquely knowledge-
able and capable merger litigants; because the takeovers subject to 
antitrust challenge usually unite direct competitors who face the 
gravest antitrust risks; because the anticompetitive effects of a 
merger threaten injury to constituent parts of the firm and benefit 
shareholders only through violation of the law; because in striving 
to retain its independence from extinction by an anticompetitive 
merger, the target firm is vindicating a key statutory goal of the 
modem merger law; and because when a merger has purely collu-
sive effects such that all competitors gain, only the target remains as 
a viable private litigant. 
302. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 119-20 n.15. 
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A. Enforcement Capability 
Of all possible merger litigants, it is the target firm that is likely 
to be most capable of mounting an effective suit within the short 
time limits of a contested takeover. The target possesses the most 
intimate knowledge of the effects of the merger because it will be-
come a part of the augmented firm whose market power threatens 
to injure competition. The target will already have in its possession 
many of the key documents needed. It will usually be the first firm, 
other than the bidder, to know of the merger, and indeed the target 
will probably have already studied the antitrust issues when consid-
ering the tender offer.303 Additionally, in critical cases it may be 
the only available private litigant.304 
The Second Circuit recently recognized the advantage of the 
takeover target as a merger litigant and the necessity of target 
standing for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws, stating that: 
[P]rivate enforcement depends on the willingness of affected compa-
nies to enter the fray and risk substantial money, time, and effort in 
lawsuits that have even more uncertainty of outcome than ordinary 
litigation .... [N]on-target competitors claiming standing face the sub-
stantial barriers of proof erected by Cargill. Consumers are unlikely 
to face the prospect of suffering a sufficient amount of damage to jus-
tify the cost of seeking a pre-acquisition injunction. The target of a 
proposed takeover has the most immediate interest in preserving its 
independence as a competitor in the market.305 
In fact, targets have brought almost thirty-five percent of all pri-
vate merger cases, or twenty-three of the sixty-six reported cases 
instituted over the fourteen-year period, 1977 to 1990, and obtained 
fifty percent of the preliminary injunctions granted.306 Targets have 
proven to be capable litigants, successfully challenging, for exam-
ple, Mobil Oil's attempt to acquire Marathon,307 LTV's attempt to 
303. See 2 AREEDA & HoVENKAMP, supra note 67, § 38lb (describing the target as the 
most knowledgeable and perhaps the only motivated plaintiff); Baumol & Ordover, supra 
note 196, at 258 (stating that a target's management is better informed than any other group 
on the competitive effects of a merger). 
304. Although I have stressed that competitors may have pro-competitive incentives in 
challenging mergers, cases clearly arise in which no competitor is motivated to challenge a 
collusive merger. Indeed, the target firm may be the last competitive holdout in a market 
otherwise dominated by a few large firms. 
305. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 260 (2d Cir.), cert 
dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989). ' 
306. See app. These statistics encompass the merger and takeover wave of the 1980s, 
which ended in 1990. See PAUL MILGRAM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION 
& MANAGEMENT 483-85 (1992). 
307. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), affd., 669 F.2d 378 
(6th Cir.), reaffd., 669 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). 
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acquire Grumman,3os and the recent attempt by South Africa's sec-
ond largest gold mining company to acquire the largest U.S. pro-
ducer,309 all of which were enjoined. Thus, targets have the best 
information, the strongest incentive, and generally the highest en-
forcement capability among private merger litigants.310 
B. Incentive Compatibility and Antitrust Injury 
The challenge to target firm standing is based on an absence of 
antitrust injury and incentive incompatibility. Critics assert that a 
takeover inflicts no injury on the target and benefits its sharehold-
ers by enabling them to sell their shares at a premium.311 Further, 
even if in some sense the target is injured, the injury is not an anti-
trust injury because it is not caused by the anticompetitive effects of 
the merger.312 Even apart from these problems, the target should 
be denied standing because the real party in interest is not the tar-
get but its managers, who sue in the target's name and do so not to 
vindicate antitrust wrongs but to keep their jobs.313 Thus, the litiga-
tion incentives of the target and its managers are fundamentally in-
compatible with antitrust goals.314 Each of these arguments, 
however, is either mistaken or overdrawn, particularly as applied to 
horizontal mergers - the focus of almost all takeover litigation. 
The target firm may suffer injury even when shareholders ap-
pear to benefit because the welfare of the firm is not identical with 
the short-term interest of a controlling group of shareholders intent 
on selling theii shares and because in some cases shareholders 
themselves are hurt. The injury sustained by the target is antitrust 
injury when it stems in whole or in part from output reduction or 
other anticompetitive effects in the restrained market. Although 
the motives of managers may indeed deviate from antitrust goals, 
equity controls and internal corporate mechanisms can modify dis-
torted managerial incentives. 
308. Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 527 F. Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y.), affd., 665 F.2d 10 {2d 
Cir. 1981). 
309. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 698 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), 
modified on other grounds, 871 F.2d 252 {2d Cir. 1989). 
310. Moreover, in some of the largest mergers, the target may be the only viable private 
litigant because competitors may lack enforcement incentives or be too small to mount an 
effective merger challenge. 
311. See Burnup & Sims, Inc. v. Posner, 688 F. Supp. 1532, 1535 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Easter-
brook & Fischel, supra note 49, at 1166-68. 
312. See Burlington Indus. v. Edelman, 666 F. Supp. 799, 805 {M.D.N.C. 1987); Easter-
brook & Fischel, supra note 49, at 1166-68. 
313. See Bumup & Sims, 688 F. Supp. at 1534. 
314. 688 F. Supp. at 1534. 
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More specifically, targets face antitrust injury from anticompeti-
tive takeovers because such mergers threaten the target with: (1) 
collusion-induced output reduction harmful to the target and its 
constituents in both partial and full acquisitions of shares; (2) possi-
ble loss of trade secrets, confidential information, and other intel-
lectual property injuring the target's competitive viability if the 
merger is not consummated; and (3) termination of its corporate 
existence in contravention of a merger law intended to preserve the 
independence of firms threatened by anticompetitive acquisitions. 
Thus, as explained below, the target's litigation incentives are fully 
compatible with antitrust goals. The crux of the objection to take-
over suits is not the target's incentives, but the incentives of its man-
agers. Distorted managerial incentives, however, are best handled 
by procedural and internal controls on managers, not disqualifica-
tion of the target. The combined force of these considerations justi-
fies the conclusion that takeover targets sustain antitrust injury 
when they challenge horizontal mergers. 
These are issues of first impression in the Supreme Court, which 
has never decided a target merger case or expressed any view about 
the application of the antitrust injury principle to takeover targets. 
In a recent amicus brief, however, the Solicitor General questioned 
whether the general antitrust injury standard promotes antitrust 
goals in takeover cases or "whether some refinement of the stan-
dard would be appropriate."315 The Solicitor stressed the factual 
difference between the Brunswick and Cargill cases, in which the 
plaintiffs claimed injury from increased competition, and a target 
suit, where the target firm seeks "to remain a viable and aggressive 
competitor."316 Thus, antitrust injury in target merger cases raises 
distinctive issues that require "careful consideration."317 
1. Partial Acquisitions 
The target sustains antitrust injury when a rival firm acquires a 
controlling interest in the target through acquisition of less than all 
of the target's shares. Such an acquisition threatens the target with 
315. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol Medical 
Products, Inc., 114 S. Ct 491 (1993) (No. 92-1274) (dismissing cert. petition pursuant to stipu-
lation). The Solicitor General urged denial of the writ of certiorari because the issue of 
target standing had been sparsely litigated in the lower courts and because the number of 
takeovers had declined in recent years. Brief for the United States, supra at 7-9. Of course, 
one reason the issue of target standing may have been sparsely litigated in recent years is that 
the difficulty of obtaining standing discourages target suits. 
316. Brief for the United States, supra note 315, at 7-9. 
317. Id. at 7 n.6. 
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antitrust injury because the bidder's partial ownership of the target 
impels the bidder to favor its own corporate interest in competition 
with the target thereby weakening the target's competitive vitality. 
Because the bidder receives only a fraction of the profit realized by 
the target, the bidder has an incentive to transfer profit from the 
partially owned target to its own fully owned profit center, for ex-
ample, by shifting sales from the target, transferring valuable com-
petitive know-how, or by blocking innovation or other strategies 
beneficial to the target in its competition with the bidder.31s 
The favoritism toward the bidder that a partial acquisition of 
shares induces tends to undermine the target's competitive poten-
tial, threatening injury to its minority shareholders and its non-
shareholder constituents. The injury the target and its stakeholders 
sustain stems directly from the anticompetitive nature of the acqui-
sition because a bidder not in competition with the target would 
have no incentive to reduce the target's output and weaken its com-
petitive strength. Moreover, even if the bidder competes with the 
target, in a fully competitive market, a reduction in the target's out-
put would not enable the bidder to increase its own profits because 
under competitive conditions the bidder has no power to raise 
prices. Hence, a partial acquisition threatens the target with injury 
if, but only if, the merger creates collusive risks. 
Established precedents recognize the anticompetitive risks aris-
ing from partial acquisitions by direct competitors.319 Thus, in its 
recent Gold Fields320 decision, the Second Circuit upheld the tar-
get's standing to challenge a partial acquisition of controlling 
shares. The bidder, the dominant South African gold producer, 
sought to acquire a controlling interest in the leading U.S. pro-
ducer. The target claimed antitrust injury because the bidder would 
be likely to favor its own wholly owned South African production 
over its partially owned U.S. subsidiary - an especially pernicious 
result because the South African facility had higher costs. In up-
318. See F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 597 F.2d 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(citing Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 314 (D. Conn), affd., 206 
F.2d 738 {2d Cir. 1953)). 
319. See Schaefer, 591 F.2d at 814; Gulf & W. Indus. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 
F.2d 687, 693-95 {2d Cir. 1973); Hamilton Watch, 206 F.2d at 738; Consolidated Gold Fields, 
PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487, 489 (S.D.N.Y.), modified sub nom. Consolidated 
Gold Fields P.L.C. v. Minorco, S.A., 871F.2d252 (1988), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989); 
Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Intl., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 203, 211-14 (N.D. Tex.), modified, 741 
F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984); see Brent W. Huber, Note, Target Corporations, Hostile Horizontal 
Takeovers and Antitrust Injury Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act After Cargill, 66 IND. LJ. 
625, 646 (1991). 
320. 871 F.2d at 252. 
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holding the target's standing to challenge the merger, the Second 
Circuit easily found antitrust injury because the target stood to earn 
less profit due to the ability of "outside corporate forces to cause it 
to restrain its own competitiveness."321 
1\vo objections may be made to this analysis. First, the bidder's 
use of its controlling interest to cripple the target in competition 
with the bidder unjustifiably assumes a breach of fiduciary duty to 
the target's minority shareholders. Second, the target suffers no an-
titrust injury because any losses the target sustains from competi-
tive restraints imposed by the bidder are outweighed by the benefits 
the target receives as a partner in the collusion. 
The first objection - unjustified assumption of breach of fiduci-
ary duty - is unrealistic because it would assume perfect compli-
ance with legal rules in the face of a palpable conflict of interest. 
That assumption defies legal experience and basic premises of cor-
porate law. The directors of the target, elected largely by the bid-
der, and frequently its officers or employees will at best have 
divided loyalties, if they are not totally dominated by the parent. 
Such directors cannot exercise the same independence as directors 
without divided loyalties, as corporate law conflict-of-interest rules 
and the Clayton Act's prohibition against interlocking directors 
both recognize.322 Indeed, antitrust authorities uniformly acknowl-
edge the dangers from acquisitions of substantial or controlling in-
terests in direct competitors.323 
The second objection - the target benefits from postmerger 
collusion with the bidder - neglects both the parent's strong incen-
tive to capture as much as possible of the collusive gain in its own 
wholly owned entity and related issues of illegality. Thus, it appears 
unlikely that the net benefit to the target and its constituents would 
remain favorable when the price is elevated because the collusive 
output reduction is likely to fall disproportionately on the target. 
Antitrust courts need not and should not resolve that issue, how-
ever, because the determination of whether the target will benefit 
321. 871 F.2d at 257. The case also involved a full acquisition of shares, discussed infra. 
322. See Clayton Act, § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1994) (prohibiting directors from serving on 
boards of competing corporations where one company has capital surplus and profits that 
exceed $1 million); ROBERT CHARI.Es CLARK, CORPORATE LAw §§ 4.1-.2 (1986). 
323. See Schaefer, 591 F.2d at 814; Hamilton Watch, 206 F.2d at 738; Gold Fields, 698 F. 
Supp. at 499-500; 5 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 53, 'll 1203c (describing the dangers as 
board of directors' influence, sensitive information, employee morale, and reduced competi-
tive incentive). 
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falls peculiarly within the province of the target's directors in decid-
ing whether to bring a merger suit.324 
Moreover, in making its litigation decision, the target's board of 
directors must face the issue of illegality. Whatever benefits the 
target receives from the collusive effects of the merger are achieved 
in violation of law. Although the target is not itself a law violator, it 
may legitimately sue to prevent a violation of the Clayton Act that 
is achieved through fundamental change in its ownership struc-
ture. 325 In addition, because the target will continue to exist as a 
separate legal entity, the collusive price raises issues of continuing 
conspiracy between the partially owned subsidiary and its parent,326 
which a determination of merger legality would help to resolve.327 
Thus, the objections to target standing in partial acquisitions are 
untenable. 
2. Full Acquisitions 
The target sustains antitrust injury in a full acquisition because 
vital constituencies of the firm face threatened losses from merger-
induced output reduction. Injury to such constituencies may in-
volve injury to the firm's workers who face diminished employ-
ment; its suppliers who face reduced demand; consumers who face 
higher prices; and the communities in which the firm operates, 
which face output-related reductions in spending, taxes, and em-
ployment. These injuries harm the target itself because under mod-
em legal and economic views, the welfare of the firm includes the 
interests of its nonshareholder constituents either directly or as en-
compassed in the long-run welfare of its shareholders and because 
any immediate gains realized by selling shareholders stem from an 
unlawful transaction. 
The modem business firm is an ingenious network of long-term 
contractual interests, which includes lenders, labor, managers, sup-
pliers, customers, and supporting communities, as well as share-
324. See CLARK, supra note 322, §§ 3.4, 3.5; supra notes 294-99 and accompanying text. 
325. See, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus. v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 698 (2d Cir. 
1973); see also discussion infra note 337 and accompanying text. 
326. See 2 AREEoA & HoVENKAMP, supra note 67, q[lj[ 1464e, 1467f (describing cases 
divided on whether parent and partially owned subsidiary have conspiratorial capacity); 
liARLAN M. BLAKE & ROBERT PrroFSKY, ANTIIRusr LAw 555-56 (1967). 
327. If the merger is held unlawful and enjoined, conspiracy issues of course will not 
arise. If the merger is held lawful based on a finding of absence of market power, future 
collaboration between affiliated firms engaged in joint production will be lawful in most 
cases. See generally HERBERT HoVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTIIRusr PouCY § 5.2d (1994). 
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holders.328 Although no single theory of the firm prevails, both 
modem economics and recent legislative and judicial articulations 
recognize the contractual nature and diverse constituencies of the 
firm.329 Indeed, the statutory law of a majority of states and com-
mon law decisions elsewhere recognize the nonshareholder constit-
uencies that compose the corporate interest and the duty of 
directors to serve that composite interest, at least when consistent 
with the long run welfare of shareholders.330 Th.us, under the gov-
erning law of most states, the firm encompasses the welfare of its 
constituents or stakeholders - all those who have invested human 
and other capital contingent on the continued existence and health 
of the enterprise. It follows that to the extent reduced output 
caused by a collusive merger injures nonshareholder constituencies 
and produces no offsetting gains, it injures the firm itself, most es-
pecially in a takeover.331 
328. See MAsAlllKO A01a ET AL., THE FIRM' AS A NEXUS OF TREATIES (1990); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakehold-
ers and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 435, 446-48; David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 
1990 DUKE LJ. 201, 236-38. 
329. See AoKI, supra note 328; Coffee, supra note 328, at 446-48; Andrei Schleifer & 
Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 37-38 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988). See generally Oliver 
Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 Co LUM. L. REv. 1757 (1989). 
330. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Tune, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989) 
(permitting consideration of "impact on constituencies other than shareholders"); Charles 
Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective, 46 Bus. LAW. 1355 (1991) 
(state statutes accord with common law rule); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New 
System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 187, 214-15 (1991); Millon, supra note 328, at 234 (referring to the common law rule 
permitting consideration of other constituencies); Marleen A. O'Connor, Corporate Malaise 
- Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STETSON L. REV. 3, 4, 279-93 (1991) (stake-
holder statutes in over half of the states); cf. 1 AMERICAN LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.02(b)(2) (1994) (explaining 
that directors may take into account nonshareholder interests when they would not "signifi-
cantly disfavor" long-term shareholder interests); Glen A. Graff, Target Standing Under Sec-
tion 16 of the Clayton Act, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 219, 239-40 (explaining that nonshareholder 
interests may be taken into account in deciding to file antitrust suit). 
331. Injuries to nonshareholder constituencies are particularly likely in takeover cases 
because the buyout severs the shareholders' interests from those of the firm's other constitu-
ents. Under the normal conditions of an ongoing firm, maximization of the shareholders' 
residual value maximizes the firm's total value. A takeover, however, breaks the unity of 
interest between the selling shareholders and other constituents. The tendering shareholders 
are no longer constrained repeat players who benefit from a reputation for fair dealing but 
now have every incentive to expropriate the sunk costs of other constituencies. See Coffee, 
supra note 328, at 447; Charles R. Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents and Hostile 
Tender Offers, 16 AM. EcoN. REv. 155, 159-60 (1986); Trevor S. Norwitz, "The Metaphysics 
of Tune": A Radical Corporate Vision, 46 Bus. LAW. 377, 377-78 (1991); Schleifer & Sum-
mers, supra note 329, at 41-42. But cf. Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, 
Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REo. 119, 172 (1992) (claiming empirical evidence 
does not support expropriation theory as cause for takeovers). 
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A collusive merger, however, will typically have more than the 
one-sided· effect of injuring nonshareholder constituents. The 
merger will instead generally benefit the target's shareholders, or 
some of them, who typically receive a premium for their shares. 
Thus, the impact of the merger on the target's constituencies ap-
pears mixed, and it is surely conceivable that the gain to selling 
shareholders may exceed the loss to other constituencies, including 
nonselling shareholders. An antitrust court, however, cannot prop-
erly make that determination. Instead, under controlling corporate 
law principles, the net effect of a takeover is an issue to be resolved 
by the target's board of directors.332 Moreover, in making such a 
determination the directors may properly disregard any gain to 
shareholders arising from the collusive effects of the merger be-
cause such gains do not reflect an increase in the value of the firm, 
if value is understood as lawful value.333 
The lawful value of the firm is its total value apart from any 
enhancement due to the antitrust violation. The gain to the target's 
shareholders from the increased profits due to future collusion, ex-
press or tacit, cannot form any part of the firm's lawful value. This 
is not to question that shareholders are entitled to the residual 
profit of the firm, but that principle applies only to lawful profit, 
and the collusive gain from a merger that violates the antitrust laws 
is necessarily unlawful.334 Such a gain, stemming from future collu-
sion or tacit interdependence made possible by the merger, consti-
332. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 & n.13, 
45 (Del. 1994); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Tune, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150; Hansen, 
supra note 330, at 1364-65 (explaining that the issue is for directors under business judge-
ment rule). To be sure, once the corporation has undertaken a sale of control transaction or 
a breakup of the corporate entity, the Delaware "enhanced scrutiny" test focuses the direc-
tors' duty on obtaining the best value for shareholders. Paramount Communications v. QVC 
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d at 48. But short of that step, the directors retain full authority to 
consider the interests of other constituencies. 
333. See Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that tar-
get's shareholders were "not entitled" to gain from tender violating merger law); Gulf & W. 
Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 698 (1973) (holding that target's 
shareholder had no right to proceed with unlawful tender as "requirement of lawfulness is 
included by implication in every tender offer"); Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 
571 A.2d at 1153 (holding that target's directors may consider illegality in evaluating tender 
bid); AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, supra note 330, § 6.02(b)(1) (explaining that target's direc-
tors may consider "questions of illegality" in deciding whether to take defensive action). 
334. Note that the premium is not unlawful in the sense that either the target or its share-
holders have themselves violated the antitrust laws, but the premium nevertheless constitutes 
gain from an unlawful transaction. In maximizing the firm's value, the directors are under a 
legal duty to maximize profit only so far as the profits stem from lawful transactions. See 
supra note 332. 
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tutes a form of unjust enrichment from illegality.33s Suit by the 
target to block an anticompetitive merger can therefore maximize 
the lawful value of the firm,336 and the authority to determine 
whether it does, clearly rests with the target's directors, subject to 
the business judgment rule.337 
It does not follow that all shareholder gain from mergers that 
violate the antitrust laws is illegal. If the acquiring firm is one of 
several bidders, the margin of unlawful shareholder gain is simply 
the difference between the anticompetitive bid of the acquiring firm 
and the next highest lawful bid.338 If the acquiring firm is the only 
current bidder, the unlawful antitrust gain is the difference between 
the current unlawful bid and the highest future lawful bid dis-
counted for delay. If a merger would increase the target's value for 
reasons apart from the merger's own collusive effects, future bids 
should be forthcoming that will enable the target to realize lawful 
value enhancement without injury to competition. Thus, enjoining 
the merger deprives shareholders only of the gain stemming from 
the anticompetitive effects of the transaction.339 
335. Cf. Grumman Corp., 665 F.2d at 16 (stating that the "shareholders are not entitled 
to a gain obtained from a sale that presents a substantial likelihood of violating§ 7"); Huber, 
supra note 319, at 648. 
336. The distinction between the lawful and the unlawful value of the firm is consistent 
with the antitrust damage rules that require corporate defendants to surrender profits gained 
from collusion - trebled - to the plaintiff. This of course causes loss to the shareholders 
though they are normally quite innocent of any antitrust violation. The more complete collu-
sion created by a merger cannot give the shareholders greater entitlement to collusive profit. 
337. See Michael Rosenzweig, Target Litigation, 85 MicH. L. REv. 110, 143 (1986) (stating 
that the business judgement rule applies to suits by takeover targets). Indeed, the target's 
directors may have a legal duty to oppose takeovers that harm the corporate interest. See 
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 
(1981); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 686 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-57 (Del. 1985). Similarly, once a company is up for 
auction under the Revlon rule, the directors arguably have a duty to consider only bids that 
do not violate the antitrust Jaws in obtaining the best price for shareholders. Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986). But cf. Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, Comment, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 
1028 (1982) (suggesting change in corporate law to preclude all or most takeover litigation 
because of manager conflict of interest). 
338. Thus, takeover gains from reduced agency costs, tax benefits, postmerger synergies, 
or other causes not connected with increased market power could be realized by merger with 
another bidder. 
339. In the unlikely event that an anticompetitive merger involves unique and otherwise 
unattainable synergies, the directors should of course take such gains into account in weigh-
ing the net corporate effect; if the gains are sufficiently large to offset any competitive harm, 
the directors may properly decline to bring suit. Indeed, under these conditions, the merger 
may in fact be lawful. See 1 ABA ANTITRUST SECIION, supra note 124, at 319-22; Pitofsky, 
supra note 34, at 206-27. Such cases, however, are likely to be infrequent because a merger 
creating market power will rarely be necessary to achieve desired synergies, and operating 
synergies are seldom present in takeovers. See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 172-74 (3d ed. 1990) (stating that effi-
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Courts and commentators who oppose target standing fre-
quently argue that antitrust injury is absent because any injuries 
sustained by the target result simply from the change in control, not 
from the anticompetitive effects of the merger; thus, the same inju-
ries would occur even if the merger did not violate the antitrust 
laws.340 As shown above, however, the injury to the target firm, 
properly conceived as the lawful collective interest of its stakehold-
ers, results directly from the merger-induced output reduction. 
These injuries would not occur in a noncollusive merger. 
Under these circumstances, the target's incentives in attempting 
to prevent an anticompetitive merger harmonize with antitrust 
goals. The output-related injury to nonshareholder constituents, in-
cluding consumers, reflects the public interest in maintaining com-
petition. To be sure, the target's managers may have private 
incentives incompatible with antitrust goals, but managerial conflict 
of interest should not defeat the target's standing when procedural 
and internal corporate mechanisms are available to control such 
conflict.341 This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that apart 
from consumers, the target's constituents would not have standing 
to sue individually, and consumers lack the incentive to sue. Thus, 
a holding that the target cannot sue to vindicate the rights of its 
stakeholders might prevent any challenge to an output-reducing 
merger - a result that, as Judge Newman recently noted, "would 
substantially impair enforcement of the antitrust laws."342 
3. Loss of Trade Secrets 
Loss of trade secrets and similar intellectual property unpro-
tected by patent or copyright laws provides an additional source of 
antitrust injury when the bidder is a rival firm. In either a full or 
partfal acquisition of shares, antitrust injury may occur if the bidder 
gains control of the target, and the merger is later held unlawful or 
divested in anticipation of such a holding. Although the target may 
regain its independence under a divestiture order or consent settle-
ciency reduced on average); Richard E. Caves, Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic Efficiency: 
Foresight vs. Hindsight, 7 INTI.. J. INDUS. 0Ro. 151 (1989). 
340. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Edelman, 666 F. Supp. 799, 805 (M.D.N.C. 1987); Carter 
Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 250 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Easter-
brook & Fischel, supra note 49, at 1156-70. 
341. See Rosenzweig, supra note 337, at 144, 147-50 (arguing that takeover suits are desir-
able because they protect the target from illegal conduct when other litigants are not avail-
able and because manager conflict can be moderated by incentive mechanisms); infra text 
accompanying notes 368-69. 
342. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 260 (2d Cir.), cert. 
dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989). 
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ment, during the period it is under bidder control, it is threatened 
with the irreparable loss of its trade secrets.343 The question arises 
whether the target's trade secrets can be protected by a hold-
separate order, which prevents the scrambling of the target's assets 
until antitrust issues are resolved, but such orders will not as a prac-
tical matter preserve trade secrets and other competitive informa-
tion after control has passed to a rival firm.344 Thus, when a merger 
between the bidder and target would be unlawful, the bidder's cap-
ture of the target's trade secrets both injures the target and also 
reduces competition by inhibiting the target's ability to compete. 
As we shall see, the bidder has an incentive to weaken the target in 
this way only when the merger would injure competition. 
Indeed, the transfer of trade secrets from target to bidder can be 
viewed as the first step in a two-step restraint of trade: the first step 
reduces the target's ability to compete by transferring key competi-
tive assets to the bidder; the second step extinguishes competition 
altogether through merger.345 Normally, the two steps collapse into 
a single judicial determination of merger legality or illegality. The 
distinction, however, is important at the preliminary injunction 
stage because the final injunction cannot effectively restore compe-
tition if the target's key informational assets have been lost during 
the pendency of the litigation. Thus, the law promotes antitrust 
goals when the target has standing to prevent such irreversible loss 
of trade secrets.346 
Some courts nevertheless object that a trade secret loss cannot 
be an antitrust injury because the harm flows from a change in cor-
porate control and bears no relation to the fact that less competi-
343. The risk of trade secret loss most commonly arises in suits by the federal govern-
ment, a state, or a competitor, to which of course the target may also be a party. If the target 
firm is the only plaintiff, however, the case will not survive a denial of a preliminary injunc-
tion and thus the issue of trade secrets becomes academic. See supra text accompanying note 
192. 
344. See United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 465-66 (9th Cir. 1988) (sustaining ap-
pointment of equity trustee because hold-separate order would not prevent loss of trade 
secrets); FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1085-86 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that 
hold-separate orders create risks of trade secret loss). 
345. Cf. Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol Medical Prods., Inc., 976 F.2d 248, 252-53 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(Parker, J., concurring) (describing how a takeover target may have suffered antitrust injury 
sufficient to establish standing to sue for injunctive relief under § 7 if merger is "climactic" 
result of prior anticompetitive conduct), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 378 (1993). 
346. See FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1085-86 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (affirming 
preliminary injunction because of confidential information and unique management); Grum-
man Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 15-16 (2d Cir.1981) (affirming preliminary injunction 
because of threatened loss of confidential information and serious disruption of business); F. 
& M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 597 F.2d 814, 818-19 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming 
preliminary injunction issued because of threatened loss of trade secrets and potential dam-
age to employee morale). 
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tion exists in the market.347 Moreover, they urge that whatever 
effect the loss of trade secrets might have on competition generally, 
the target firm sustains no injury because its shareholders have re-
ceived the full market value for their ownership interest in the tar-
get, including its trade secrets.348 
In fact, the loss of trade secrets may injure both competition and 
the target firm when. the target's future viability depends on reten-
tion of its trade secrets. In a full acquisition of shares, the transfer 
of the target's trade secrets to the bidder injures competition by 
frustrating effective relief, if the merger is subsequently held unlaw-
ful or abandoned in anticipation of such a finding. Although the 
merger is blocked, the bidder's temporary control over the target 
gives it the opportunity - and it has every incentive - to appro-
priate the target's trade secrets. Strikingly, this incentive arises only 
when the merger would create collusive conditions injurious to 
competition. 
The bidder's incentive to take the target's trade secrets arises in 
a collusive merger because when the target's continued viability is 
essential to competition, the capture of its trade secrets provides 
the bidder with an alternative means to reduce the target's competi-
tive viability and thereby earn a supra-competitive return should 
the merger ultimately be barred. The bidder prefers to capture 
rather than to preserve the target's trade secrets because absent the 
collusive conditions created by the merger, the bidder could earn 
only a normal return from the sale of the target with its trade 
secrets intact. Thus, when the target's future viability depends on 
retention of its trade secrets, the bidder's temporary control of the 
target gives it both the power and the incentive to frustrate effective 
merger relief and thereby injure competition.349 
In a partial acquisition between rival firms, transfer of the tar-
get's trade secrets to the bidder causes a similar injury to competi-
tion. As in a full acquisition, the trade secret transfer injures the 
target's future competitive viability. The partial acquisition case 
differs in one important respect: the bidder in a partial acquisition 
347. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Edelman, 666 F. Supp. 799, 805 (M.D.N.C. 1987); 
Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 250 (C.D. Cal. 1984); 
Bumup & Sims, Inc. v. Posner, 688 F. Supp. 1532, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1988). 
348. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 49, at 1162-63; Joseph Gregory Sidak, Antitrust 
Preliminary Injunctions in Hostile Tender Offers, 30 KAN. L. REV. 491, 503-04 (1982). 
349. The bidder's incentive to gain control of the target's trade secrets remains even if the 
bidder must pay the full market price for such secrets. The market price will be based either 
on the value of the trade secrets in the premerger competitive market or their enhanced 
value in the postmerger collusive market In either event, the bidder gains by taking the 
trade secrets. 
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has an incentive to take the target's trade secrets even in a competi-
tive market because its ownership of the target is only partial.3so 
The prospect of collusive gain from the merger intensifies that in-
centive and significantly increases the risk that the bidder will at-
tempt to undermine the target's viability by taking its trade secrets. 
It follows that when the target holds vital trade secrets, a partial 
acquisition threatens injury both to the target and to competition. 
The issue remains whether the target may suffer antitrust injury 
in cases where there is no prospect that the merger will later be 
held unlawful or divested under a consent settlement if a prelimi-
nary injunction is denied. In such a case, which will arise when the 
target is the sole plaintiff, how can the target be hurt considering 
that the merger price necessarily includes the value of the target's 
trade secrets? In fact, the conclusion of target injury follows from 
our previous discussion of antitrust injury in partial and full acquisi-
tions of shares.351 There, as in the trade secret case, the target sus-
tains injury through merger-induced losses to its nonshareholder 
constituents, as well as to minority shareholders in partial acquisi-
tions, who retain an economic and legally recognized interest in the 
target's continuing welfare. Of course, in trade secret cases, as in 
partial and full acquisitions of shares, the selling shareholders stand 
to benefit handsomely from the anticipated collusive effects of the 
merger. As discussed earlier, however, the illegal source of that 
gain disqualifies it as an appropriate offset to the losses that the 
target's nonselling stakeholders sustain.352 
Thus, in both partial and full acquisitions, the injury the target 
sustains from loss of trade secrets is essentially identical. The injury 
flows from the enhanced value the trade secrets have in a collusive 
market. The acquisition of the target, whether partial or full, gives 
the bidder the power to cripple the viability of the target by seizing 
its trade secrets, thereby crippling effective merger relief and injur-
ing competition. 
4. Loss of Independence 
The target firm sustains antitrust injury, different in kind but 
equally contrary to merger policy, from its extinction as an in-
dependent firm. The target's loss of independence causes antitrust 
injury because it is both an anticompetitive effect and the indispen-
350. See F. & M. Schaefer, 591 F.2d at 818; Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch· Co., 114 
F. Supp. 307, 314 (D. Conn.), affd., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953). 
351. See supra text accompanying notes 58-77. 
352. See supra text accompanying notes 332-39. 
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sable mechanism of the unlawful merger. In its recent Gold Fields 
decision, the Second Circuit upheld the standing of a takeover tar-
get as a competitor in the restrained market on just such a the-
ory.353 The competitive injury to the target stemmed from its loss 
of "the power of independent decision-making as to price and out-
put" as a result of an unlawful acquisition; as Judge Newman 
explained: 
It is hard to imagine an injury to competition more clearly "of the 
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent," [citing Brunswick], 
than the elimination of a major competitor's power to determine its 
prices and output. It is precisely the loss of this power that makes a 
section 1 conspiracy so pernicious. For this reason, a member of a 
section 1 conspiracy has standing to challenge the restraint upon its 
freedom to compete, even though, in the long run, it may enjoy the 
benefits of the cartel. 
... The antitrust laws ensure the right to compete. That is what 
Gold Fields [the target] wishes to do, and that is what it will not be 
able to do if the threatened takeover succeeds.354 
The target's loss of independence is also the indispensable 
means by which the violation occurs. Thus, the determination that 
the target sustains antitrust injury also finds support in the Supreme 
Court's Mccready decision,355 which upheld antitrust injury where 
the plaintiff's injury was a necessary step that was "inextricably in-
tertwined" with the violation.356 As the Solicitor General argued 
recently to the Supreme Court, the target's loss of independence is 
"integral to the violation," which otherwise would have no anticom-
petitive effect.357 It is precisely the loss of the target as a competi-
tive decisionmaker that injures competition and reduces output. 
Under these circumstances, the target's incentive to retain its inde-
pendence and economic freedom fully accords with antitrust goals. 
353. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dis· 
missed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989). 
354. 871 F.2d at 258-59 (citations omitted). But see Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol Medical Prods., 
Inc., 976 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1992) (declining to follow Gold Fields rule because Fifth Circuit 
"narrowly interpret[s]" antitrust injury), cert. dismissed on stipulation, 114 S. Ct. 491 (1993). 
355. Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982), cited with approval in Associated 
Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983} and 
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 (1986). 
356. 457 U.S. at 484. In Mccready, the plaintiff's injury as a consumer of boycotted 
psychological services was a necessary step by M.D. psychiatrists in effectuating a boycott 
against the targeted psychologists. The dissenting Justices and some commentators disagree 
with the decision in part because the more directly injured psychologists might appear to be 
better enforcers. Mccready, 451 U.S. at 487 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 2 AREEDA & 
HoVENKAMP, supra note 67, 'l[ 334.1; PAGE, supra note 49, at 1499-1511. But in a takeover 
case, destruction of the independence of the target firm is the overarching goal and direct 
object of the merger, and clearly there is no more capable enforcer. 
357. Brief for the United States, supra note 315, at 7 n.6. 
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The loss-of-independence rationale is not weakened by the fact 
that the target would also lose its independence if the merger raised 
no risks to competition - if, for example, as one judge suggested in 
Gold Fields, the target had only a two percent market share.358 To 
object to standing on these grounds, however, is to equate standing 
with the presence of an antitrust violation. The correct analysis is 
to assume the presence of an antitrust violation and then ask if the 
plaintiff has standing to challenge it.359 Thus, standing does not de-
pend on whether the plaintiff is likely to win the case but on 
whether, assuming the transaction violates the law, the plaintiff's 
resulting injury is an anticompetitive effect of the violation. Quite 
clearly, the loss of independence from an unlawful merger is an an-
ticompetitive effect of the violation, as well as its essential mecha-
nism. It deprives the target of the power to determine its price, 
output, and other competitive terms in a concentrated market 
where independent determination is critical to competition. 
Indeed, the target's injury from loss of independence bears the 
same relation to the underlying antitrust wrong as does the victim's 
lost profit in a predation case. In a predation case - as in a target 
merger case - the challenged conduct may adversely impact the 
plaintiff whether or not it is unlawful. Thus, in the recent Brook 
Group case,360 the plaintiff~competitor claimed predatory injury 
from below-cost pricing. In rejecting the plaintiff's suit due to its 
failure to prove that the defendant had recouped its own losses 
through subsequent high prices, the Supreme Court did not ques-
tion the plaintiff's standing. Yet clearly the plaintiff's losses would 
have been the same whether or not the defendant had recouped its 
predatory investment. Similarly, in Professional Real Estate,361 the 
Supreme Court did not question the plaintiff's standing to chal-
lenge predatory litigation although the plaintiff's injury would have 
been precisely the same whether or not the alleged predatory litiga-
tion was objectively baseless and brought with malicious purpose, 
A plaintiff alleging predation may bring a weak case but does 
not for that reason lack antitrust standing. That is to say, the plain-
tiff's antitrust injury does not depend on whether the challenged 
conduct - below-cost pricing or vexatious litigation - would hurt 
358. Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 264 (Altimari, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
359. 2 AREEDA & HoVENKAMP, supra note 67, § 360f. If in fact the plaintiff's suit lacks 
legal basis, summary dismissal procedures are available. 
360. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993). 
361. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 
1920 (1993). 
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the plaintiff if and only if the conduct is unlawful but on whether, 
assuming the conduct is unlawful, the plaintiff sustained an injury 
the merger statute aims to prevent. Nothing is changed in this anal-
ysis if we substitute the target's loss of independence for the preda-
tory victim's lost profit. In both cases the plaintiff's injury -
whether lost profits from predation or loss of independence from an 
unlawful merger - is a consequence the antitrust laws strive to 
prevent.362 
Finally, recognition of loss of independence as a measure of an-
titrust injury validates a key congressional goal in enacting the 
merger law and reconciles an apparent divergence between con-
gressional and judicial policy. In adopting the Celler-Kefauver 
Act,363 Congress sought to preserve the independence of business 
firms threatened by what Congress perceived to be a "rising tide" 
of concentration.364 Nevertheless, the Act did not change the statu-
tory test, which was phrased in terms of utmost generality.365 The 
courts, in construing the broad statutory language have developed 
legal tests that exclude the nonefficiency factors that motivated 
Congress.366 The two developments appear at odds. The more ex-
pansive congressional purpose, however, can be reconciled with the 
narrower judicial test by recognizing the authority of the courts to 
define the substantive legal standard but at the same time giving 
standing to the class of litigants Congress wished to protect, which 
surely would have included takeover targets threatened with loss of 
independence. 
The problem of managerial conflict of interests remains, of 
course. The target's managers may be motivated to sue not for any 
of the reasons previously articulated but simply to keep their jobs. 
The problem of manager conflict, however, is not confined to the 
362. The standing issue is different in a consumer case, where the alleged collusive agree-
ment will injure the plaintiff consumer only if it is unlawful. That difference, however, simply 
reflects the differing nature of the antitrust violation in consumer and competitor cases. In 
consumer cases, the effects on the victim and on competition are always the same, while in 
competitor cases the effects on the victim and on competition may either differ or be the 
same, causing a more complex characterization problem, but this problem does not defeat 
the plaintiff's standing to sue. 
363. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch.1184, 64 Stat.1125 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 
21 (1994)). 
364. Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 
74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 228-38, 249-55 (1969); see also Bradley, supra note 98, at 40-44. 
365. Clayton Act, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 {1994) (stating the test as being "substantially ••• 
[to] lessen competition, or ... tend to create a monopoly"). 
366. Compare Bok, supra note 364, at 249-55 (Congressional goals included preservation 
of small locally owned firms from anticompetitive acquisition by larger rivals.) with 4 
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 53, Ill 904 (legal standard). 
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loss-of-independence rationale but infects all target merger litiga-
tion. The answer is not to bar the target from vindicating its anti-
trust rights but rather to adopt conflict-resolving procedures, as 
discussed in the next section. 
C. Controlling Managerial Incentives 
The target's managers' perverse incentives are the flaw most 
often condemned in merger suits by takeover targets. The critics 
insist that the managers want to retain their jobs, not benefit the 
target firm. Thus, the incentives of the managers seeking to enjoin 
the merger bear no consistent relationship with the public interest 
in competition; indeed, the incentives of the target's managers may 
be incompatible with both the target's welfare and the public 
interest. 
Unquestionably, a takeover creates a managerial conflict of in-
terest,367 but it does not follow that courts should bar merger suits 
by target firms. If in fact the target is threatened with antitrust in-
jury, the motives of its managers cause no legal disability to the 
firm, the real party in interest. As mentioned earlier, the Second 
Circuit recognized this point in the recent Gold Fields decision, 
where it rejected the notion that a target firm could lose its right to 
sue because its managers might have improper motives.368 Indeed, 
the antitrust injury principle would exceed all bounds if the target 
lost its capacity to sue because the motives of its human agents were 
flawed. Thus, at bottom the problem of managerial litigation abuse 
presents not an issue of standing but of judicial control of public 
interest litigation. Using their broad equitable powers, courts have 
ample authority to address this issue. 
The incentive compatibility problem of takeover suits arises 
from the risk of strategic litigation to upset the delicate timing of a 
merger, collusive settlements that defeat antitrust goals even when 
the merger claim has merit, and the lesser problem of wrong out-
comes caused by the need for speedy decisions. Although these 
problems are inherent in merger litigation, they raise an acute prob-
lem in the takeover field, where the granting of a preliminary in-
junction usually suffices to terminate the bid. Existing equity 
controls, augmented by improved procedures, however, can effec-
367. See generally James F. Cotter & Marc Zenner, How Managerial Wealth Affects the 
Tender Offer Process, 35 J. FIN. EcoN. 63 (1994) (describing conflict between wealth effects 
on managers and on shareholders). 
368. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 257-58 (2d Cir.), cert. 
dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989). 
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tively limit opportunistic and abusive litigation conduct by 
managers.369 
1. Existing Judicial Controls 
Available procedures to control managerial behavior in take-
over suits include: (1) expedited hearings that significantly reduce 
delay costs; (2) "curative relief" proposals by which merger defend-
ants agree to divest themselves of specified assets creating competi-
tive risks, thereby making the balance of the acquisition legitimate; 
(3) amicus participation by federal and state enforcement agencies, 
which the court may invite on its own motion; ( 4) possible Rule 11 
sanctions against the target's attorneys, including inside counsel, for 
ill-founded or improperly prosecuted suits;310 and (5) judicial 
weighing of the equities by which the preliminary injunction court 
may directly consider factors bearing on possible litigation abuse by 
managers. 
2. Improved Procedures 
Additional procedures can powerfully augment existing equity 
controls. First, the target may place control of the litigation in the 
hands of disinterested outside directors, advised by independent 
counsel. Second, the target may disconnect the managers' contin-
ued tenure in office from the target's success in the merger litiga-
tion, through a procedure of conditional resignation. Third, the 
court may appoint an equity trustee to hold the target's shares dur-
ing the pendency of the merger litigation. These procedures seek to 
harness the high litigation capability of the target firm, while con-
taining the agency risk inherent in control of the litigation by man-
agers with theµ- jobs at stake. 
The proposed additional procedures either directly limit the au-
thority of the managers to control the merger litigation or reduce 
managerial conflicts of interest by separating the managers' contin-
ued tenure in office from the outcome of the merger suit. Effective 
containment of the risk of manager litigation abuse, however, does 
not imply that the procedures should remove all possibility of man-
369. In addressing these issues, it is vital to recognize that private merger enforcement 
involves an interactive relationship among the equity court, the target, and the target's man-
agers in which multiple moves are possible. As a result, courts are not limited to a single, all-
or-nothing response to the filing of a takeover merger suit but instead can apply antitrust 
procedures and equity controls incrementally and responsively. 
370. Rule 11 sanctions against the target itself would not be effective in preventing ill-
founded target litigation because the bidder who acquires the target's assets would ultimately 
pay the sanctions. For the same reason, litigation bonds are ineffective against target firms. 
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agerial gain from blocking a merger. Self-interest is a powerful and 
unavoidable motivation in litigation, as in other fields of human en-
deavor. Thus, the goal of the proposed procedures is not to strip 
the managers of all personal gain from preventing the merger but to 
focus their self-interest on cases where serious antitrust harm is 
threatened. Accordingly, the proposed procedures do not remove 
the prospect that the managers will benefit from stopping the 
merger but aim to prevent them from benefitting through litigation 
tactics that defeat antitrust goals. By this means, the zeal of private 
ambition can effectively serve the public interest in maintaining 
competitive markets. 
The outlined procedures depend on the initiative of the target 
firm, which must in each case propose the procedure to the equity 
court. The target would be motivated to commit itself voluntarily 
to such a procedure by the expectation that it would help to con-
vince the court that a preliminary injunction would serve the public 
interest. That would be an important gain for the plaintiff in view 
of the frequent judicial skepticism concerning target merger suits. 
a. Independent Directors. The target can directly limit possi-
ble litigation abuse on the part of its managers by placing control of 
the litigation in the hands of disinterested outside directors, who 
would retain outside counsel to advise them in their decisions. · Of 
course, the independent directors would themselves be likely to 
lose their positions in the event of takeover, but the degree of con-
flict is much less because outside directors typically have other posi-
tions; indeed, corporate law specifically recognizes the greater 
independence of the outside director in merger transactions.371 A 
requirement that the directors consult outside counsel provides 
greater assurance that they will receive unbiased legal advice. 
The litigation control of the independent directors might be lim-
ited to major litigation decisions, or it might encompass full control 
of the litigation by the independent directors. The broader delega-
tion, however, appears preferable. If the independent directors' au-
thority is limited to major litigation decisions, such as the filing of 
suit, settlement, and compromise, the directors must continue to 
371. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. 637 A.2d 34, 44 
(Del. 1994) (emphasizing the importance of outside directors in protecting against manage-
ment partiality in merger transactions); see also James A. Brickley et al., Outside Directors 
and the Adoption of Poison Pills, 35 J. FIN. EcoN. 371 (1994) (describing positive stock mar-
ket reaction to poison pill adoption when target's board controlled by outside directors, sup-
porting hypothesis that outside directors act in shareholder interest); Jennifer J. Johnson & 
Mary Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 
315, 379.84 (1987). 
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rely on the incuinbent managers for day-to-day management of the 
litigation. The incumbent managers, however, remain subject to 
the conflict of interest that motivated the independent director pro-
cedure. The more effective means for the target to achieve mana-
gerial neutrality is to place the litigation totally in the hands of the 
outside directors and their legal advisors. Because part-time direc-
tors lack the time to manage an ongoing litigation, the directors 
would probably need to appoint a litigation manager or "special 
counsel" with full authority to conduct the antitrust suit, subject to 
supervision by the outside directors. 
The disinterested-director procedure reduces risks of strategic 
litigation and at the same time preserves managerial incentive to 
block an anticompetitive merger. Control of the litigation is put in 
the hands of independent directors, but success in the merger suit is 
likely to assure the managers' continued tenure. Preservation of 
the managerial incentive to oppose merger is desirable because the 
independent-director procedure, like other equity controls and 
mechanisms, requires an initial managerial decision in order to in-
voke it. If the managers did not stand to benefit from blocking the 
merger, they might simply accommodate the takeover, rather than 
risk antagonizing the bidder without hope of gain.372 The 
independent-director procedure effectively meets these dual needs 
by utilizing the managers' motivation to keep their positions while 
placing control of the litigation in independent agents who, to some 
significant degree, can channel the force of managerial zeal toward 
pro-competitive enforcement goals.373 
Requiring the directors to disclose the terms of any settlement 
agreement to the court and to the public following the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction could further strengthen the independent-
director procedure. Disclosure of settlement tends to discourage 
collusive or strategic settlements in which competition benefits are 
372. This is not to reject the possibility that the managers might act selflessly, opposing a 
merger that injured the target even if they obtained no personal benefit. Their efforts will 
clearly be strongest, however, when personal gain is joined with fiduciary obligation; the 
most effective procedures will combine both motivations. 
373. The effectiveness of the disinterested-director procedure turns critically on the inde-
pendence of the outside directors in making decisions free from managerial influence. A 
court, in accepting such a procedure as adequate to assure prosecution of the merger suit in 
the public interest, must be confident of the independence and uncorrupted judgment of such 
directors. Clearly their stature and prior experience are relevant factors in making such an 
assessment. In addition, the court would have to be convinced that the board of directors 
had effectively delegated litigation control to the independent directors. The court might 
appropriately ask the target to stipulate that it would report promptly to the court any 
change in the delegation, subject to the sanction of immediate dissolution of the preliminary 
injunction for failure to report or any impairment of the independent directors' authority. 
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surrendered for private gain. Although the court has no power to 
require approval of settlement agreements in non-class action 
suits,314 it has inherent authority to impose reasonable conditions 
on the issuance of a preliminary injunction to assure that the injunc-
tion promotes the public interest.375 A settlement disclosure condi-
tion is a reasonable and limited means to inhibit collusive 
settlements that frustrate the public interest goal of private merger 
enforcement. Alternatively, in exercising its discretion to issue an 
injunction, the court may take into account a voluntary undertaking 
by the directors to make such disclosure as a factor bearing on the 
public benefit from an injunction. A settlement disclosure provi-
sion is likely to constrain the conduct of outside directors, for whom 
future reputation effects would normally loom larger than any im-
mediate benefits from allowing the merger.376 
b. Conditional Resignations. An alternative approach to lim-
iting possible litigation abuse by the target's managers would be to 
leave the managers in full control of the litigation but to separate 
the success of the merger suit from the managers' retention of their 
positions. A mechanism to achieve this objective would be corpo-
rate adoption, with managerial assent, of a procedure under which 
the managers and inside directors would make binding and irrevo-
cable commitments to resign in the event a merger is enjoined or 
abandoned after a suit is filed. 
Following defeat of a merger bid, the disinterested directors, 
acting on the advice of an: outside management consulting firm hav-
ing no prior relation with the target, would determine whether the 
target's officers were then the best persons available to continue as 
managers. The outside directors would be obligated to rehire the 
old managers only if so advised. The outside directors might of 
course rehire the old managers, or some of them, even if they were 
not the best persons available because of the advantage of manage-
ment continuity, but the letter-of-resignation procedure would dis-
connect assured continuity in office from defeat of the hostile bid. 
374. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(e) (authorizing judicial approval only for class action 
settlements). 
375. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944); supra text accompanying notes 
281-84; supra note 288. 
376. By contrast, a settlement disclosure requirement would probably not be effective for 
full-time managers because of the many ways in which a successful bidder could reward the 
target's managers after they become employees of the bidder-controlled firm. 
The subject of settlement disclosure is discussed further in connection with competitor 
suits, where the procedure is generally more effective. See supra text accompanying notes 
281-89. 
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To that extent, the letter-of-resignation procedure reduces the man-
agers' incentive to resist takeover in order to retain their offices; 
this is especially true in the case of underperf orming managers. 
The conditional resignation procedure thus mimics a takeover in its 
effect on managerial tenure because an outside management con-
sultant is likely to replace weak managers with more qualified 
replacements. 377 
The problem with the conditional-resignation approach comes 
from the risk that after the merger bid is defeated, either the direc-
tors or the managers might renege. The inside directors might at-
tempt to repudiate the resignation procedure, retaining the old 
managers. Alternatively, the managers might refuse to honor their 
resignations, threatening the target with costly and disruptive litiga-
tion. Thus, as in the disinterested director procedure, a preliminary 
injunction court must have confidence that the procedure will be 
carried out before accepting it as adequate to protect the public 
interest. One means to increase judicial confidence would be for 
the inside directors and managers to agree to substantial bonds sub-
ject to forfeiture in the event they reneged. Thus, the inside direc-
tors would forfeit their bonds if they sought to withdraw control of 
the resignation process from the outside directors; the managers 
would forfeit their bonds if they failed to carry out their agreements 
to resign. In addition, the managers could be asked to agree to an 
attorney's-fees provision requiring them to pay the target's attor-
ney's fees if the target prevailed in any suit by the managers chal-
lenging the resignation procedure. This mechanism will work only 
if the outside directors are resolute in enforcing any conditional res-
ignations and bonds or penalties to which the parties have agreed. 
c. Equity Trustee. The most comprehensive approach to the 
problem of litigation abuse by managers would be the appointment 
of an equity trustee. Following the precedent of a recent Ninth Cir-
cuit decision,378 the court might appoint a trustee in equity to hold 
the target's shares and to manage the target during the pendency of 
the litigation.379 The trustee device serves both to limit managerial 
control of the merger suit and to disconnect the managers' contin-
ued tenure from the litigation outcome. Under such a procedure, 
377. The availability of this procedure also gives independent directors a viable strategy 
by which to oppose an unlawful takeover without assuring continuity of an underperfonning 
management team. 
378. See United States v. BNS Inc., 858 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1988). 
379. See United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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the trustee would have full control of the litigation but need not 
intervene in other managerial decisions that do not affect the 
merger litigation. At the conclusion of. the suit, the trustee would 
either transfer the target's shares to the bidder if the bidder prevails 
or sell the shares to a less anticompetitive buyer if the target 
prevails.380 
The Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. BNS Inc. 381 upheld 
the appointment of an equity trustee to manage the takeover target 
during merger litigation brought by the United States. Admittedly, 
the circumstances in BNS differed from those in a private merger 
suit because the appointment of the trustee was aimed not at con-
trolling litigation abuse by the target's managers but at protecting 
the target's trade secrets from the bidder during pendency of the 
government suit.382 Nevertheless, the rationale of BNS applies 
equally to a private merger suit because protection of the target 
from managerial litigation abuse is as vital to the target's welfare as 
protection of its trade secrets. In both instances, appointment of an 
equity trustee stems from the court's broad equitable power to "use 
novel and flexible methods to mold its decree to fit the necessities 
of a specific case and effectuate the intent of Congress. "383 
A possible objection to the use of the trusteeship device arises 
from the anomalous position in which it places the trustee. As the 
legal holder of the target's shares, the trustee must both protect the 
bidder's equitable interest in the target and manage litigation that 
may reduce the value of that interest. To resolve this anomaly, the 
court should instruct the trustee to manage the litigation so as to 
maximize the target's "stand alone" value - the value of the target 
as a separate entity apart from the bidder. This instruction is justi-
fied because it preserves the status quo pending the court's ruling 
380. The same result often is achieved by a hold-separate order, which allows the merger 
to go forward with the acquired assets held separately until the antitrust issues are resolved, 
thereby allowing the bidder to acquire the target while preserving the ability to achieve effec-
tive relief. See supra text accompanying note 127. A hold-separate order, however, is not 
feasible in takeover litigation because the bidder gains full control of the target and is then 
free to order the target's managers to dismiss the suit. In addition, the bidder gains access to 
the target's trade secrets, threatening the target's competitive viability if the merger later is 
held unlawful. Use of an equity trustee overcomes these difficulties. 
381. 858 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1988). 
382. The target intervened in the consent proceeding to protect its trade secrets, and the 
appointment of the trustee effectuated that purpose. See 858 F.2d at 465-66. 
383. 858 F.2d at 466. See generally 1 ABA ANlITRUST SEcnoN, supra note 124, at 365-
69; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 124, §§ 2947-48 (discussing general authority and discretion of 
courts in granting preliminary injunctive relief); Leubsdorf, supra note 124, at 549 (noting the 
increasing judicial concern with impact of preliminary injunctive relief on society and the 
public interest). 
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on the merits. At the same time, appointment of an equity trustee 
benefits the bidder by providing a less inhibiting alternative than a 
preliminary injunction because it allows the bidder to purchase the 
target's shares, thereby avoiding delay risks. Thus, the equity 
trustee achieves the purpose of a hold-separate order without its 
drawbacks. 
Nevertheless, because the procedure places the trustee in such 
an unusual position with respect to the beneficiary, some courts 
may be reluctant to appoint an equity trustee without the consent 
of both target and bidder. That consent, however, might well be 
given. The target would be likely to consent if it thought that in the 
absence of the equity trustee, the court would deny the preliminary 
injunction. The bidder would be likely to consent if it thought that 
once the target had proposed an equity trustee, the bidder's refusal 
to join in the arrangement might lead the court to grant the injunc-
tion.384 For these reasons, both parties might well agree to the 
trustee's appointment, especially if the preliminary injunction court 
suggests that it might react adversely to a failure to agree. Used in 
this manner, the trusteeship device facilitates the sale of the target's 
shares, removes control of the litigation from the managers, and 
disconnects success in the litigation from the managers' continuance 
in office.385 
The equity trustee approach is limited because it may leave the 
managers with insufficient incentive to oppose the merger. If the 
trustee succeeds in blocking the merger, the trustee must then sell 
the target's shares to the highest eligible bidder. Thus, in all likeli-
hood, the target will come under the control of an outside owner, 
placing the continued tenure of the managers at risk. On the other 
hand, if the bidder prevails, the managers, having actively resisted 
384. In consenting to an equity trustee, the bidder might reason as follows: by requesting 
appointment of a trustee, the target has signaled its good faith to the court because even if 
the target prevails, its shares will be sold to an unknown buyer that is free to appoint new 
managers; thus, the court will understand that the target's managers have substantially sev-
ered their own welfare from the litigation outcome. In addition, the target has placed control 
of the litigation in an independent trustee, who will no doubt quickly dismiss the suit should 
it lack merit. 
The bidder reasons further: if under these conditions, I refuse to consent to the trustee 
procedure, the court may well conclude that the target's suit has solid basis. After all, if the 
target's suit is as weak as I claim, I should be able to convince the trustee to dismiss the case, 
and in the meantime, use of this procedure assures my ability to purchase the target's shares. 
If I refuse to consent to a trusteeship that imposes only a short delay cost on a lawful bidder, 
the court may assume the worst and grant the preliminary injunction. Thus, the bidder is 
likely to give its consent. 
385. The trustee is free to allow the managers to continue to manage the business includ-
ing the litigation but can intervene if litigation-induced motivations of the managers threaten 
the corporate interest. 
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the merger, are even more likely to be ousted.386 As a result, man-
agers may have little incentive to evoke the equity trustee proce-
dure, even when available, and thus it is unclear how frequently the 
target will use this procedure.387 Nevertheless, the availability of 
the procedure is beneficial because it so effectively resolves the 
problem of managerial confiict.388 
3. Effectiveness of Proposed Procedures 
Existing equity procedures, augmented by one or more of the 
suggested improved procedures, can effectively contain risks of 
managerial abuse in takeover litigation, including risks of strategic 
litigation, anticompetitive settlements, and the lesser risk of wrong 
outcomes. 
a. Strategic Litigation. Several existing procedures reduce the 
problem of strategic suits filed to block or delay a lawful merger. 
Expedited hearings can shorten preliminary injunction proceedings 
to a few weeks, reducing the ability to frustrate a merger through 
delay. Curative relief, proposed by the defendant, often enables 
the court to resolve the antitrust problem short of divestiture of the 
target. Moreover, the preliminary injunction court can directly dis-
courage strategic litigation by denying or dissolving the injunction if 
the court observes or suspects the suit is purely strategic.389 In ad-
386. See Cotter & Zenner, supra note 367, at 66 (discussing above-average manager turn-
over after takeover). 
387. Clearly, a court should draw no negative inference about the merits of a merger suit 
from the target's failure to propose an equity trustee. 
388. 1\vo other improved procedures are possible, but both have serious drawbacks. 
First, to resolve the issue of managerial conflict, the target's managers might agree to indem-
nify the target for attorney's fees and court costs if the suit lacks significant merit. Enforce-
ment of such an undertaking presents difficulties. If the bidder prevails, it can release the 
target's managers from their agreement after it gains control of the target. If the bid is with-
drawn, the target remains under the control of its old managers from whom the obligation is 
owed. Even if the managers nominally pay, indirect reimbursement remains possible when 
the managers continue to work for the corporation they head. Moreover, enforcement of the 
undertaking requires a separate proceeding to determine whether the merger suit was 
meritorious. 
Second, the target may issue "golden parachutes" to its managers payable in the event of 
a takeover in order to compensate them for losing their positions - and to neutralize their 
incentive to resist a takeover. Golden parachutes, however, may tilt the balance too heavily 
in favor of a merger, inducing managers to avoid takeover challenges of unlawful mergers 
injurious to the target and the public. Moreover, although golden parachutes may align the 
managers' interests with those of selling shareholders, it separates the managerial interest 
from nonselling shareholders and other corporate constituencies. See generally John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. 
REv. 1, 106-07 (1986) (discussing golden parachutes); Rosenzweig, supra note 337, at 148-50 
(proposing similar procedures). 
389. Strategic behavior sometimes benefits the target. For example, the target may bring 
an antitrust suit to allow time for additional bids to raise the tender offer price. But strategic 
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dition, powerful supplemental procedures are available to contain 
strategic abuse by managers. The most feasible of these is probably 
the independent-director device, under which the target would 
place full control of the litigation in the hands of its disinterested 
outside directors. Alternatively, conditional resignation of the 
managers or appointment of an equity trustee both disconnect man-
agerial tenure from litigation success, thereby removing the manag-
ers' incentive to pursue strategic suits. 
b. Colllisive Settlements. The independent-director and the 
equity-trustee procedures reduce the problem of collusive settle-
ments under which anticompetitive mergers may be compromised 
without benefit to the target or the public. Independent directors 
with external positions are far less susceptible to collusive induce-
ment than managers whose jobs are threatened. An equity trustee 
presents an even smaller risk of collusive settlement because the 
trustee has no continuing stake in the target. In addition, condi-
tioning a preliminary injunction on disclosure of settlement terms 
also discourages collusive settlements. 
Even if these procedures are not available, target litigation re-
mains beneficial in deterring anticompetitive mergers. The bidder 
can never be certain the target will settle short of effective relief, 
and in any event, the bidder must bear settlement costs that in-
crease with the strength of the antitrust cases. Moreover, settle-
ment does not bar government suit, which becomes more probable 
if the target develops strong evidence of anticompetitive effects. 
Thus, target suits retain significant deterrence value despite residual 
risks of settlements that fail to achieve effective relief. 
c. Wrong Outcomes. The problem of wrong outcomes caused 
by compressed time schedules for preliminary injunction hearings 
appears exaggerated in view of the target's sophistication, litigation 
resources, and knowledge of the industry, which permit the target 
to retain a large team of knowledgeable lawyers able to accomplish 
within a few weeks what might ordinarily require months.390 The 
problem of time-induced wrong outcomes, of course, would be 
completely avoided under the equity-trustee device, which allows 
behavior benefiting the target presents no problem of managerial conflict - the focus of the 
takeover suit critique. Moreover, such behavior is not invariably inconsistent with antitrust 
goals to the extent that it makes anticompetitive bids more costly. In any event, existing 
equity procedures constrain strategic behavior by targets. 
390. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39, 302-10. 
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the merger to go forward and thus reduces the pressure for an im-
mediate decision. 
D. Gravity of Violation 
The powerful enforcement capabilities of takeover targets 
should be concentrated on merger violations that raise the most se-
rious risks to competition. Two mechanisms are available to 
achieve this result. First, enforcement should focus on horizontal 
mergers - the most anticompetitive type of merger. Horizontal 
merger enforcement forms the bedrock of merger policy because 
the successful prevention of mergers that directly create market 
power removes the need for other types of merger enforcement. In 
fact, the federal courts have recognized the primacy of horizontal 
merger enforcement both in their decisions and in explicit 
statements. 391 
In a leading and often cited Second Circuit decision, Judge 
Friendly declined to issue an.injunction in a private nonhorizontal 
merger, noting that the challenged merger "differs totally from the 
horizontal merger illustrated by United States v. Philadelphia Na-
tional Bank. "392 In reaching that decision, Judge Friendly explicitly 
recognized the possible strategic use of antitrust litigation and the 
need for caution in issuing preliminary injunctions that might frus-
trate takeovers.393 Since that time, antitrust lawyers have assumed 
that preliminary injunctions in private cases generally are not avail-
able against nonhorizontal mergers.394 Consistent with this appreci-
ation, my fourteen-year review of private merger cases revealed 
only one instance in which a nonhorizontal merger was enjoined.395 
Equity procedures and internal corporate controls provide a 
second means by which courts can focus the enforcement efforts of 
takeover targets on the most serious violations. As discussed 
above, courts can apply direct judicial controls and separating 
mechanisms to channel the keen enforcement capability of take-
391. See Joseph F. Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, f!Jl 
YALE LJ. 1, 42 (1977). 
392. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.) (involving large 
horizontal merger) (citing United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974). 
393. Cargil~ 498 F2d at 854; see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Edelman, 666 F. Supp. 
799, 806 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (stating that strategic litigation makes denial of preliminary injunc-
tion "particularly compelling"). 
394. See generally ABA MONOGRAPH No. 16, supra note 1, at 32-36. 
395. See McCaw Personal Communications, Inc. v. Pacific Telesis Group, 645 F. Supp. 
1166 (N.D. Cal. 1986). 
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over targets to challenge horizontal mergers that raise the gravest 
antitrust concerns. In addition, when balancing the equities, the 
preliminary injunction court must directly consider gravity of the 
violation.396 Assessment of this factor is particularly feasible for 
horizontal mergers because precisely stated Justice Department 
guidelines permit a threshold determination of potentially serious 
antitrust violations.397 By these means, the highly effective but un-
ruly enforcement efforts of takeover targets can be focused on hori-
zontal mergers that involve the most serious anticompetitive risks. 
CONCLUSION 
Private antitrust enforcement raises difficult issues of accommo-
dating public enforcement goals and the self-interested agendas of 
private enforcers. Effective private merger enforcement is 
threatened because the courts have focused on a single input into 
the private enforcement system - the incentive incompatibility of 
private enforcers. The isolated focus on that factor alone has 
caused the present crisis in private merger enforcement in which 
the courts frequently hold that the only two viable enforcers -
competitors and takeover targets - lack standing to sue. To re-
store effective enforcement, the courts must view private merger 
enforcement as a coherent system with a desired output - a mech-
anism by which legislative goals are to be achieved through percep-
tive judicial procedures. 
The legislative goals of dual enforcement, deterrence of an-
ticompetitive mergers, and vindication of core merger enforcement 
objectives require that the most capable merger enforcers be able 
to challenge the most anticompetitive mergers with the least incen-
tive incompatibility between their own private agendas and public 
antitrust goals. Effective private merger enforcement requires that 
courts face the fact that the only capable private enforcers, take-
over targets and competitors, have flawed incentives. The courts, 
however, must view the issue realistically, recognizing that perfect 
purity of incentives by self-interested enforcers is an impossible and 
self-defeating illusion; that effective enforcement can be achieved 
only through a balancing of the factors necessary for enforcement 
396. Cf. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. HI-Shear Indus., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating that preliminary injunction in merger case warranted where viola-
tion "fairly clear" and citing Cargill, 498 F.2d at 870); Chemetron Corp. v. Crane Co., 1977-2 
Trade Cas. (CCH) 'JI 61,717, at 72,932 (N.D. III. 1977) (granting injunction in target merger 
where violation "very clear"). 
397. Merger Guidelines, supra note 97. 
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viability; and that the courts themselves must talce an active role in 
assuring that private suits promote the public interest, using their 
equity powers to control and modify the litigation conduct and in-
centives of private enforcers. . 
By these means, the courts can reconcile the divergent forces of 
private self-interest and public enforcement goals, restoring the 
shattered unity of the concept of private attorney general and com-
bining the high idealism of public enforcement goals with the mo-
tive power of private economic incentive. Such reconciliation could 
provide a model for other areas of antitrust law and perhaps for 
public interest litigation generally. 
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APPENDIX 
REPORTED PRIVATE MERGER 
CASES 1977-1990 
State 
Competitor Target Customer Consumer Supplier Atty. Gen. Total: 
No. 
SmTS: 
1977-1981 8 13 3 1 0 0 25 
1982-1983 4 2 0 0 0 1 7 
1984-1986 9 4 1 0 0 1 14* 
1987-1990 10 4 0 1 0 s 20 




1977-1981 1 4 0 0 0 0 s 
1982-1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1984-1986 2 1 0 0 0 O** 3 
1987-1990 3 2 0 0 0 1*** 6 




1977-1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1982-1983 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
* Suit brought by dual status competitor and customer, thus the total number of 
cases brought was 14. 
** In addition, one consent decree was entered. 
*** In addition, three consent decrees were entered. 
